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ABSTRACT 
Aisha Mershani 
Palestinian Civil Resistance: A Case Study of the Popular Struggle Against the Wall from 2002-2013 
 
My dissertation explores the Israeli Apartheid Walls’ violence through the theoretical 
framework of Johan Galtung’s triangle of violence. By highlighting the violence triangle, I 
am able to interpret effective civil resistance strategies used in the popular struggle against 
the Wall. Drawing upon Galtung’s theory of violence and peace, I argue that all violence 
must be equally resisted to achieve positive peace. In Palestine, to achieve peace civil 
resistance must be employed against the violence triangle of the Wall, and the Israeli 
occupation. By combating the triangle of violence with civil resistance, the cyclical existence 
of violence can be transformed into a pathway of peace. 
Using the case study of the Apartheid Wall highlights the violence triangle in an 
extreme contemporary situation. I emphasize how civil resistance strategies were effectively 
used to combat the violence of the occupation. For my research, I applied qualitative research 
methods to obtain various types of data from 2002-2013. As a participant observer, I 
immersed myself in the popular struggle as a solidarity activist from 2003-2005. From 2006-
2013, I conducted in-depth interviews with various Palestinian communities affected by the 
Wall since its construction. During these ten years I photographed the violence of the Wall, 
and the resistance movement, as part of a visual ethnography.  
What this research revealed was grassroots resistance against the Wall was not 
successful in ending the occupation; this was largely due to Israel’s ability to increase 
structural and direct violence and repress the civil resistance movement. The resistance 
against the Wall was successful in combating Israel’s cultural violence, which was achieved 
by using unarmed methods, ultimately exposing Israel’s violence triangle to the numerous 
activists working in solidarity with the Palestinian people. The narrative was then shifted 
from "Palestinian as terrorist perpetrating the violence", to one of "Palestinian as victim of 
Israeli violence." My work highlights how Palestinian civil resistance has the ability to end 
the occupation, and achieve positive peace, when used against the violence triangle. 
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation, “Palestinian Civil Resistance: A Case Study of the Popular 
Struggle Against the Wall from 2002-2013,” uses Johan Galtung’s triangle of violence as 
a theoretical framework to analyze the Israeli Apartheid Wall’s violence and, more 
specifically, how the Palestinian civil resistance movement combated this violence. 
Examining the Apartheid Wall’s development in the West Bank from 2002 through 2013, 
I illustrate how it affected the indigenous Palestinian people through Israel’s various 
means of violence, and how the Palestinian people resisted their oppressive situation. 
I focus on the Wall because it exemplifies how Israel uses the politics of 
technology, by way of the triangle violence, to control Palestinian lands and resources, as 
well as the Palestinian people themselves. This feature of the Israeli occupation has 
served a dual purpose for Israel. The Wall unilaterally annexes Palestinian land, including 
the contentious city of Jerusalem, essentially dissolving the 1967 Armistice Green-Line. 
The Wall also separates Palestinian communities from each other, creating an open-air 
prison, thus limiting collective resistance. By utilizing Galtung’s theory of violence I am 
able to identify how Israel maintains control over the Palestinian people through direct, 
structural and cultural violence.  Identifying the violence triangle through the Apartheid 
Wall, informs activists to the degree in which the violence triangle represses the 
indigenous Palestinian people. This clarity with which Israel utilizes violence in turn 
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supports activists’ activities on the ground; they are able to use this knowledge to 
nonviolently resist the violence triangle in total, combating direct, structural and cultural 
violence. Both the knowledge of Israel’s violence, and the use of nonviolent techniques, 
in turn reframes the narrative from the "Palestinian as terrorist perpetrating the violence", 
to one of "Palestinian as victim of Israeli violence." The reframing of the narrative is 
essential for the nonviolent resistance movement to increase activist support for the 
Palestinian people in their goal of self-determination. 
Although human rights groups have published studies of the Wall’s violence, 
there is a gap in regards to long-term academic studies. Human rights organizations 
working in the West Bank, such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) and 
the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem publish annual reports on the Wall to 
share information about the effects of the occupation. This information is important to 
various stakeholders, but it has not been examined outside of this context. This study uses 
fieldwork and photography, gathering information from human rights reports and 
Palestinian informants, to investigate the long-term effects of the Wall project through 
the framework of Johan Galtung’s triangle of violence. By using Galtung’s typology of 
violence we can analyze how the Wall is detrimental for the Palestinian people, and how 
a resistance movement can respond to the varying layers of violence in an effective way. 
This research broadens our understanding of how Israeli violence impacts Palestinians’ 
existence, and more importantly, how they resist this form of colonial violence. 
Civil resistance in Palestine is not new. Palestinians have resisted colonial 
violence since before the state of Israel was established. The Palestinian people have 
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participated in two contemporary intifadas (uprisings).  Activists of the First Intifada, 
which took place in 1989, utilized unarmed techniques to convince the Israeli 
government to negotiate with the then-exiled Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).  
These resistance methods increased the movement’s power, and Israel was not willing to 
allow this to occur again. Although the 1993 Oslo Accord negotiations were framed as a 
success, they actually created a more repressive environment for the Palestinian people. 
These “peace” negotiations aimed at eliminating “negative peace,” or the absence of 
direct violence, but only from the Palestinian side, and they failed to address Israel’s 
direct and structural violence against the Palestinian population. As a result, the Oslo 
Accords exacerbated Israel’s structural violence; these “negotiations” proved ineffective. 
As a punishment for the First Intifada, Israel separated the Palestinian people into 
Bantustans1 and established numerous checkpoints to track Palestinian movement. Israel 
performed these actions (a new form of violence) to prevent another uprising. Palestinian 
activists resisted Israeli violence for the second time in 2000. Unlike the First, in this 
Second Intifada, activists used armed resistance methods, which enabled Israel in their 
ongoing attempt to justify to their own citizens, as well as the international community, 
the use of enhanced collective violence against the Palestinian people living inside the 
West Bank. As a result, Israel established the Apartheid Wall, which instigated a new 
iteration of Palestinian resistance: the popular struggle against the Wall. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Bantustans originated in South Africa as territories, or black homelands, in the 
Apartheid system. Various scholars have used this term in the case of Palestine, and 
scholar Leila Farsakh specifically discusses the analogies of South Africa and Palestine. 
She focuses on the separation of land territories allotted to Palestinian inhabitants inside 
the Occupied Territory of the West Bank, which restricts the possibilities of a viable 
Palestinian state. (2005: 230) 
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For some scholars, such as Norman (2013), the Second Intifada extends past 2002 
into 2006, including the time the Wall construction and the resistance against it began. 
However, I argue that the Second Intifada ended in 2002 and the popular struggle against 
the Wall is a distinct uprising in the succession of Palestinian struggles against the 
occupation. The struggle against the Wall is a separate movement, and activists have 
learned from each previous intifada. The movement against the Wall began as a struggle 
against the construction of the Apartheid Wall, which aimed to annex Palestinian land for 
the expansion of illegal Israel settlements. Local farmers began to resist the demolition of 
their agricultural lands and the uprooting of their trees to save their livelihood. As the 
Wall continued to travel south through the West Bank, entire villages saw it as the third 
Nakba (catastrophe) and joined in the struggle against it. Starting in 2002, when Wall 
construction began, Palestinians living along the Wall have referred to the resistance 
against it as the “Third Intifada.”  
Few scholars have examined the demonstrations against the Wall.  Some focus on 
the role of international activists, while others discuss the role of Palestinians, but none 
experienced the resistance as an activist-researcher. As I am a solidarity activist, my 
research does not reflect a Palestinian perspective. Because Palestinians’ perspectives are 
important for this work, I interviewed numerous Palestinians living in the West Bank and 
analyzed their narratives about the Wall’s violence and the resistance. It is vital for the 
issues I discuss here to reflect the realities on the ground, and the interviews helped 
achieve accuracy. I aimed to construct what Richard Jackson describes as, “in-depth, 
contextualized, face-to-face ethnographic research in which the subjects are allowed to 
speak for themselves or participate directly in the construction of the research process 
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itself” (2015: 27).  The testimonials in this dissertation are first-hand accounts of 
Palestinians living inside the West Bank who illustrate the Wall’s destruction. 
I investigated the realities on the ground in the West Bank, the violence of the 
Wall, and civil resistance strategies using theoretical frameworks within the fields of 
Palestine Studies, Peace Studies, and Resistance Studies. Palestine Studies scholars have 
analyzed Palestinian experiences through the approaches of law, human rights, 
economics, and history. Few scholars have explored the grassroots Palestinian uprising 
against the Wall with a Peace Studies lens. Most Peace Studies researchers take a neutral 
stance toward Palestine/Israel, leaving unexamined the power difference between the two 
groups. According to Richard Jackson:   
This is certainly the case in terms of the Israel-Palestine conflict, a focus 
of a great many peace studies scholars who nonetheless continue to 
attempt forms of reconciliation and conflict resolution based on the 
implicit assumption that Palestinians and Israelis represent two equal 
parties in a conflict – rather than a situation of colonial dispossession and 
oppression by one powerful party against a much weaker party who 
employ a range of resistance strategies. (2015: 33) 
 
To address this problem, I examine the power dynamic that manifested through the 
occupier’s use of violence and the resistance strategies the occupied used. This case can 
be usefully examined using Galtung’s theory of violence. According to Richard Jackson, 
“Galtung’s original formulations of the linked concepts of structural and cultural violence 
have received little serious empirical or theoretical attention in the intervening years, and 
are rarely used as an explicit analytical framework within peace research” (2015: 32). 
Galtung’s theory of violence is unique in that it supports a multi-dimension approach to 
violence, and not merely a singularly perceptive of violence. I thus use Galtung’s theory 
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to unpack the layers of violence Israel has imposed on Palestinian people between 2002 
and 2013 to envision how violence might transform to peace.  
All scholars do not share the perception of Galtung’s theory of violence as an 
effective analytical tool for achieving peace, and this must be noted in regards to ongoing 
research. Kathleen Weigert highlights the disadvantages of using structural violence as a 
framework of understanding peace, “Structural violence seems, in effect, to reduce if not 
eliminate the notion of human agency. Worse yet, the concept may engender a fatalism 
which precludes action” (2010: 132). Weigert asserts that structural violence has the 
tendency to restrict collective action due to the violence itself viewed as beyond the scope 
of resistance. I agree with Weigert that there is potential for impotence when facing 
violence at an extreme level. Because of this, violence needs to be isolated to a specific 
case to allow room for the oppressed to conceptualize effective resistance. The prospect 
of ending the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories could be debilitating for the 
occupied population in the face of extreme violence, but focusing on the Wall through the 
violence triangle expands the possibility for resistance.  
It isn’t merely the scope of structural violence that allows room to critique 
Galtung’s theory; C. A. J. Coady discusses the flaws of Galtung’s theory in regards to the 
focus of eliminating both direct and structural violence to achieve peace. He asserts that 
Galtung assumes that direct violence alone isn’t worth aspiring to abolish, ad thus is 
problematic for peace aspirations. 
 
This justification of the value of his definition is either muddled or 
mischievous (and just possibly both). If the suggestion is that peace 
cannot be a worthy social ideal or goal of action unless it is the total 
ideal, then the suggestion is surely absurd. A multiplicity of compatible 
but non-inclusive ideals seems as worthy of human pursuit as a single 
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comprehensive goal, and, furthermore, it seems a more honest way to 
characterise social realities (2008: 28). 
 
Coady’s concerns are valid; eliminating direct violence should be enough to constitute a 
successful campaign. With that said, negative peace, or the absence of direct violence, 
does not mean that the violence won’t return. By eliminating both direct and structural, as 
Galtung argues, the opportunities for direct violence to resume are reduced. In the case of 
Israeli violence, the elimination of direct violence does not mean peace will be achieved 
for Palestinians. The absence of direct violence will limit harm to the Palestinian 
population, but it will not result in a viable future. By eliminating structural violence as 
well the chances for direct violence are decreased, and is a more sustainable aim for a 
resistance movement. 
By examining how the violence triangle manifests in the context of contemporary 
Palestine, specifically in the case of the Wall, I analyze the effectiveness of civil 
resistance strategies used in the popular struggle. I conclude that before pursuing civil 
resistance strategies, it is essential to identify how the violence triangle is manifesting in 
order to combat the violence and achieve positive peace. This research investigates how 
the struggle against the Wall resisted the Israeli violence triangle and effectiveness of this 
particular social movement. 
 
Literature Review  
Civilian-based, unarmed resistance is only effective against violence when it 
addresses all forms of violence. Building on Galtung’s theory of violence and peace, I 
argue that direct, structural and cultural violence must be equally resisted to achieve 
positive peace. Galtung defines peace as positive and negative: negative peace is the 
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absence of direct violence, and positive peace is the absence of direct and structural 
violence (1969: 168). However, in my view, when direct and structural violence are 
absent I define it as neutral peace. The additional absence of cultural violence is 
necessary in order to establish true positive peace, which is the absence of the entire 
violence triangle. 
To achieve positive peace, resistance is necessary to eliminate violence. 
Analyzing the violence triangle can lead to the design of more effective civil resistance 
strategies. “Civil resistance theory” is largely understood as pertaining to “nonviolence.” 
However, this term is not widely used in the context of Palestine. In this section, I 
examine the violence triangle, as well as the various understandings of unarmed civil 
resistance, to give greater understanding to the violence triangle in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory known as the West Bank. I also discuss the Palestinian movement to 
combat the violence triangle of the Wall.  Palestinian resistance is largely based on 
nonviolent tactics to combat the violence triangle, but is locally referred to as “the 
popular struggle.” 
 
Triangle of Violence 
Understanding the triangle of violence is essential when focusing on Israel’s 
occupation of the Palestinian Territories. The violence triangle is the dominating force 
that upholds the occupation and oppresses the Palestinian people. Galtung published his 
initial theory on violence in the article, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research” (1969). As 
a pioneer in peace studies, he explored how violence is viewed in relation to peace. For 
Galtung, “What we intend is only that the terms 'peace' and 'violence' be linked to each 
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other such that 'peace' can be regarded as 'absence of violence'” (1969: 168). Just as there 
is not only one form of violence, neither is there a single definition of peace. Galtung 
defined various aspects of violence within a triangular model and in direct relation to 
both positive and negative peace.  
In the West Bank, the violence triangle limits Palestinians’ abilities to thrive. For 
Galtung, violence is “present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual 
somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations” (1969: 168). The 
potential versus the actual is of primary importance. If thriving is possible, the potential is 
greater than the actual, and if the potential cannot be achieved due to external powers, 
then violence is present. In this early article, Galtung focused on two forms of violence: 
direct violence and structural violence. He highlighted the differences between these; 
direct violence is “the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence 
as personal or direct,” and he defined “violence where there is no such actor as structural 
or indirect” (1969: 170). An actor or an army commits direct violence. Although this 
definition is how the concept of “violence” is widely understood, in Galtung’s 
formulation, this is only one aspect of violence. As direct violence is visible, it is most 
often regarded as “violence.” Direct violence refers to bodily harm, such as hitting, 
punching, maiming, and killing. Structural violence is harder to identify, as it is invisible 
and may therefore be viewed as “normal.” Structural violence is ingrained into societal 
structures. Essentially, it is inequality: unequal power within the system, which benefits 
one social group over another. Structural violence is exploitative, making the overall life 
chances of different groups unequal. It “increases the distance between the potential and 
the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance” (Galtung, 1969: 168). In 
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“Violence, Peace and Peace Research,” Galtung refers to direct and structural violence as 
personal and indirect violence. He interchanges the words “in two different ways, using 
the word-pairs personal structural and direct-indirect respectively (Galtung, 1969: 171). 
Direct and structural violence are visible and invisible, and they exist simultaneously. 
Direct violence enforces and maintains structural violence. 
In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, direct and structural violence are not the 
only forms of violence present; they are achieved through cultural violence. In his later 
work, Galtung extended his violence theory into a triangle formation, including cultural 
violence. He defined cultural violence as “any aspect of a culture that can be used to 
legitimize violence in its direct or structural form. Symbolic violence built into a culture 
does not kill or maim like direct violence or the violence built into the structure” 
(Galtung, 1990: 291). Palestinian cultural attributes, such as the concept of nationalism, 
typically shown through the use of the Palestinian flag, the celebrations during funerals 
when Palestinian martyrs die at the hands of Israeli violence, the Arabic language in 
itself, and religious teachings, are all deemed as negative in contrast to Israeli ideology. 
The Israeli state, through their pop culture and mainstream education, considers the 
Palestinian as lesser and aggressive. In other words, cultural violence is essentially racist 
ideology, in which the Other is inferior due to their identity. Cultural violence paints all 
of the Palestinian population as inherently violent, and subsequently as terrorists. Unlike 
direct and structural violence, cultural violence is not fatal, but it is used to legitimize 
these other forms of violence, “Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence 
look, even feel, right – or at least not wrong” (Galtung, 1990: 291). Israel uses cultural 
violence against the Palestinian people as a means to enforce more direct and structural 
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violence. As Galtung argues, “One way cultural violence works is by changing the moral 
color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or at least to yellow/acceptable” (Galtung, 
1990: 292). Direct violence is visible and easily acknowledged as violence, while cultural 
and structural violence are invisible and harder to recognize, making them extremely 
dangerous. 
 
 
 
Together, these three forms of violence create the violence triangle. They work 
together to maintain control and ultimately to oppress. To simplify these, Galtung 
explains that, “Direct violence is an event; structural violence is a process with ups and 
downs; cultural violence is an invariant, a 'permanence', remaining essentially the same 
for long periods” (1990: 294). In the West Bank, the triangle of violence is always 
present, physically oppressing, continuously reproducing inequality within the system to 
limit potential, and relying on hate to perform dominance over the Palestinian people.  
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In the West Bank, the triangle of violence upholds the occupation, which is driven 
by structural violence. Direct and cultural violence support structural violence, the 
essential component to Israel’s dominance. The triangle can be positioned at any angle; 
the bottom points of violence indicate that they are a byproduct of the top point. As 
Galtung notes, “Violence can start at any corner in the direct-structural-cultural violence 
triangle and is easily transmitted to the other corners” (1990: 302). Cultural and direct 
violence are at the base of the triangle, implying that they maintain structural violence at 
the pinnacle of the triangle. As Galtung notes, “When the triangle is stood on its 'direct' 
and 'structural violence' feet, the image invoked is cultural violence as the legitimizer of 
both” (1990: 294). All three forms of violence maintain the violence triangle; it can shift 
to highlight which form of violence is leading. The tip of the triangle is the identifier, the 
main aspect of violence under examination, and the other forms of violence maintain it 
with control and domination.  
Peace is the ultimate goal in regards to the occupation, yet peace is only 
obtainable through the absence of violence. Galtung distinguishes between different 
forms of violence to explore two aspects of peace. For Galtung, “Peace also has two 
sides: absence of personal violence, and absence of structural violence” (1969: 183). In 
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this regard, personal violence is synonymous with direct violence. He refers to these two 
sides as negative peace and positive peace:  
The reason for the use of the terms “negative” and “positive” is easily 
seen: the absence of personal violence does not lead to a positively defined 
condition, whereas the absence of structural violence is what we have 
referred to as social justice, which is a positively defined condition 
(egalitarian distribution of power and resources). (Galtung, 1969: 183) 
 
To obtain positive peace (social justice), eradicating negative peace is necessary. 
Galtung does not, however, discuss cultural violence in this context. Although Galtung 
defines violence in a three-point triangle, he explores peace only in a two-part model. 
 
 
This theoretical inconsistency presents problems for the case of Palestine’s future, 
where an absence of structural violence and a presence of cultural violence would fail to 
lead to positive peace. In this case, the absence of direct violence is negative peace, but 
the absence of structural violence does not necessarily negate all violence into positive 
peace, as Galtung suggests. If it is not resisted, latent cultural violence continues and may 
reinvigorate the violence triangle. I call the absence of structural violence neutral peace. 
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Neutral peace is neither positive nor negative, but stable. In a state of neutral peace, direct 
violence is absent and social justice is present to an extent, but cultural violence remains 
dormant and easily accessible. The “open bridges”2 years in the West Bank allowed more 
rights for Palestinian residents in the West Bank, yet these rights were quickly revoked 
when the “cultural violence” threat of Palestinians was revisited by Israeli politicians. 
Unless all three forms of violence are abolished, the violence triangle threat is ever-
present, and will re-emerge with time. To achieve what I see as true positive peace and 
long-lasting justice, cultural, direct, and structural violence must all be abolished. 
 
Nonviolence Triangle 
A state of positive peace would essentially be a nonviolent violence triangle, 
meaning direct, structural and cultural nonviolence In Israel/Palestine; a single, non-
bordered truly democratic state could allot equal rights to all people. Building on 
Galtung’s violence theory, Jorgen Johansen formulated a nonviolence theory for an ideal 
society, considering direct, structural and cultural nonviolence. Johansen defines direct 
nonviolence as “the full scale of pragmatic nonviolent methods and strategies” (2007: 
151). Another term for direct nonviolence is strategic nonviolent resistance. For 
Johansen, structural nonviolence “consists of those structures in our society that promote 
cooperation, reconciliation, openness, equality and peaceful actions in conflict situations” 
(2007: 151). Essentially, direct nonviolence, or nonviolent resistance, is found in a social 
structure built on social justice ideals where rights are realized. Johansen identifies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Open-Bridges years refer to the time period between 1967-1987, shortly after Israel 
began to occupy the West Bank. During this time Palestinians were able to move beyond 
the Green-Line with more ease. 1987 was the start of the First Intifada, when Israel 
became more strict with Palestinian travel. 
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cultural nonviolence as “those parts of our culture that transmit traditions of nonviolent 
behavior and which commemorate and honour nonviolent values and qualities” (2007: 
151). Although this is what positive peace can look like as an end result, the people must 
create the peace, as it cannot merely be given. The implementation of the violence 
triangle will limit positive peace. To achieve a nonviolent, direct-structural-cultural 
positive peace triangle ideal, resistance by the people is essential. 
 The Palestinian people have been resisting Israeli colonization since the state was 
established. Resistance is a set of actions taken by the oppressed to transform the status 
quo. For Jacques Semelin, “the term ‘resistance’ refers to acts through which a 
determination to refuse is expressed collectively” (1993: 27). Resistance can be armed or 
unarmed. Richard Jackson highlights the dangers of resistance, considering the “Twin 
temptations to either embrace violent revolutionary action or to reject the idea of 
‘resistance’ outright because of its connotations with violent activities” (2015: 21).  
Resistance broadly encompasses varying definitions along a spectrum. According to 
Chenowith and Stephan, “The term resistance implies that the campaigns of interest are 
noninstitutional and generally confrontational in nature. In other words, these groups are 
using tactics that are outside the conventional political process” (2011: 12). In their book, 
Why Civil Resistance Works, which highlights both armed and unarmed resistance 
campaigns over the past century, they find that “Between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent 
resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their 
violent counterparts” (Chenowith and Stephan, 2011: 7). Nonviolent campaigns 
achieving their intended goals was more probable, largely due to their tactics, which 
allowed for more participation (Chenowith and Stephan, 2011: 11). In Jorgen Johansen’s 
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view, unarmed campaigns are more effective than armed resistance because “Violence is 
blind. Most nonviolent means are much more specific” (2007: 144). Johansen argues that 
nonviolence targets issues but violence is indiscriminate, and although violence can 
impact humans, the political ideologies remain unchanged (2007: 144). There is also a 
greater chance that armed resistance techniques will provoke violent retaliation. This is 
not to say that violent reactions to unarmed resistance do not happen, but it most cases, 
retaliatory violence to unarmed resistance is less severe. 
 This dissertation examines primarily unarmed resistance from the Palestinian 
perspective. I employ Jacques Semelin’s definition of civil resistance, initially introduced 
in his book Unarmed Against Hitler as “civilian resistance” (1993). Semelin describes 
civilian resistance as, “civil society’s spontaneous process of struggle, by unarmed 
means, against the aggression of which it is victim” (1993: 27). For Semelin, civil society 
has the power to rise up against violence using unarmed means. Unarmed resistance is 
often defined as “nonviolence,” but, for Véronique Dudouet: 
This definition does not imply, however, that all actions without violence 
have to be nonviolent. Nonviolence might be described as a direct 
substitute for violent behaviour: it implies deliberate restraint from 
expected violence, in a context of contention between two or more 
adversaries. One advantage of the term nonviolent resistance over the 
more general nonviolence is this emphasis on conscious and active 
opposition to violence. The label civil resistance is also widely used in 
reference to the unarmed, non-military character of nonviolent 
movements. (2008: 4) 
 
Civil resistance is unarmed confrontation performed by a civilian population against an 
opponent. Civil resistance allows for culture and language to shape how unarmed 
resistance movements are defined outside of the nonviolence rubric. “Civil” refers to 
people (the masses) and “resistance” implies opposition or confrontation. Essentially, 
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civil resistance is a people-powered mass movement in struggle for justice. For Howard 
Clark, “’People power’ has frequently been used to describe the mass mobilization of one 
section of ‘the people’ against another” (2009: 4). Clark grounds this definition in historic 
protest movements that took governments down due to their rigged elections. Although 
different issues are at work, “people-powered movement” accurately describes 
Palestinian grassroots resistance against Israel’s colonial endeavors. 
 As the Palestinian movement relies on the masses, it is typically defined as a 
popular struggle. The terms used to describe unarmed resistance movements are 
extremely important. The label of a movement cannot be imposed by outside parties; it 
must come from within the movement itself. The next section will explore various 
definitions of unarmed nonviolent resistance. I explore nonviolence in depth as a 
progression to express the ways the theory is understood, and also practices by activists 
to give context to the use of unarmed resistance by Palestinians. Starting with nonviolent 
resistance, I examine two schools of nonviolence (principled and pragmatic) and where 
the Palestinian people situate their struggle. Extending the mainstream definitions of 
nonviolent resistance, I analyze the Palestinian concept of popular struggle and 
Palestinian civil society’s unarmed movement against Israel’s occupation. 
 
Nonviolence Theory 
The concept of nonviolence has been widely observed as a method of resistance. 
Jorgen Johansen details how the term is not often used alone and typically accompanies 
another word to specify the circumstances, “It is often used as a specifier for other topics 
and hence followed by another word – nonviolent action, nonviolent philosophy, 
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nonviolent communication, nonviolent defense, and many more” (Johansen, 2007: 143). 
In the context of the violence triangle, “nonviolence” is paired with the word “resistance” 
to denote unarmed techniques. For Véronique Dudouet:   
The basic principles of nonviolent resistance encompass an abstention 
from using physical force to achieve an aim, but also a full engagement in 
resisting oppression, domination and any other forms of injustice. It can 
thus be applied to oppose both direct (physical) violence and structural 
violence (2008: 3). 
 
There are two main families of nonviolent resistance: principled and pragmatic. One is 
based on ideology and the other on strategy. Both have been starting points for 
Palestinian resistance. Principled nonviolence emphasizes morality and is found in 
traditional and/or religious beliefs. Pragmatic nonviolence is a choice an individual 
makes to create a strategic social change model. According to Thomas Weber, these two 
separate approaches “have been termed ‘principled,’ where emphasis is on the human 
harmony and a moral rejection of violence and coercion, and ‘pragmatic,’ where conflict 
is seen as normal and the rejection of violence as an effective way of challenging power” 
(2003: 250). Both principled and pragmatic nonviolence are used, often simultaneously, 
when resisting an opponent; therefore, they are not mutually exclusive.  
 
Principled Nonviolence 
Principled nonviolence is based on the pacifist tradition, where hurting others is 
morally wrong for religious and philosophical reasons. For Johansen, “In the pacifist 
tradition, we include nonviolent ideas, aspects, views and visions from religions, 
philosophies, ethics and lifestyles” (2007: 145). Dudouet explains, “in other words, by 
conviction rather than by expediency” (2008: 6). Of primary importance in this 
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understanding of nonviolence is the idea that the process should encapsulate the intended 
end, or as Johansen notes, “That the aims do not justify the means” (2007: 146).  In the 
following section, I will explore two primary principled nonviolence theorists: Mahatma 
Gandhi and Judith Stiehm. Gandhi was one of the first to cultivate the theory and practice  
of principled nonviolence. Stiehm built on this work a few decades later by developing 
two approaches to nonviolence, coining the term, “conscientious nonviolence,” a model 
combining principled and pragmatic nonviolence.  
Gandhi is widely known for nonviolence; people have called him “the godfather 
of nonviolence activism” (2003: 251). His was a humanistic approach based on morals. 
His first venture into resistance began in South Africa, where he worked with local 
activists against the oppressive system. He eventually moved back to his native India, 
where he began a campaign against the British Empire. Gandhi resisted the British 
through Satyagraha, or “clinging to truth,” which is the holding of truth within the soul 
or spirit. According to Gandhi, “Satyagraha in the general sense of the word means the 
way of life of one who holds steadfastly to God and dedicates his life to him” (1969: iii). 
This model is based on religious implications. A true Satyagrahi is a man of God who 
believes that change can be derived by way of love. Satyagraha is a way of being and 
soul force, and nonviolence is the weapon of a Satyagrahi. 
Principled nonviolence concerns itself with the process of resisting as much as the 
end results. For Gandhi, the means and the ends were to be the same. For Thomas Weber:  
Means and ends should be equally pure. The end growing out of the means 
is just as logical as the tree growing from a seed, and what is attained by 
love is retained for all time, while what is obtained by violence has within 
it the seeds of its own destruction. (2003: 253)  
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Gandhi used methods of conversion, believing that the opponent could convert to a new 
way of being. He felt that taking an injury would allow the rival to come to an 
understanding through reason and conscience. Self-sacrifice and endurance of pain and 
suffering without imposing them onto your rival are key to embodying true Satyagraha. 
Satyagraha means proving dedication to the cause and oneself. This allows one to 
tolerate inflictions while staying true to the soul. As Gandhi notes: 
The motive is to convert the opponent and make him one’s willing ally 
and friend. It is based on the idea that the moral appeal to the heart and 
conscience is, in the case of human beings, more effective than an appeal 
based on threat of bodily pain and violence. (1969: iii)  
 
The aim is to gain an ally by showing the opponent the situations’ severity through 
Satyagraha’s soulfulness. 
 Although Satyagraha is a peaceful way of using nonviolence, it is not passive 
resistance. Satyagraha is seen as a weapon of the strong, where truth binds the people. It 
combines various aspects of resistance, such as police or military non-cooperation and 
withdrawal, tax payment refusal, court boycott, and alternative institution-creation. 
Another method the Indian Satyagrahi movement used was civil disobedience. This tactic 
relied on disciplined groups’ actions demonstrating the endless capacity of suffering 
without retaliation. It also involved fasting, an action away from the self for the love of 
the rival, “Gandiji showed that for nonviolence to be effective requires constructive effort 
in every sphere of life, individual, social, economic, and political” (Gandhi, 1969: v). 
One who is nonviolent in her everyday life is also nonviolently resisting.  
In 2014, Newsweek published a story entitled, “Where is the Palestinian Gandhi?” 
– a common question in discussions of Palestinian resistance. According to the journalist 
Jeff Stein, “The Palestinians who preached nonviolence and led peaceful marches, 
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boycotts, mass sit-downs and the like are mostly dead, in jail, marginalized or in exile” 
(2014). But this account fails to adequately examine the complexities of local resistance. 
Since Gandhi’s movement, numerous practitioners have utilized principled nonviolence, 
including activists in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
A few decades after the success of Gandhi’s revolutionary Satyagraha, Judith 
Stiehm wrote an essay entitled, “Nonviolence Is Two” (1968), describing two forms of 
nonviolent resistance. What Stiehm called “conscientious nonviolence” resembles 
Gandhi’s “principled” approach; she also theorized a “pragmatic” framework of 
resistance. For Stiehm, conscientious nonviolence reflects a “religious or ethical belief, 
which categorically prohibits injury to another” (1968: 23). This form of nonviolent 
resistance is associated with pacifist and passive resistance movements. Pragmatic 
nonviolence, according to Stiehm, “is more or less spontaneous response by an unarmed 
populace or by a minority group to a situation regarded as intolerable” (1968: 24). 
Numerous mass movements are formed through pragmatic nonviolence. Both 
conscientious and pragmatic nonviolence approaches reject violence as a means to 
change, but they differ in practice.  
Conscientious nonviolence is more concerned with an individual’s behavior than 
the outcome of the resistance. Like in Gandhi’s model, from this approach, the 
conscientious nonviolence practitioner cannot achieve success without committing to 
nonviolence in everyday life. The approach is based in the psyche. A moral 
understanding is thought to lie within each conscientious nonviolence follower. 
According to Stiehm, in this tradition, “One must obey one’s own conscience, and one 
must neither tempt nor coerce another to violate his” (1968: 24). The practitioner must 
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have high morals and religious beliefs. This approach assumes that communication 
failures between an individual and their conscience create conflict. Like Gandhi’s 
Satyagraha, the approach aims to convert the enemy through reason or emotion rather 
than self-sacrifice, helping the opponent understand and change their own conscience. 
Conscientious nonviolence attempts to create awareness, to teach, and to facilitate 
opponents’ insight in order to transform the situation.  
These approaches to nonviolence are different in several ways. Conscientious 
nonviolence assumes that the opponent merely needs education to tap into their 
conscience, which limits the potential for change. In addition, this form of nonviolence is 
framed as an individual’s duty to God, as conscientious nonviolence followers are 
pacifists (Christians), which may lessen the appeal to secular would-be practitioners. 
Pragmatic nonviolence, which is not situated in a religious tradition, is seen as a 
“business-like” resistance strategy. For Stiehm, it is, “waging effective goal-oriented 
struggle against a stronger opponent, or minimally, against an opponent capable of 
inflicting severe damage if the conflict should become violent” (1968: 25). This approach 
mobilizes nonviolence as a weapon in a different way from Gandhi’s approach. For 
Gandhi, nonviolence is a spiritual weapon that can totally eliminate conflict. In pragmatic 
nonviolence, nonviolence is a weapon engaged in conflict – basically, a soldier without 
arms. 
Pragmatic nonviolent practitioners do not use physical means to convince 
opponents to change, but they use coercion as a tactic. According to Stiehm: 
Even though it utilizes coercion and even illegal techniques this type of 
nonviolence professes to be part of the democratic process since it 
assumes that victory (which goes with the stronger side) will usually go to 
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the side with the largest number of supporters; thus, the majority rules. 
(1968: 26)  
 
Creating a situation where the opponent feels compelled to change their behaviour for 
their own interest is coercive. The practitioners’ tactics force that need for change in the 
opponent. 
 
Pragmatic Nonviolence 
In the struggle against the Wall, Palestinians utilize unarmed pragmatic 
nonviolence methods against Israel’s militarized army. Pragmatic nonviolence relies on a 
group to be precise in their decision-making methods. According to Johansen, the 
pragmatic approach “regards nonviolent actions as being important and effective as 
political tools, as a collection of techniques, and as a means for communication, for 
revolutions, for a social movement, and for a system of defense” (2007: 145). Strategic 
nonviolence mimics war, but as they oppose violence, practitioners are unarmed. For 
Dudouet, “It involves the waging of ‘battles,’ requires wise strategy and tactics, employs 
numerous ‘weapons,’ and demands courage, discipline and sacrifice of its ‘soldiers’ 
(2008: 7). Scholar Gene Sharp, who was once an avid follower and student of Gandhi’s 
principled nonviolence approach, focused on pragmatic nonviolence. He adapted a 
strategic model widely known today in Peace Studies. According to Dudouet, Sharp 
“justifies the recourse to civil resistance on strategic grounds” (2008: 7). For Sharp, 
pragmatic nonviolence is a tool utilized in conflict, and numerous methods are used in 
this approach (1973). 
According to Weber, “Nonviolent action is a strategy for imperfect people in an 
imperfect world” (2003: 257). Sharp uses the pragmatic approach to develop a precise 
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strategy that anyone interested can use. His perspective allows  various practitioners to 
adopt nonviolence without the judgments of their morality. Sharp distinguishes between 
belief systems and techniques for those engaged in a nonviolent movement. For Sharp, 
the pragmatic approach is a way of conducting nonviolence, not resolving or eliminating 
it (1973). He refers to nonviolence as a way to act as if in a war, except one side is 
unarmed: “It involves the matching of forces and the waging of ‘battles,’ requires wise 
strategy and tactics, and demands of its ‘soldiers’ courage, discipline, and sacrifice” 
(Sharp, 1973: 67). Strategic nonviolence is a political way of dealing with social and 
political issues. For Sharp, nonviolence is “one response to the problem of how to act 
effectively in politics, especially how to wield power” (1973: 64). In this model, coercion 
can defeat the opponent if it forces them to change their mind without any will or 
agreement, and in the process, changing the situation’s power dynamics. 
 
Forms of Nonviolent Resistance 
 
The Palestinian popular movement utilizes various nonviolent resistance methods 
in their struggle against the occupation. Sharp examines various methods, such as 
nonviolent protests, nonviolent noncooperation, nonviolent intervention, nonviolent 
direct action, nonviolent revolution, and civil disobedience (1973). These forms are 
typically used in pragmatic nonviolence actions, and some forms of principled 
nonviolence utilize these methods as well.  
Nonviolent protests pursue persuasion through symbolic acts, such as protests, 
slogans, formal statements, dramatic and musical performances, and memorializing 
actions. These acts can usefully share information with a wide audience, but typically do 
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not effectively transform situations. According to Johansen, “Nonviolent protests are 
actions of peaceful opposition but do not go as far as refusing to cooperate or directly 
intervene” (2007: 149). Alternatively, nonviolent noncooperation much more effectively 
coerces opponents, and can occur in the context of social noncooperation, economic non-
cooperation and political noncooperation. The point is “to decrease or withdraw 
completely the normal level of cooperation” which “changes the power relation between 
the actors” (Johansen, 2007: 149). Psychological interventions like fasting and physical 
interventions like nonviolent obstruction are forms of pragmatic resistance. Although 
these forms of nonviolent intervention are useful, their effectiveness often depends on the 
participation of third parties. For Johansen, “Some of these actions are there to support 
the local civil society; others are carried out as ‘third’ parties acting with their own 
agendas” (2007: 149). Nonviolent direct action, another form of resistance, uses physical 
actions in order to force change. Such forms of direct action are sit-ins, strikes, vandalism 
or graffiti. Some other widely used forms of direct action are street theater and street 
projections. Civil disobedience, also a form of direct action, is the active refusal to obey 
certain laws. Civil disobedience resisters can use numerous tactics, such as peacefully 
blocking an area or occupying a facility. Nonviolent revolution, which consists of a 
significant change occurring in a relatively short period of time using nonviolent means, 
is difficult to obtain. This is only possible if governments do not take brutal measures 
against protesters, which is rare. Nonviolent revolutions did occur between 2000 and 
2005 in post-communist, Eastern European countries in the colored (or flower) 
revolutions. There are numerous ways to use pragmatic nonviolent methods to combat an 
enemy; these are merely a few examples of the most widely used. Although these 
	   26	  
methods are grounded in nonviolence theory, not all practitioners identify with the 
concept of nonviolence.  
 Nonviolence is not a concept accepted by all resistance activists. Peter Gelderloos 
takes an anarchist approach to understanding nonviolence in his critique entitled, How 
Nonviolence Protects the State. Gelderloos highlights how nonviolence is ineffective 
through its use of patriarchy and racism, which ultimately gives more power to the state.  
He argues that nonviolence “has implicit and explicit connections to white people’s 
manipulations of the struggles of people of color.” (2007: 8) He discusses how violence 
is already present for people of color, and that “pacifism assumes that white people who 
grew up in the suburbs with all their basic needs met can counsel oppressed people, many 
of whom are people of color, to suffer patiently under an inconceivably greater violence” 
(2007: 33) Gelderloos’ argument is based on critiquing the theory of principled 
nonviolence, which focuses on a pacifist tradition. In Palestine, the majority of 
nonviolent resistors use pragmatic nonviolence, but there are entire organizations, such as 
al Watan center in Hebron, that take a principled approach to nonviolence education and 
resistance. In the Palestinian context, nonviolence as a concept is not widely accepted due 
to the many reasons Gelderloos highlights. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
resistance is referred to as popular resistance as a way to maintain ownership of the 
movement away from the white western perspective.  
Not all resistance movements use nonviolence as a means of struggle. In the case 
of Palestinians, violent resistance has been utilized in an effort to achieve self-
determination. As Wendy Pearlman highlights in her analysis of Palestinian violent and 
nonviolent resistance, “movements rarely use violent or nonviolent protest to the 
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complete exclusion of the other” (2011: 4). Violence has proven ineffective as a 
resistance model, and has set back the Palestinian cause due to the increase of Israeli 
violence. Nonviolent activism has always been a characteristic of Palestinian resistance, 
and the grassroots have utilized various strategic methods in the hopes to achieve their 
goal of self-determination, including the use of stone throwing at nonviolent 
demonstrations, “For movements that espouse armed struggle, a shift towards stone 
throwing represents a decrease in the violent character of the protest” (Pearlman, 2011: 
4). In the case of Palestinian resistance against the Wall, pragmatic nonviolence is 
utilized, with the addition of stone throwing, in an attempt to combat the highly 
militarized Israeli army. Movements can define their own struggles, take techniques from 
strategic nonviolence, and adapt unarmed movements within their own cultural contexts 
and local understandings of resistance. 
 
Popular Struggle 
In the Palestinian context, although resisters’ tactics are often nonviolent, the 
people do not typically use the term “nonviolence” to describe their struggle. However, 
as there is a great power imbalance between the heavily armed Israeli military and the 
indigenous Palestinian people, nonviolent tactics are viewed as the most effective and an 
essential way to resist pragmatically. According to Beshara Doumani, Palestinians need 
to use nonviolent tactics, even if they are not based on a principled ideology, 
“Palestinians cannot afford to give up the moral high ground by resorting to tactics and 
strategies that allow for indiscriminate violence” (2007: 62). Violence escalates violence, 
and due to the power imbalance, Palestinian armed resistance has been ineffective and 
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harmful to the overall population. Nonviolent tactics could disrupt the “violent 
Palestinians” narrative, but this is not the main reason this form of resistance is used. 
Palestinians utilize unarmed means because it is the most effective form of resistance 
against the heavily armed Israeli military. Fayez, a farmer and activist leader from 
Tulkarm, described the need to take up nonviolent tactics of resistance as a strategic 
move for Palestinian people living under occupation: 
We need to play on our side, not on the Israeli side. The Israeli side is 
strong army, they have the tanks, the jeeps, the planes (f16), and they have 
the atom bomb. With the violence … we cannot do anything when we 
need to go to play with this [violent] side. But with our side, when we took 
the nonviolence way, I think it’s very good for us. We can show all the 
people in the world that we are in the right, and we have important idea, 
and this means we need to have our freedom.3 
 
Although the Palestinian movement has been using nonviolent tactics, the movement is 
referred to as a “popular struggle” throughout the Occupied Territory, not “nonviolent 
resistance movement,” as international and Israeli communities often refer to it. 
Palestinians prefer to use the term “popular struggle” (muqawameh sha’abiyeh in 
Arabic), when discussing this resistance movement against Israeli violence. George 
Rishmawi, an activist from Beit Sahour, explained how people understand these two 
words: “Popular struggle [Palestinian] people immediately think about struggling against 
the occupation. This [word] became attached to it.”4 Countless Palestinians I interviewed 
understood the Arabic term laa ‘oonph (“nonviolence”) to mean “no resistance,” and also 
found the term too passive an identifier for Palestinian resistance. George described how 
over time using the word “resistance” after “nonviolence” transformed some minds, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.  
4 Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 
2013.	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the linguistic change still did not carry the same meaning as “popular struggle” for the 
people inside the West Bank. As Palestinians related to the word “popular struggle” with 
regard to general resistance for self-determination, this term was the most effective 
descriptor of local resistance against the Wall and Occupation. “Popular” is a term 
Palestinians use to identify the people rising up together. According to Dudouet, “Popular 
participation in demonstrations and civil disobedience increased the unity of the 
resistance, creating connections across factions, age groups, social and geographical 
divisions” (2008: 14). “Popular struggle” can mean unarmed resistance against the 
occupation and can avoid dealing with the conceptual issues surrounding “nonviolence.” 
George explained: “There is no difference in the technique, and it’s a matter of 
terminology.”5 The meaning of the word “nonviolence” is subjective and there is a 
“western” connotation. Searching for peace in Israel/Palestine has been a topic for 
mainstream media outlets and political and academic circles, who typically identify the 
situation as a conflict rather than an occupation. This labeling positions Palestinians as 
violent aggressors and Israelis as victims. Countless international peace practitioners 
think that peace will manifest if Palestinians use nonviolence, rather than if Israel 
withholds violence. This is another reason why Howard Clark prefers the term, “unarmed 
resistance” instead of “nonviolence”:  
It is more accurate in situations where there is a threat of violence, a 
measure of counter-violence (such as stone throwing), or where a 
movement has an armed wing but adopts “unarmed” methods in many 
circumstances as do the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico and Palestinians. 
(2009: 4) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 
2013.	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Using the term “popular struggle,” which suggests unarmed resistance, the Palestinian 
people define their anti-occupation, anti-colonial struggle using both tactics under the 
rubric of nonviolence, and including another, local method of resistance, stone throwing.  
 
Boy with slingshot hiding from the Israeli military. Bil’in 2005 
 
As nonviolence practitioners typically view stone-throwing as violent, numerous 
Palestinians do not use the term “nonviolence” to describe their movement. However, as 
they do not view stones as weapons, Palestinians view their struggle as unarmed. 
Although Palestinians have utilized unarmed techniques, outsiders who attempt to define 
this movement disapprove of the use of stones. Mazen Qumsiyeh contextualized the 
resistance in Palestine: 
When you have an unarmed society and you have an armed colonial settler 
that is using extreme violence to kick us off our land, people resist it, as I 
said, with a variety of methods, hundreds of methods. Some people choose 
to throw stones, small number of people.6  
 
There are numerous stones on the ground in the West Bank, and some people use them to 
resist the military violence they encounter while attempting to stay on their land. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Interview with Mazen Qumsiyeh. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.	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However, not all Palestinian activists utilize stones. Even those who choose not to use 
stones still find the action of stone throwing incomparable to Israeli violence. According 
to Ayed Morrar from Budrus: 
The stone in Palestine doesn’t target to kill, or to affect seriously the other 
side. They [Palestinian people] want to show the people that we are strong, 
we can dare you, and we can stop you. You aren’t our destiny, we have 
another alternative, and we don’t agree for your occupation. We have our 
own power to stop you.7  
 
Richard Falk would agree: “Reliance on symbolic and low-tech violence (stone 
throwing), especially if directed at military or illegal and armed settler personnel, seems 
clearly to be permissible given the present conditions of occupation” (2002: 27). The 
violence the Palestinian people endure on a daily basis from a heavily armed military is 
viewed as an acceptable reason to take up stones and hurl them at armed Israeli soldiers. 
Stone throwing causes outside practitioners to question whether the movement is 
nonviolent, but locals largely accept the act. Dudouet highlights this point: 
The use of stones by Palestinian youth embodied this principle of turning 
the opponent’s superior force to one’s own advantage. Strategically, the 
Israeli army was not trained for such a type of non-lethal guerrilla warfare. 
Symbolically, the battle of stones against tanks and automatic weapons 
represents an unfair fight: the massive Israeli retaliation upset the status 
quo by damaging morale in the army’s troops and increasing public 
sympathy for the Palestinians. (2008: 16) 
 
Stones were an integral part of the First Intifada, which is understood as a nonviolent 
movement. These same tactics have been utilized during the resistance against the Wall. 
For George, stone throwing is relatively safe depending on the situation: “Stone throwing 
at army jeeps or tanks, you know 100% that you aren’t harming anyone when you are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Interview with Ayed Morrar, Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. January 2007.  
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throwing the stone at the tank.”8 He shared, however, that he would intervene if he saw 
stone throwing at a demonstration against the Wall – he does not believe it is wrong, but 
it gives the army a reason to attack the demonstrators. George quickly added that soldiers 
attack demonstrators even if no one has thrown a stone. Whether stones have been 
thrown or not, the Israeli army appears to respond to each demonstration the same way: 
with violence towards the demonstrators. Jamal from the Stop the Wall campaign, an 
organization that supports the villages in the resistance to the Wall, defended the stone 
throwing: 
Here you are facing a military, a military who came and started shooting at 
you immediately, and they killing you, so don’t ask us not even to react to 
this in our ways. Don’t take out of us, of our hands, our own experience 
that we built in the nonviolence as Palestinians.9  
 
Jamal asserted that the Palestinian people know how to resist and do not need suggestions 
from the international or Israeli communities. The Palestinian people want to own their 
own movement without the interference of others. The term “popular struggle” allows 
Palestinians to maintain their power and defines the movement more precisely than the 
term “nonviolence.”  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 
2013.	  	  9	  Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.	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Young boys throwing stones at the bulldozers and the military jeep during  
the construction of the Wall. Beit Liqia. March 2004. 
 
 
Although Palestinians have decided to use nonviolent tactics in the popular uprising 
against Israeli violence, they are still asked repeatedly to use nonviolence when 
discussing resistance inside the Territories. In 2005, a conference was held in Bethlehem 
in cooperation with the Holy Land Trust organization. The Stop the Wall campaign was 
invited to speak at the conference, and 600 people from around the world attended. Jamal 
asked the audience one question: “How many conferences, how many of you have been 
to Israel and conduct such a meeting, or training courses, or conferences? Why us? We 
are the ones who are aggressive and savage? It is accusing us that we are violent.”10  The 
typical narrative is that Palestinians are violent; therefore, they need to be educated in 
nonviolence, even when they are resisting a violent army without the use of arms. 
However, although the Israeli army causes great violence for the Israeli people’s 
“security,” no one makes an effort to educate the Israeli population on how to be 
nonviolent. According to Jamal Juma, “We organized thousands of demonstrations since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.  
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2002, not a single bullet has been shot at the demonstrations, not a single one.”11 The 
international community should recognize Israel violence and support the Palestinian 
people's right to self-determination via their popular struggle against the brutal 
occupation. Essentially, the international community needs to recognize the violence 
Israel imposes daily on the Palestinian population and it needs to put more pressure on 
Israel to decrease their violence against this population. Due to the power asymmetries 
between the civilian Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Israeli army, it is 
essential that the people use methods that will support them in their goals for self-
determination. In the face of extreme violence, it might seem trivial to utilize these 
methods, but although they are unable to defeat the violence, they are effective in 
exposing it. As Dudouet observed: “Although the power of nonviolent resistance does 
seem weak and inefficient in the face of acute power asymmetries, it has proven to be a 
very strategic tool in the hand of marginalized communities to redress structural 
imbalance and claim rights to justice or self determination” (2008: 2). The unarmed 
movement highlights Israel’s violence, rather than continuing the mainstream narrative of 
violent Palestinians. According to Richard Jackson:   
It will also re-focus attention on power asymmetries, the much-greater 
lethality and destruction of structural and cultural violence, the key 
concept of justice, the necessity of abandoning the morally dubious but 
dominant approach to neutrality in conflict management, the importance 
and role of (nonviolent) resistance in achieving social justice and local 
peace, and the key issue of pacifism and anti-violence, among others. 
(2015: 21) 
 
To achieve peace in Palestine, civil resistance must be employed against the violence 
triangle. Starting with the structural violence of the Wall, and thus the Israeli occupation, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.	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popular struggle can begin to shift the balance of power. Civil resistance can be a 
pathway to transform the cyclical existence of violence into peace. 
 
The Researcher 
Personally, I came to this work from my mixed religious identity. I am the 
daughter of a Moroccan Muslim father and an American Jewish mother. My Jewish 
identity specifically brought me to this work. I grew up in a Zionist household, like most 
American Jewish families. My synagogue taught about Israel, but always from the Jewish 
perspective of persecution. As I obtained more formal education, I became more 
interested in the “Palestinian/Israeli Conflict.” In 2003, when I was in my mid-twenties, I 
traveled to Israel for the first time to learn more about what the mainstream media and 
my synagogue had taught me. On that trip, my religious identity as a Jew and extensive 
documentation from my local Rabbi enabled me to extend my visa for six months. As my 
name is Islamic, I was forced to prove my Judaism to receive the privileges Israel allots 
to Jews. After resisting the Wall as a political solidarity activist with numerous 
Palestinian villages for six months, I returned to the U.S. and applied for Aliah12. 
Although I recognized the issues I would face living in Israel with an Islamic name, I was 
not fully aware of the significance of this action. I lived in Israel for roughly ten months 
after that, and continued resisting the Wall. As time passed, the ID I had acquired became 
a personal and political issue for me. I was taking advantage of my identity privilege, 
which is based on a racist system, while Israel did not recognize the basic rights of the 
Palestinian communities I was working with. I attempted to renounce my Israeli 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Based on the ‘Law of Return’, which views Jewish people in diaspora the right to 
‘return” to the state of Israel and become an Israeli citizen. 
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citizenship in 2005, a year and a half after I had received it. The process to attain Israeli 
citizenship had taken me roughly 30 minutes in an US based Jewish Agency office to 
prove my Judaism, but renouncing it took over a year. Eventually, I was able to 
successfully give up this privilege that I had never deserved. As I continued my solidarity 
work, I grew as an activist and as a scholar.  
 
 
 
Palestinian activists with a sign in Spanish that reads: Palestine is our land, no justice,  
no peace. Beit Ula November 2004 
 
Methodology 
In this research, I mixed qualitative research methods to obtain data for the 
ethnographic case study. I conducted fieldwork intermittently from 2003 to 2013. As a 
participant observer and solidarity activist, I immersed myself in the popular struggle 
against the Wall from 2003 to 2005. This method was necessary for my project. 
Jorgensen notes: 
Participant observation, whereby the researcher interacts with people in 
everyday life while collecting information, is a unique method for 
investigating the enormously rich, complex, conflictual, problematic, and 
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diverse experiences, thoughts, feelings, and activities of human beings and 
the meanings of their existence. (Jorgensen, 2015) 
 
In addition, I photographed the struggle against the Wall as it traveled throughout the 
villages, documenting the land destruction and the resistance movement as part of a 
visual ethnography. As Jan Brace-Govan asserts, “Visual ethnography is an 
anthropological approach that incorporates visuality throughout the research process” 
(2007: 736). I used thousands of images I captured from 2003 – 2013 to visually 
investigate and illustrate the processes of violence I was analyzing.  
The images I captured during the several years I was working on the ground 
provided a historical archive for this period of time, and were documented as visual 
symbols of injustice. According to Thomas Olesen, visual injustice symbols occur when 
suffering is not only photographed, but also when the images convey meaning beyond the 
photo itself (2011: 4). My photography during the struggle against the Wall not only 
documented the resistance movement, but also captured daily life under occupation. This 
body of work was part of a larger narrative of violence and resistance. Essentially, these 
images were “snapshots of a reality more or less accidently witnessed by the 
photographer” (Olesen 2011: 4). I then used these images in the larger context of anti-
occupation activism. Photographs are often used by activists for political objectives, and 
have the ability to move beyond textual analysis. As Olesen notes, 
In the process of infusing a photograph with an injustice meaning, activists 
draw on injustice frames located in the political-cultural structure of 
society; second, once created, visual injustice symbols themselves enter 
the political culture and memory structure, of society to become potential 
resources in subsequent activism (Olesen, 2011: 5). 
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Visual injustice symbols, as a political tool, support peace framing. Peace framing 
positions images taken within conflict areas through the human-interest perspective. 
According to Semtko and Valkenburg, as quoted in Bruce, the human-interest frame 
“brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or 
problem” (Semetko & Valkenburg qtd in Bruce, 2010: 5). Peace framing uses the human-
interest frame to express a civilian perspective of violence. This is in contrast to the 
widely used journalistic perspective of conflict framing. Conflict framing “is most often 
communicated through a focus of present events and political or military leaders rather 
than on soldiers and civilian victims” (Greenwood and Jenkins: 2013: 210). My 
photography exposes the human interest, the indigenous population that is subjected to 
Israeli military violence. Participant observation research connected me to my subject, 
which is typical when using photography as data. As Brace-Govan argues, “a closeness is 
constructed between the photographer and the photographed (2007: 741). My visual work 
also highlights the Israeli soldiers, which supports the claim that it is not only the system 
that oppresses, but is implemented through militarized labor. The use of photos in this 
visual ethnography supports the argument within the texts, providing it more depth by 
expressing what the violence of the occupation looks like as it is being discussed. 
Using photos in this dissertation helps to reframe the occupation from the 
mainstream narrative, which essentially sees Palestinians as violent, to one of Israel as 
the cause of the violence. Re-framing the narrative is essential when focusing on the 
Israel/Palestine. Mohamed Elmasry, in his analysis of how two major US newspapers, the 
New York Times and Chicago Tribune, framed the Second Palestinian Intifada, highlights 
of US mainstream media bias towards Israel. In his study he finds that whether a 
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Palestinian or an Israeli is killed that the news was framed “in such a way as to legitimate 
Israeli killings by implicitly justifying Israeli violence and assigning more prominence to 
the Israeli perspective” (Elmasry 2009: 1). Elmasry isn’t the only scholar to discuss the 
mainstream media bias towards Israel. Amahl Bishara highlights in depth in her book 
Back Stories: U.S. News Production and Palestinian Politics, the methods that are used 
by western journalists, in collaboration with Palestinian labor, to report on the Second 
Intifada. She states, “many Palestinians are deeply concerned about how they and their 
struggle are represented in U.S. and other Western media” (Bishara, 2012: 12). Her 
subjects feel that they are represented through the lens of the West, both in regards to 
western values and through mainstream narrative (Bishara, 2012: 12). Due to mainstream 
media framing of the events that occur in Israel/Palestine, peace framing, and the use of 
visual injustice symbols, are necessary to support the textual analysis and essentially 
reframe the narrative to Israel as violent and Palestinian as victim to that violence. 
Testimonials were used in addition to photography as another data set. From 2006 
to 2013, I conducted in-depth interviews with individuals from various Palestinian 
communities affected by the Wall since the construction began. I collected narratives 
from 40 Palestinian residents living inside the Occupied Territory of the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem, and analyzed them to understand the effects of the Wall and the 
resistance movement against it. I traveled from north of the West Bank in Tulkarm to the 
South Hebron Hills  (the southernmost point of the West Bank) to gather testimonials 
from residents in both rural and urban environments. 
There are a few perspectives absent from this paper, which should be noted. The 
lack of a strong female voice is not due to the lack of women engaged in the resistance 
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movement against the Wall. Women have always played a vital role in the resistance 
against the occupation, and are actively involved in resisting the Wall. As Mary King 
describes in relation to women’s resistance post 1967, “the women’s movement that 
remained in the occupied territories proceeded to put down deep roots and become 
central to the process of civilian mobilization” (King, 2007: 95). I intentionally searched 
for women I had personally encountered while participating in the resistance when 
conducting the first-hand interviews. It should also be noted that there was a large 
contingent of Israeli activists that are missing from these stories. This was intentionally 
omitted from my dissertation due to my desire to specifically focus on the indigenous 
struggle against the Wall. As a solidarity activist, I must give some credit to Israeli 
groups that did risk their safety in solidarity during the struggle against the Wall, 
specifically the Anarchists Against the Wall, with whom I traveled with on numerous 
occasions in the Occupied Territories.  
My work in Palestine began late in the winter of 2003, when I first arrived. I 
attended a “peace conference” in East Jerusalem, where I met a South African solidarity 
activist. She brought me to the village of Mas’ha, where local women were discussing the 
Mas’ha Peace Tent and the villagers’ struggle before my arrival. That same day, we 
traveled from the Salfit region village to the Ramallah district, where Budrus village is. 
When we arrived, a group of international activists were sitting in Ayed Morrar’s yard. 
Morrar, the local village leader, was not present. I then learned that the Israeli military 
had taken him from his bed the previous night to attempt to suppress the resistance. The 
following day, the village continued to struggle against the Wall in Morrar’s absence, and 
another local stood in as the leader. I began to document the struggle with my camera, 
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resisting the Wall in solidarity with the Palestinian people. As the Wall’s construction 
moved south, the other activists and I followed in support of the local communities 
affected by the Wall. I lived in Palestine until 2005, when I returned to the U.S. to share 
my photos and the resistance stories.  
I returned to Palestine in 2006 to conduct research on the resistance to the Wall 
for my master’s degree. Within three months, the amount of time my tourist visa would 
allow, I interviewed fifteen prominent activists resisting the Wall. In the summer of 2013, 
I returned for a three-month period to continue the long-tem study of the Wall for this 
dissertation. I met with several villagers to discuss new events and conducted more 
interviews to expand my data set. In 2006 and 2013, I hired translators to assist with 
interviews. In 2013, I also hired a local driver as a guide and for safety. I conducted the 
majority of the interviews in person in the West Bank and two by way of the telephone 
and in English. I interviewed Palestinian residents in Arabic to avoid introducing 
language privilege into the research and limiting the number of people I could speak 
with. I interviewed a wide range of the Palestinian population throughout the West Bank: 
the elderly, municipality workers, middle-aged people, mothers, fathers, Muslims, 
Christians, and even young organizers. In 2006, I recruited most of my first interviewees 
with the help of the Stop the Wall Campaign. In 2013, the Popular Struggle Coordination 
Committee, a Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization focused on accessing the 
damages of the Wall, helped me recruit interviewees. On both trips, I interviewed people 
I knew personally from my years of solidarity work. A lot of the people I spoke with 
were initially suspicious and asked me numerous questions before they let me interview 
them. They feared repercussions for speaking on the record about the current situation of 
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Palestinians. Several shared that as they were targeted after they protested, they feared 
punishment from the Israeli military. Others wanted those outside the region to know the 
realities on the ground and willingly shared their stories without concern. Several 
residents asked me to use their first name only to conceal their identity. Those who I had 
known from my involvement in the resistance were overjoyed when I returned to their 
village. Almost all the people I interviewed regarding the resistance to the Wall 
remembered me from when I took photos, and they eagerly shared both their stories of 
resistance and the consequences they faced for their actions. I brought compact discs 
containing numerous images of the struggles to each village for their historical archives. 
The interviewees were happy to learn that people outside of Palestine were able to see my 
photographic images of their struggle. They were also very happy that I was continuing 
to work on this cause in solidarity. I currently use the narratives to inform predominantly 
American audiences about the ongoing resistance movement.  
 
Overview of Chapters 
This dissertation is comprised of three parts that comprehensively examine the 
occupation of the West Bank, the Apartheid Wall, and the popular, Palestinian led 
resistance movement. Part 1 contextualizes the occupation, Part 2 overviews the Wall’s 
violence, and Part 3 illustrates the indigenous people’s response to the violence through 
an unarmed resistance movement that has lasted for several years. Part 1 consists of two 
chapters to contextualize the realities on the ground. Chapter 1 first summarizes pre-
Israel, Palestinian history through Ottoman rule. Next, it overviews Israel’s colonizing 
efforts, highlighting several crucial historical events: the 1948 al-Nakba, the 1967 al-
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Naksa, the 1989 First Intifada, the 1993 Oslo Accords, and the 2000 Second Intifada. 
These events contextualize the focus of this dissertation and the newest colonial project: 
the Apartheid Wall. Chapter 1 next focuses on judicial justice and lack thereof, 
examining two Israeli High Court cases that speak to the dangers of the Wall: the Beir 
Surik case and the Alfei Menashe case. Chapter 2 illustrates how the violence triangle 
functions within the contemporary Occupied Territory of the West Bank by discussing its 
history. Additionally, Chapter 2 details the violence triangle by exploring structural, 
direct and cultural violence as isolated, yet mutually reinforcing aspects of West Bank 
violence. 
The second part of the dissertation utilizes first-hand testimonies to detail how 
Israel employs the violence triangle in establishing the Apartheid Wall. Chapter 3 
explains how Israel uses the Wall to dispossess the Palestinian people of their lands and 
resources in order to build and expand Israeli settlements. Illustrating how Israel 
confiscates Palestinian lands through the construction the Wall, and demonstrating how 
violence operates through the Wall’s path, Chapter 3 stresses the dangers the Wall poses 
to Palestinians residing in the Occupied Territory. Next, Chapter 3 explores how the 
Wall’s path directly affects each region, from North of the West Bank, to the mid-Salfit 
region, to the West Ramallah district villages, to the Northwest Jerusalem villages, and 
lastly to the area near Bethlehem City, Al Walaja village. The chapter showcases 
narratives from Palestinians affected by the Wall to expose the violence of dispossession 
through the Wall’s establishment. The chapter discusses how Palestinian resisters use 
court cases to utilize the Israeli judicial system in search for justice, with few positive 
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outcomes. Chapter 3 concludes by investigating how the Palestinian people were first 
informed about the Wall on their lands and summarizing the Wall’s impact.  
Chapter 4 analyzes how Israel uses the Wall and other structural violence 
implements, such as checkpoints, gates, road closures, and bypass and tunnel roads, to 
restrict Palestinian movement within the West Bank. This chapter explains how 
Palestinians experience the effects of restricted movement – access to labor, the costs of 
time and money, and daily harassment, and how, by constructing the Wall, Israel has 
unilaterally redrawn the border without political negotiations.  
Chapter 5 explores the case of the Jerusalem Envelope, where Israel has 
implemented an unequal ID system to restrict Palestinians’ access to the city and access 
to services there. This chapter focuses on two major Jerusalem suburbs, Abu Dis and Al 
Ram. These suburbs are a few miles from Jerusalem, but the Wall disconnects both 
suburbs from the city. Chapter 5 further explores the structural violence of the 
checkpoints where Israeli soldiers monitor and limit Palestinian access to the holy city. 
This chapter examines the revitalized E1 plan to exclude Palestinian-populated areas 
from the Jerusalem Envelope, while including Israeli settlements, thus transforming the 
city’s demographics. This plan profoundly restricts Palestinians’ access to medical care. 
Chapter 5 argues that Israel uses the Wall in the Jerusalem Envelope as a political 
strategy to isolate Palestinian claims to the holy city. 
The third part of the dissertation (Chapter 6) examines the civil resistance 
movement that began as a direct response to the violence of the Wall, through an analysis 
of Wall-resisters’ first-hand testimonials. This chapter reviews a brief history of 
Palestinians’ resistance, examining the anti-Wall resistance that took place between 2002 
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and 2013. The chapter explores the important political formations involved and resistance 
approaches and tools, such as local popular committees, activists’ solidarity with the 
Palestinian people, and the use of media and nonviolent tactics. Personal testimonies 
expose resistance methods, the Israeli army’s direct violence against activists, and the 
Palestinian Authority’s neglect and dismissal. These are the realities on the ground for the 
civil actors in this nonviolent resistance movement against the brutal Israeli occupation. 
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Part 1 
Historical Context 
 
 
It is essential to understand the history of Palestine to fully grasp the ongoing 
violence triangle that Israel employs in the contemporary Occupied Palestinian Territory 
of the West Bank. The violence Palestinians experience in the West Bank is a 
continuation of Israeli aggression, which has lasted over the past sixty years. To maintain 
control, Israel has utilized the violence triangle to colonize the lands and clear them of the 
indigenous peoples since it was established as a state in 1948. 
Palestine was not an independent state before Israel was established, but 
Palestinians aspired to statehood when the British departed in 1947. Israel has still not 
recognized this dream; the extreme violence Israel has continued to employ to maintain 
total control over the lands and its indigenous people demonstrate this. The violence of 
colonization began in 1948 with al-Nakba, when the nascent Israeli state conquered the 
majority of Palestinian lands and massacred the local people. In 1967, another colonizing 
opportunity presented itself to the Israeli state: Israel brought the West Bank and Gaza 
under its control. This, also known as “the occupation,” brought with it strict military 
laws applicable to Palestinians residing in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and no 
opportunities for change coming from the Israeli state. The indigenous Palestinian people 
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resisted the ongoing Israeli violence two times in an effort to force a change: in 1989 
during the First Intifada, and again in 2000 during the Second Intifada. These uprisings 
illustrated Israel’s lack of total control over the Palestinian people. As a result, Israel 
increased the ever-present violence triangle to maintain more control over the indigenous 
people and ultimately maintain its long-lasting occupation without concessions. 
Recognizing its loose grip on the Palestinian people, Israel designed and 
implemented several enhanced and integrated forms of direct, structural and cultural 
violence to conquer the land and the people. Israel had actively used the violence triangle 
since the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, but over time, it enhanced these three 
forms of violence to escalate its domination over the occupied population. With each 
oppressive move, Israel improved their use of direct, structural and cultural violence to 
combat the occupied population, and to further their settler colonial plans. Chapters 1 and 
2 explore the historical events that occurred, putting current events into context. It is 
essential to understand this history of violence in order to better imagine and plan how to 
work toward an envisioned peaceful future. 
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Chapter 1 
Palestine: A Historical Context 
 
It is imperative to understand the history of modern day Palestine in order to grasp 
the complexities of the current occupation. For centuries, occupying entities have 
controlled the indigenous people. Palestinians have never experienced independence as a 
sovereign nation state. As the occupiers have changed, the indigenous desire for 
statehood has increased, and varying forms of violence have been used to repress the 
people. This continuum of control over the land most recently resulted in the settler-
colonial state of Israel. Although Israel is not the first occupier of Palestine, the 
contemporary occupation has been extremely violent in achieving settler-colonial 
domination. 
This chapter will highlight five main historical events to give greater context to 
the establishment of the Apartheid Wall. I will discuss three moments in history where 
Israel used varying forms of violence to gain control over the land: the Nakba, the Naksa, 
and the Oslo Accords. I will also discuss the First Intifada and the Second Intifada 
movements, which were direct responses to Israel’s violence, but which utilized different 
tactics. Each of these events has permanently shifted the realities on the ground. 
Collectively, these five points in history culminated in the establishment of the Apartheid 
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Wall. The most recent symptom of Israel’s long-lasting domination over the Palestinian 
people, the Wall has continued the violence to further the colonial endeavors.  
 
Ottoman Rule 
Prior to Israel’s colonization of Palestinian land, the Ottoman Empire controlled 
the area. As early as 1516 CE, the Ottoman Empire conquered the entire Middle East. 
This area was known then as greater Syria. The Ottomans maintained total control of the 
lands, using Arab clans to perform local governmental duties (Smith, 2001). Then 
Ottoman rule began to decline, and according to Mazin Qumsiyeh, “The fate of the 
Palestinians was being drawn elsewhere by politicians who had scant regard for the local 
population. The British schemed to divide up the Arab world with France under the 
Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916.” (2011: 47). 
After World War I, in 1917, the Ottoman Empire was conquered and divided by 
European powers. The European colonial expansion began in the Middle East. France 
took control of Syria and Lebanon. In what became known as the British Mandate, 
Britain colonized Iraq, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan. On November 2nd, 1917, Arthur 
James Balfour, the British foreign secretary, wrote a letter to Lord Rothschild, a leader of 
the British Jewish community. The letter declared that the country of Palestine was to be 
given to the Zionist entity as a new homeland. This letter, which became known as the 
Balfour Declaration, was a crucial turning point in the history of Palestine (Peretz, 1996). 
At this time, Jewish communities in Eastern Europe were under attack in pogroms, which 
Zionists used to leverage their claims to Palestinian land. Balfour’s letter declared that the 
Zionists’ interests did not clash with the interests of the indigenous population (Pappe, 
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2004). The British remained in Palestine until 1948. They eventually left, due to 
resistance from both Jewish and Palestinian inhabitants. Several Jewish terrorist gangs 
carried out large-scale attacks, which prompted the British to leave. At this time, Israel 
dominated the indigenous Palestinian population and maintained controlled over the land.  
 
al-Nakba  
  Israel’s statehood project began long before the state was instituted. In 1947, 
strategies to conquer the land were put into action. The British started to relinquish 
control and the United Nations (UN), only two years old at the time, became involved in 
the fate of Palestine. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) 
visited the country and recommended to the UN General Assembly that the land be 
divided into two side-by-side states. This partition would split the land into one state for 
the Zionist movement, and one state for the indigenous Palestinians. Jerusalem would be 
left under the administration of the UN, established as corpus separatum (Pappe, 2007). 
On November 29th, 1947, the Zionist movement accepted the partition plan. This plan is 
officially known as UN General Assembly resolution 181 (United Nations, 1947). The 
Arab League declined the plan because the land was being taken away from the 
indigenous people for the Jewish minority. To accept a small piece of land would 
undermine Palestinians’ self-determination and statehood.  
 The partition of the land brought forth extensive violence. The British began 
evacuating the country in February 1947. From December 1947 to May 15th 1948, when 
the last British soldier left Palestine, numerous indigenous people were murdered. Israel 
massacred entire communities and exiled the rest. As Israeli historian Ilan Pappe noted, 
	   51	  
“By the time the British left in the middle of May, one-third of the Palestinian population 
had already been evicted” (2004: 131). Israel maintained the violence until the majority 
of the land was conquered, confiscating more lands than the partition had initially 
allotted. 
 
 
 
The violence prompted the Arab league to advance troops to defend the 
Palestinians.  During April and May of 1948, Zionists put what they called Plan D into 
action.  
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Plan D was put into full operation in April and May. It had two very clear 
objectives, the first being to take swiftly and systematically any 
installation, military or civilian, evacuated by the British. The second and 
far more important, objective of the plan was to cleanse the future Jewish 
state of as many Palestinians as possible. The main military force was the 
Hagana, which had several brigades. Each brigade received a list of 
villages it was to occupy. Most of the villages were destined to be 
destroyed, and only in very exceptional cases were the soldiers ordered to 
leave them intact. (Pappe, 2004: 130)   
 
On May 14th, 1948, at 4:00 PM, in Tel Aviv, Israel was officially proclaimed a state. 
Palestinians call this prominent historical event the Nakba, (which means “catastrophe” 
in Arabic), while Zionists call it the War of Independence. This event marked the 
beginning of the Zionist control over the land and its residents. 
The fighting lasted for over a year. In 1949, a cease-fire was declared. Shaul 
Cohen wrote, “Under the Labor Party, Israel signed the armistice treaties with its Arab 
neighbors, including the 1949 agreement with Jordan that created the Green Line” (2006: 
688). Armistice lines, also known as the Green-Line, were established, separating the 
land into sections under the Armistice agreement. Egypt would control Gaza and the 
Trans-Jordan Army would control eastern Palestine, now known as the West Bank 
(which includes East Jerusalem). The rest of the land was annexed and controlled by the 
newly formed state of Israel (Peretz, 1996). This division was maintained for twenty 
years, until more violence erupted and Israel occupied more land. 
 
Naksa/1967 War 
Israel maintained control of land conquered in 1948, while Egypt and Jordan 
continued to control the West Bank and Gaza. Tensions grew in the twenty years 
following the Nakba. The surrounding Arab countries aligned with Palestinian 
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communities in a new battle with the Israelis. Palestinians refer to this war as the Naksa, 
which translates to “setback” or “relapse,” but the Israelis know it as the Six-Day War. 
The Naksa began on the 14th of May, 1967. Egyptian forces approached the 
border of Israel from inside the Sinai Peninsula, due to misinformation from the Soviet 
Union about a direct threat to Syria along the northern borders. Egypt quickly emerged as 
a Palestinian ally against Israel and Jordan soon followed. On June 5th, 1967, Israel 
enacted a preemptive strike to stall any Arab attack. Israeli Air Forces attacked the bases 
of Egypt, as well as bases in Syria, Jordan, and Iraq (Peretz, 1996). Israeli ground forces 
attacked Gaza and the Sinai at the same time. Within three days, Israel had seized Gaza 
and all of the Sinai. Jordan was quickly defeated, leaving Israel to occupy the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem. On June 10th the Golan Heights were taken from Syria, and 
Israel was seen as a dominating force. It took the Israeli army six days to defeat and 
conquer the rest of historical Palestine. Israel almost immediately began to build illegal 
Jewish settlements throughout the West Bank and Gaza. The transferring of their 
population into the areas they occupied is illegal through UN Security Council Resolution 
242 (United Nations, 1967). Israel’s plan was to conquer all Palestinian land and colonize 
it with their settler populations. 
Israeli settlements began to flourish inside the West Bank and Gaza, now known 
as the Occupied Territories. In 1979 all of the Sinai, except for Taba, were returned to 
Egypt as the result of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Israel maintained control of the 
Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank, and continues to occupy them today. 
Israel claims that the 2005 withdrawal of settlements in the Gaza Strip represent its return 
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to Palestinian leadership, yet Israel still controls all access via land and sea and restricts 
all movement in and out of the area.  
 
 
 
First Intifada 
Utilizing various methods to oppress the Palestinian people, Israel continued to 
occupy the territories. The indigenous people within the Occupied Territories responded 
to the violence of the occupation by organizing a massive resistance movement. In 1987, 
the First Intifada (“shaking off” in Arabic, but loosely translated to “uprising”) broke out. 
This was the direct result of decades of violent Israeli oppression and the desire for 
Palestinian representation and statehood. A car accident on December 8th, 1987, in 
Jabalya, Gaza, triggered the movement. An Israeli military vehicle killed four 
Palestinians. Mark Tessler recounted, 
While there had been predictions during 1986 and the first part of 1987 
that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were exhausted and would 
soon lose the will to resist Israel’s continuing drive into these territories, 
spontaneous and widespread protest demonstrations erupted in December 
	   55	  
1987, showing that Palestinians under occupation had in fact lost neither 
their political will nor the capacity to challenge Israeli government 
policies. (1994: 677)  
 
The nonviolent demonstrations were organized as grassroots resistance throughout the 
streets of Palestine. They spread from the refugee camps of Gaza into the rural areas and 
towns of the West Bank. The most commonly known mark of the Intifada was stone 
throwing. Young boys symbolically hurled pieces of their land towards the highly 
weaponized Israeli military. For Avram Bornstein, “The violence created a spectacle, but 
more significant was the initiation of non-violent mobilization to disengage from Israel. 
Villages, town councils, labor unions, women’s organizations, and Islamic centers 
became politicized” (2008: 110). The resistance included numerous forms of nonviolent 
action, such as mass rallies, general strikes, refusal to pay taxes, confrontations, and civil 
disobedience. The participants were young and old, urban professionals and rural 
farmers. All of Palestinian society rose up for a common goal; resisting the occupation of 
their lands. 
The Israeli army, quick to squash the movement, responded with violence towards 
the unarmed protesters. They shot live ammunition and rubber bullets to deter protesting. 
The Israeli military attacked entire villages with tear gas and beat and arrested 
demonstrators. The international media took notice to this uprising, relaying images from 
the streets of Palestine to the outside world.  People were now seeing the casualties of 
Israel’s aggression and the violence of the occupation. According to Alain Gresh and 
Dominque Vidal, 
A thousand days after the start of the uprising, the statistics were as 
follows: more then a thousand dead, tens of thousands wounded, nine 
thousand prisoners—which, with four thousand already in detention, made 
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a total of thirteen thousand detainees from a population of 1.7 million 
inhabitants. (2004: 128) 
 
The resistance lasted more than four years. After Israel’s failed attempt to crush the 
ground movement, the need for negotiations was obvious if a cease-fire were to come to 
fruition. 
 
Oslo Accords 
Israel had limited control over the indigenous people throughout the Occupied 
Territories and recognized the need to negotiate with the Palestinians. The Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) was the representing body for the Palestinian people. 
Yasser Arafat, who was then in exile in Tunis, led the PLO. Israel began talks with 
Yasser Arafat in Madrid on October 1991, amidst the resistance. The talks resumed in 
September 1993 in Oslo, Norway, they are known as the Oslo Accords. By the time the 
Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, 1,162 Palestinians (241 of them children) and 160 
Israelis (5 of them children) had been killed. These talks were an important milestone for 
the future of these two peoples, and this was the first time direct negotiation between the 
opposing leaders had occurred. 
The Israeli left Labour movement and the exiled PLO gathered to discuss the 
future of the Palestinian people. The talks were based on UN Security Council resolutions 
242 and 338 and the PLO recognizing Israel’s right to exist as a state in peace and 
security. Although these talks were seen as a forward step, the accords failed to address 
the return of the refugees, Jerusalem, the continuation of settlements, or the establishment 
of a Palestinian state. This was problematic for the future of Palestine and its people. 
According to Bornstein,  
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The major issues of contention, such as the right of return for Palestinian 
refugees, the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, and the status 
of East Jerusalem, were put on hold in the hope that interim peace would 
build trust toward future compromise. (2008: 111)  
 
Israel was strategic in postponing these issues for later talks, as these points were the 
most contentious and Israel did not intend to concede them. Israel’s initial aim was to 
suppress the powerful movement on the ground, not give up more control.  
The Oslo Accords were set on a Declaration of Principles (DOP), and the main 
intention was to set up a Palestinian Self-Governing Authority (PISGA) so that Israel 
would withdraw from Gaza and the West Bank and allow Palestinian self-governance to 
occur. This process was planned to take five years to fully implement. In the interim, the 
areas would be divided into three zones with varying jurisdiction. Area A would be under 
full Palestinian control, Area B would be under Palestinian civil control and Israeli 
military control, and Area C would remain in full Israeli control. 62% of the West Bank 
is located in Area C. With Israeli military control of areas B and C, Israel was able to 
maintain control over the West Bank and overpower any resistance against the 
occupation.  
Oslo was successful in carving up the West Bank into fragmented enclaves, 
increasing Israel’s domination over the territory. According to Anne Marie Baylouny,  
A large portion of Oslo focused on geographic changes, and it is these 
provisions that were enacted. Geographic and border control measures 
were deemed especially important for Israeli security by the Israeli 
military, who had a strong hand in crafting the provisions in Oslo II 
particularly. (2009: 46) 
 
Oslo aided Israel in prolonging the discussions of the contentious issues and made it 
harder for future possibility of resistance within the territory while simultaneously 
controlling more of the land. 
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The negotiations allowed for some of the provisions from the agreement to be 
implemented, such as the inauguration of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) and 
Palestinian control of some of the land. The other aspects of the agreement have yet to be 
recognized. As Israel still maintains a strong military presence in the West Bank, the 
Palestinian Authority has partial control over the land. The PA has been tasked with 
playing a security role for Israel inside Area A, and has little trust from the majority of 
Palestinians due to their lack of power. Twenty years since Oslo, the West Bank is worse 
off today than before the First Intifada. 
 
The Second Intifada 
The occupation did not end with the Oslo Accords, as the negotiations had 
intended. In actuality, more severe restrictions were imposed onto the Palestinian people, 
creating a more hostile environment. Palestinians within the Occupied Territories were 
systematically monitored and controlled, while Israel continued to build more settlements 
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in the Territories. On September 28th, 2000, the Israeli politician, and soon to be Prime 
Minister, Ariel Sharon, entered the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Israeli soldiers and 
policemen heavily guarded Sharon, anticipating that this move would provoke the 
Palestinians. This action was the trigger that started the Second Intifada. The al-Aqsa 
mosque is the third holiest Islamic site in the world, and this act by Sharon created 
outrage amongst the Muslim population worldwide, as well as inside the Occupied 
Territories. His actions were seen as a mockery to the plight of the Palestinian people and 
highlighted his power in the region. Clashes broke out on site at the mosque between the 
Palestinians in the Jerusalem area and Sharon’s security forces. Several Palestinian lives 
were lost in the first day of resistance, and thus began what is known as the “Intifadat al-
Aqsa” in Arabic, and the “al-Aqsa Intifada” in English. 
The uprising spread throughout the Occupied Territories. Unlike the First Intifada 
where all the people resisted nonviolently, the Second Intifada saw both armed and 
unarmed resistance against the occupying forces and Israeli civilians. The Israeli army 
responded to this uprising in the same manner as the beginning of the First Intifada: with 
violence. The fact that some Palestinian factions were armed intensified Israel’s violence. 
Within the first three days, thirty Palestinians were killed, and four hundred were 
wounded. According to Gresh and Vidal, “During the following month, more than two 
hundred Palestinians were killed, one-third under the age of 17” (2004: 131). Israel re-
occupied the Territories, which it had never actually left – a defiance of the Oslo Peace 
Accord signed in 1993. As a result, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) declared 
October 6th the “Day of Rage,” urging Palestinians to attack Israeli posts in the Occupied 
Territories. The Israeli forces, then stationed in the Nablus region, withdrew from their 
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post guarding the tomb of Joseph. Palestinians destroyed the tomb of Joseph as a form of 
resistance. This act provoked retaliation by the Jewish community; they destroyed a 
mosque in the northern city of Tiberias. The violence cycled within both the Occupied 
Territories and Israel proper. As they were treated as second-class citizens by the Israeli 
state, Palestinian populations living inside Israel saw this movement as a chance to resist 
their plight as well. They rose up in response by way of protests, participating in sit-ins 
and road blockades in Haifa and Jaffa, two heavily populated Palestinian cities in Israel. 
Israeli police killed thirteen Palestinian citizens of Israel while they protested.  
The Second Intifada saw an escalation of violence against the occupation forces 
from extremists groups. By November, groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades were retaliating against Israeli forces and Israeli civilians alike. They 
blew up business establishments and buses heavily populated by Israelis. Reacting to the 
violence in Israel, the occupation forces retaliated by way of assassinations, large-scale 
incursions, and daily closures, creating problems for the rest of the Palestinian 
population. Collective punishment was a tactic Israel used against all people residing 
inside the Territories. During air strikes, which were meant to kill alleged operatives, 
Israel killed thousands of innocent Palestinians. Within the first year and a half of the 
Second Intifada, and a month before the construction of the Wall began in March of 
2002, the ongoing cycle of violence accounted for 1,442 Palestinian deaths and 400 
Israeli deaths (Gresh and Vidal, 2004). The numbers differed considerably with the 
Palestinian loss of life tripling that of Israelis. 
The Oslo Accords had made promises to the Palestinian people that were not kept. 
For several years, people waited for the occupation forces to grant them more rights, but 
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with each year came more oppression. There were problems in the “self-ruled” areas due 
to the lack of economic development and assistance from the international community 
through the peace accord. The PA was not able to proceed as an independent entity, and 
those residing in the West Bank suffered due to this. Al-.Jazeera published an article on 
December 8, 2003, entitled “The Second Intifada,” which stated,  
The Intifada was – and still is – an expression of a deep disappointment 
and frustration over the ongoing disrespect and denial of basic rights for 
Palestinians caused by the occupation – including the right to free access 
to Jerusalem, security and development, and the refugees' right to return. 
(2003) 
 
The Second Intifada was a direct response to the neglected conditions inside the 
Occupied Territories and the increased Israeli military violence. In two years, the Israeli 
army had arrested and interrogated thousands of Palestinians and assassinated dozens of 
alleged militants. 
The Second Intifada differed from the First Intifada in various ways. When the 
First Intifada occurred, the people had hope for their future and saw resistance as a 
political partner and a way to secure rights. It was an organized movement throughout the 
territories. Mass involvement gave it enough power to force negotiations between Israel 
and the exiled PLO. Besides the mental and emotional differences, there were physical 
differences on the ground between the First and Second Intifadas. The Oslo Accords, 
which were meant to create a state for the Palestinian people, separated the West Bank 
land into three fragmented areas. This separation made it extremely difficult to organize 
resistance using the same methods that were used in the First Intifada. As Israel restricted 
movement between the areas, people could not reach each other. As Israeli journalist 
Amira Hass explained,  
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It was only with the outbreak of the current uprising that the extraordinary 
ingenuity of the “zoning” system, backed by the network of bypass roads, 
could be fully appreciated: with most of the population living in the 
scattered islands of A and B, separated from each other by the vast ocean 
of C lands, hundreds of villages and half a dozen towns could be totally 
paralyzed by strategically placed barricades and ditches, tanks, and IDF 
sharpshooters, thereby devastating an entire economy and disrupting all 
social life. (2002: 9) 
 
Israel was strategically positioned inside the West Bank to prevent another Intifada. The 
resistance of the first uprising forced Israel to negotiate, as they were not able to maintain 
control over the people. With the fragmentation of the West Bank, checkpoints, and 
heavy military presence, the Second Intifada was more easily crushed by the Israeli 
military. The Israeli authorities locked down the West Bank and Gaza, and everyone 
living inside the Occupied Territories was collectively affected. Over the next few years, 
intermittent violence occurred on both sides, and Israel found a new way to ensure 
control and security: by establishing the Wall. The Palestinians, on the other hand, had no 
security or protection against Israel’s violence. 
 
The Wall 
Although the Wall’s construction began during the summer of 2002, the concept 
of the Wall had begun almost a century earlier when the initial Israeli settlers discussed 
colonizing the land of Palestine. Zeev Jabotinsky, a revisionist Zionist from Russia, 
published an article entitled “The Iron Wall (We and the Arabs).” According to 
geographer Shaul Cohen, 
Jabotinsky ([1923] 1937) laid the foundation for today’s security fence. 
He observed that the Palestinian Arabs look upon Palestine with the same 
instinctive love and true fervor that any Aztec looked upon his Mexico or 
any Sioux looked upon his prairie. (2006: 686) 
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Recognizing that the indigenous Palestinian was connected to the land, Jabotinsky knew 
that they would not readily accept Zionist colonization. Jabotinsky suggested physically 
separating the Palestinians from the incoming settlers by way of a wall. From his 
perspective, this would force the indigenous Palestinians to concede to the idea of a 
future Palestinian state and allow for Israeli expansion without resisting.  
This concept of the “Iron Wall” was not proposed again until the 1990s. This was 
a time period when Israel had implemented various restrictions upon the Palestinian 
population residing inside the West Bank. Israel used the influx of suicide bombers 
coming from inside the West Bank, into Israel proper post Second Intifada, to attempt to 
justify to both Israeli citizens and the international community, the concept of a security 
barrier. The suicide bombers were a form of armed resistance against the occupation. 
Rather than examine the reasons for armed resistance, Israel implemented more severe 
forms of violence against the entire Palestinian population. 
Palestinian armed resistance created fear amongst the Israeli population and, in 
1995, the Labour party Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin commissioned the design of a 
“security fence” along the internationally recognized Green-Line of the West Bank. By 
1996, the Labour party successor Prime Minister Shimon Peres approved the proposal. 
Journalist Graham Usher explained, 
At the height of the 1996 crisis over the suicide bombings, Peres approved 
the construction of a two-kilometer wide “buffer zone” along the Green 
Line comprising fences, electronic surveillance fields, helicopter patrols, 
and a permanent presence of soldiers and police, all to prevent Palestinian 
entry into Israel. (2005: 32)  
 
Rabin and Peres’ plans drew on Jabotinsky’s concept of the Iron Wall to separate the 
populations and limit Palestinian resistance. However, the Labour concept did not come 
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to fruition. The Likud party that succeeded Peres had their own political concerns around 
the establishment of a Wall. The Likud party is known for their ideological interests in 
the expansion of the Israeli state. The Wall would cut off the possibility of overall control 
over Eretz Israel.13 It was not until the Labour party was back in power that Ehud Barak 
suggested another plan for the Wall at Camp David talks in 2000. This plan was to 
separate the West Bank into sections concentrated around three main settlement blocs: 
Ariel in the north, Maal’e Adumim in the centrally located Jerusalem area, and Gush 
Etzion in the south (Usher, 2005: 32). This plan would have created Palestinian 
Bantustans within the occupied West Bank, limiting the possibility of a Palestinian state. 
Former Palestinian President Yasser Arafat rejected the plan during the Camp David 
talks. Barak’s successor, Ariel Sharon of the Likud party, approved a new plan, drawing 
on both the Peres plan of separating the people, and the Barak plan of creating 
bantustans. Sharon added to the plans the missing element of erasing the border 
altogether to control the entire West Bank land. The Likud party had a constituent base of 
ideological settlers living in the illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank. As building a 
Wall on the Green-Line would cut them off from Israel proper, this plan was not accepted 
amongst the settler community. According to Peter Lagerquists, 
Most significantly, there was fierce opposition from Israeli settlement 
groups. Erasing the Green Line had been the main aim of their movement. 
They feared that a barrier, by interpellating for the first time a physical 
boundary between Israel and the occupied territories, would isolate them 
spatially, symbolically, and eventually politically. (2004: 6-7) 
 
Sharon planned to annex more land inside the West Bank, secure the illegal Israeli 
settlements and include them into Israel proper, while simultaneously stealing Palestinian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Biblical name for the historic land of Israel, most conservative Jews believe they were 
given this land by G-D as told in the Torah.	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land for the expansion. Sharon’s plan would unilaterally define the borders without the 
need for political cooperation with the Palestinian Authority. The settler movement 
approved Sharon’s plan, and the establishment of the Wall began. 
 
 
The Wall being constructed. Bethlehem 2004 
 
The Wall was built deep inside the Green-Line, weaving in and out of Palestinian 
villages throughout the West Bank, annexing Palestinian land, and securing illegal Israeli 
settlements into Israel. Because the Wall was not built on the Green-Line, it appropriated 
Palestinian lands for the settler population, increasing colonial expansion. The UN Office 
of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(OPT) concluded, “The Barrier’s total length is approximately 708 km, more than twice 
the length of the 320-kilometre-long 1949 Armistice Line (Green-Line) between the West 
Bank and Israel” (OCHA, 2011: 4). Israel was able to steal more land and appease its 
settler base by not building the Wall on the Green-Line. The effects of the Wall on the 
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Palestinian population inside the West Bank were never a factor when discussing the 
details of the Wall. 
The Wall has several characteristics. The physical aspect of the Wall depends on 
the location and the nearby populations. According to the Palestinian Academic Society 
for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), 
It’s a combination of 8m high concrete wall (mainly around East 
Jerusalem areas), trenches, fences, razor wire and military only roads. 
There is also a 30-100m wide “buffer zone” east of the Wall with 
electrified fences, trenches, sensors and military patrol roads and some 
sections have sniper towers. (2007: 313) 
 
In rural Palestinian areas, the Wall is comprised of a fence; at times the fence is 
electrified. In highly populated Palestinian areas, the Wall is built of concrete, and is 26 
feet high. Buffer zones are situated near the Wall and watchtowers are strategically 
placed to monitor people near the Wall. OCHA describes the characteristics of the Wall 
as consisting of, “fences, ditches, razor wire, groomed sand paths, an electronic 
monitoring system, patrol roads, and a buffer zone (OCHA, 2011: 4). All of the areas 
around the Wall are considered closed military zones; it is illegal for Palestinians to go 
near them. If someone is in the buffer zone, the Israeli military employs direct violence, 
shooting him or her. The buffer zone extends 500 feet from the Wall. Nothing can legally 
be built on this part of the land, nor can it be used for agricultural purposes. The buffer 
zone confiscates Palestinian land in the name of “security.” In addition to the Wall and 
the areas adjacent to it, Israel established what it calls the “seam zone”: the area between 
the Wall and the Green-Line. As the Wall dips deep into the Occupied Territory to secure 
the settlements, the seam zone accounts for a sizable area of the West Bank. As this area 
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is considered a closed military zone, a permit must be obtained from the Israeli 
authorities to enter the area. Gabriela Becker described the seam zone: 
Already, the areas between the wall and the Green Line – the seam zone or 
seam administration as it is referred to by the occupation – are de facto 
annexed, either through their inaccessibility to landowners and farmers, or 
by the military and court orders that declare these areas closed or 
demanding permits. (2006: 1239)   
 
Permits to enter a seam zone are difficult to acquire, which helps Israel to maintain 
ownership over these lands. In several cases, entire villages exist in seam zone areas, and 
residents must obtain a permit to enter and exit their village. Palestinians are required to 
have a permit to enter their own villages and lands, while the Israeli settlers are able to 
build without restrictions on the Palestinians' confiscated lands.  
 
      Men sitting in front of their store blocked by the Wall.  
      January 2004 Abu Dis. 
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The Wall was built in several phases. Phase I of the construction began on June 
16th, 2002, in the north of the West Bank. It was finished in the northern towns and 
village less than a year later, in July, 2003. According to a 2007 Palestine Monitor fact 
sheet, “The first stage is comprised of a 145 kilometer long section extending from Salem 
checkpoint in the northwest Jenin district, through the Tulkarm and Qalqilya 
governorates, to Masha village in the Salfit area” (2007). Qalqilya city was completely 
surrounded by the Wall and had only one entry point; it was built on two sides of the 
town, and a fence was built on the third side.  
 
The Wall in front of the greenhouses. December 2006. Qalqilya.  
 
Massive land confiscations occurred as a result of the Wall’s path in Phase I. 15,000 
dunums14 of land were destroyed. According to the Stop the Wall Campaign, “13 villages 
have been de facto to Israel and some 50 villages are separated from their lands” (2007). 
Phase I confiscated 72% of Jayyus – a small village in the Qalqilya district. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  1 dunum is equivalent to 1,000 square metres.	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In the winter of 2003, Phase II of the Wall’s construction began in the northeast 
section of the West Bank and the area around Jerusalem, known as the Jerusalem 
Envelope. Human rights organizations have been arguing against the structure since 
construction began. Amnesty International made a statement regarding the Wall: 
Israel is continuing the construction of the fence/wall, with the second 
phase running even more deeply than the first phase into the West Bank. 
This is cutting many more thousands of Palestinians off from their land 
and essential services in nearby villages and towns and further restricting 
the movements of all Palestinians in these areas. (2003) 
 
The second phase of the Wall in the north connects the existing Wall, which was built in 
Phase I of the Wall travels east towards the village of Tayaseer on the border of Jordan. 
This area is roughly 45 km in length. The Wall in the Jerusalem Envelope is the most 
concerning in regards to its location. As a major Palestinian city, numerous towns and 
villages rely on the services inside the city. These services are not offered in other areas 
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of the West Bank, and the Wall completely cut people off. According to Stop the Wall 
campaign:  
The Envelope will annex the Ma’ale Adumim settlement block, to the east 
of Jerusalem city, annexing 62 km2 (just over 1% of the West Bank), 71 
km2 from Etzion West in southwest Jerusalem, and 31 km2 in the Giv’on 
block northwest of Jerusalem. Altogether this adds up to 237 km2. (2005) 
 
Jerusalem is a holy city and people are prevented from accessing the city for religious 
purposes. Israel states that permits are given to worshipers for the holy month of 
Ramadan, or to Palestinian Christians to visit the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, but 
Palestinians are denied entry into Jerusalem. 
 
 
Boy in Abu Dis playing with his toy car on the Wall. Abu Dis. 2006 
 
The Wall’s construction has not stopped since it began in 2002. It will eventually 
encircle the West Bank, imprisoning all the residents there. The area around Jerusalem is 
finalized; the Wall will enclose the city. From Jerusalem, the Wall will extend to the 
Bethlehem region, connecting the constructed portions of the Wall there. From 
Bethlehem, it travels south to Hebron. Eventually, the Wall will also run along the 
	   71	  
eastern side of the West Bank, entrapping the Palestinian population inside while 
annexing more land for illegal Israeli settlements.  
 
Judicial Justice? 
There have been numerous judicial proceedings concerning the Wall, both 
internationally and locally within the Israeli Court System. Although the judicial system 
is a likely forum to bring a disputed claim, it has hardly made a difference in the case of 
the Wall. Those connected to the court system are from the same mindset and community 
as those who are approving and building the structure. As the Israeli judicial community 
supported the construction of the Wall, the Palestinian people approached the 
international community in their search for justice. On December 8th, 2003, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution: A/RES/ES-10/14. The request for 
the International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ) would provide an advisory opinion 
on the legality of and consequences to the construction of the Wall in the Occupied 
Territories. On July 9th, 2004, seven months after the submission to the courts, the ICJ 
declared the Wall illegal. The advisory opinion concerning the legal consequences of the 
construction of the Wall in the Occupied Territories is as follows: The construction itself 
is contrary to International Law; Israel must stop construction and dismantle what has 
already been built in the West Bank and in and around the Jerusalem area. Israel is 
obligated to compensate the communities and the people who had their lands taken for 
the construction of the Wall (ICJ, 2004: 136). Israel did not view the ICJ decision as a 
concern, as it was an advisory opinion. Israel is mandated to follow international law as 
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laid out the in the Fourth Geneva convention, which protects civilian populations in the 
time of war. The ICJ cites the Forth Geneva Convention when stating in a press release: 
Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War of 12 August 1949, have in addition the obligation, while 
respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure 
compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in 
that Convention… (2004) 
 
Although the United Nations and the International Courts have the power to mandate an 
end to the construction of the Wall, they have merely given advisory opinions. This 
allows Israel to choose whether to accept the opinion or make their own ruling in regards 
to the Wall. Israel has maintained that the Wall is a security concern and continued to 
build it long after the ICJ opinion was declared. The Palestinian communities affected by 
the Wall continued to reject the status of the Wall and aimed their judicial grievances to 
the Israeli High Court, where decisions would be obeyed. 
 
The Case of Beit Surik  
Around the same time the ICJ was contemplating the verdict for the Wall, a local 
case was being heard in the Israeli High Court. The western Jerusalem villages took the 
case of the Wall to the Israeli court system in hopes to stop the Wall. This case was 
known as the HCJ 2056/04, Beit Surik Council vs. the Government of Israel and the 
Commander of the Israeli military in the West Bank. The case was heard in the Israeli 
Supreme Court under the High Court of Justice. The case began February 29, 2004, when 
the construction of the Wall started in the area. Numerous proceedings were held in the 
courts for this case before the verdict came in on June 24, 2004 (Jewish Virtual Library, 
2004). 
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The villages in the case were Beit Sourik, Biddu, El Kabiba, Katane, Beit A'anan, 
Beit Liqia, Beit Ajaza and Beit Duku. The petition ordered that the land seizure was 
illegal and the route should be changed, due to its harm to plaintiffs. It is estimated that 
42,000 dunums of Palestinian land is affected by the structure. It continued to state that 
the Wall would pass over 4,859 dunums and would therefore separate people from 37,000 
dunums of their land. 26,500 of this land is agricultural and had been cultivated for 
generations. After numerous proceedings, the Wall’s route would change in a few of the 
locations in the northwest Jerusalem area. Although the construction had halted during 
the court case, the land had already been paved in numerous areas. The agricultural 
resources, which the village relied on, were already destroyed. Construction soon began 
for the newer portions of the rerouted Wall, enclosing the western villages into the West 
Bank. 
 
The Case of Alfei Menashe  
Another High Court case began in the middle region of the West Bank, in the 
Salfit area. The Wall was securing Alfei Menashe, an Israeli settlement near the 
Palestinian city of Qalqilya. The settlement is located illegally within the West Bank. The 
Wall was built around Alfei Menashe in August of 2003, connecting it to Israeli proper. 
The Wall surrounds the entire area, enclosing five Palestinian villages. The Israeli 
military claims that they are complying with the needs of the population, stating on their 
website: “The IDF (Israel Defense Forces) issued ‘permanent resident cards’ to the 
residents of the villages, which allow them to live in the enclave and travel from it to the 
rest of the West Bank and back, through a number of gates in the fence” (Israeli Ministry 
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of Foreign Affairs, 2005). This statement was found to be inaccurate; the residents stated 
that they were not allowed to access their lands. In collaboration with the Association for 
Civil Rights in Israel, the residents of the isolated villages brought the case into the legal 
arena against the Israeli state. The petition asked for the Wall to be moved to the Green-
Line and included the judgment from the Beit Suriq case. The petition expressed that this 
route also creates great harm to the residents inhabiting the northern area. The villages 
submitted a petition, HCJ 7957/04, and on September 15, 2005, the court ruled that the 
Wall was not to be moved to the Green-Line, but it was rerouted. The villagers had 
demonstrated that the route caused injury to the communities in its path.  
The new route causes injury to all residents of the West Bank. The route of the 
Wall in total is imprisoning the Palestinian population while stealing Palestinian lands 
and securing illegal Israeli settlements. The rerouting of the Wall would not have 
occurred if the villagers had not taken the case of the Wall to the Israeli High Court. The 
people were not able to stop the Wall through legal channels, but they did save time and 
cost Israel more money.  
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Although communities affected by the Wall brought the issue to the courts to find 
a solution, they found that the Israeli judicial system is not meant to support the occupied, 
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only the occupiers. The other cases were not as successful as the two main cases 
mentioned. The route of the Wall remains deep inside the West Bank, affecting numerous 
villages and towns. Stop the Wall campaign has been following the issue of the Wall: 
According to Israeli military officials, the Wall’s total length will be some 
810 km. The cost of the Wall is now estimated at $2.1 billion, and each 
km costs approximately $2 million. In addition, the Occupation has spent 
2 billion shekels to construct alternative roads and tunnels. (2015) 
 
The Wall’s route has created numerous enclaves and ghettos around Palestinian villages, 
towns and cities. It continues to dip deep inside the West Bank, severely affecting every 
aspect of life of those residing there.  
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Chapter 2 
Violence Triangle in Contemporary Palestine 
 
 
Israel utilizes several forms of violence to maintain control of the Palestinian 
people and further their aim of colonial domination over the land. Johan Galtung’s 
“triangle of violence” theory surpasses the mainstream definition of violence, extending 
our understanding of violence into a three-point model (1969). The triangle of violence 
incorporates the interrelated forces of direct, structural, and cultural violence, which all 
work together to oppress. This framework is essential to understanding the contemporary 
occupation of Palestine.  
Johan Galtung, one of the fathers of peace studies, developed the triangle of 
violence theory over several decades in two stages. He initially defined violence as a two-
part model of direct violence and structural violence (1969). For Galtung, direct violence 
is visible physical abuse committed by social actors. Structural violence is invisible and is 
ultimately more harmful than direct violence, due to its ability to affect countless people 
at the same time. Structural violence creates inequality within society, limiting certain 
social groups’ potential while establishing more for others. Social actors use direct 
violence to enforce structural violence. In essence, according to Galtung, “Violence is 
present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental 
realizations are below their potential realizations” (1969: 168).  
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Decades later, Galtung extended his theory of violence to account for cultural 
violence, creating the violence triangle (1990). Like structural violence, cultural violence 
is invisible and affects numerous people at the same time. It is symbolic and encapsulates 
how cultures are viewed within social systems. For Galtung, 
By “cultural violence” we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic 
sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language 
and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that 
can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence. (1990: 
291) 
 
Cultural violence makes both direct and structural violence seem normal (Galtung, 1990: 
291). Cultural violence is used as an excuse to use physical abuse and legal and social 
inequalities. Israel has successfully used the violence triangle to repress the Palestinian 
people since initial colonial conquests. The goals are to gain more control over the land 
and to exile the indigenous people through creating systemic inequalities and limiting 
Palestinian potential. 
 
Historical Timeline of Violence Triangle 
The triangle of violence in Palestine began before the state of Israel was 
established. Cultural violence was present when the European colonial powers were 
deciding how to rule over all of the Arab lands after World War 1. Edward Said 
highlights cultural violence in his book Orientalism (1979). He explains that the British 
viewed Arabs as inferior to themselves and as unappreciative of the colonial occupation 
(Said 1979: 33). Said describes how Arthur James Balfour, a key participant in the 
handover of Palestine to the Zionists, discussed what he called the “native problem” in 
Egypt. Balfour’s opinion of the Arabs was clear in his June 1910 speech: 
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First of all, look at the facts of the case. Western nations as soon as they 
emerge into history show the beginnings of those capacities of self-
government … having merits of their own…. You may look at a whole 
history of the Orientals in what is called, broadly speaking, the East, and 
you never find traces of self government. (as cited in Said, 1979: 32)  
 
Balfour saw the indigenous Arabs as an inferior Eastern culture and unable to govern 
themselves. This perspective helped the Zionist entity gain more rights over Palestine. 
The Zionists leaders used their shared, recognizable, European identity to persuade the 
British to give them more shares of Palestinian land. As Mazin Qumsiyeh highlights, 
“Many British officers were far more comfortable working with English-speaking 
European Jews than trying to understand and deal with the local inhabitants” (2011: 50). 
Although the indigenous Palestinian people were the demographic majority on the land, 
the European Zionists orientalized their identity to dispossess them of their land. 
This cultural violence laid the groundwork for direct violence, which the early 
settlers exacted on the indigenous Palestinian people. In 1947, the British relinquished the 
rights of the land to the Zionist leaders, and the direct violence campaign began. The 
Nakba (catastrophe) occurred in 1948: the Israelis massacred the indigenous Palestinian 
people and displaced millions. The aim of the Nakba was to transform the demographics 
and gain control over the land. Palestinians who survived the massacres were expelled to 
other lands or internally displaced within the West Bank and Gaza. Numerous 
Palestinians were ousted from their familial lands inside Israel proper and forced to live 
away from their native villages. They were not permitted to visit their homes again. The 
Palestinians who continued living inside Israel proper from 1948 onward are considered 
citizens. They experience ongoing structural violence within the Israeli socio-legal 
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system. They are denied basic rights, compared to the Jewish Israelis, and are treated as 
second-class citizens. 
Israel utilizes direct violence as a tactic to enforce both structural and cultural 
violence. Like in 1948, Israel utilized direct violence again in 1967 during the Naksa to 
conquer the remaining Palestinian lands from Jordan. The occupation of the West Bank 
and Gaza began and the violence triangle made its way to the lands that had not been 
conquered in 1948. Structural violence implements were immediately established to 
maintain control over the territory. An ID system was devised to differentiate between 
Israelis and Palestinians and between different groups of Palestinians. Israel also began to 
transfer their population inside the Occupied Territory, constructing settlements. 
Israel’s ID system was established to separate Palestinian people, categorizing 
them by residence. As Tawil-Souri explains, post-1967 identity cards in the Occupied 
Territories were based on a color system to differentiate people: 
Palestinian Territories (OPTs), but not East Jerusalem, were 
issued orange ID cards. Any Palestinian from the OPTs barred 
from entry into Israel (usually, but not always, a person with a 
previous arrest record) was issued a green card. (2011: 72) 
 
Palestinians living in East Jerusalem were given a blue identity card. Although Israeli 
citizens also carry a blue ID, they are not the same. Israeli citizens, including Palestinians 
who have lived in Israel since 1948, are issued blue Israeli ID cards declaring their 
citizenship. East Jerusalem blue ID holders are viewed as residents of Jerusalem, but not 
citizens. This distinction allows Israel to revoke residency from Palestinians who relocate 
to other countries or live inside the West Bank. However, Israelis who live abroad 
become dual citizens.  
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  Structural violence was vital for Israel to maintain a colonial project inside the 
West Bank. Israel began settlement construction shortly after occupying the territories 
and began to transfer the Israeli population into the West Bank and Gaza. Legal 
inequalities between the settlers and the indigenous people were created as soon as Israel 
started occupying the territory. A dual system of rights between the indigenous 
Palestinians and the settlers were devised, substantiating structural violence. The settlers 
living in the West Bank are considered Israeli citizens by Israeli civil law. Indigenous 
Palestinians, as occupied people, live under Israeli military rule. Israeli settlers continued 
to move into the Occupied Territories, building their communities on government-
sanctioned land confiscated from Palestinians. The initial stages of the occupation relied 
on the imbalanced rights of the two populations. Israel was able to further dominate the 
land and the people, through structural violence implements. 
 The various forms of structural violence Israel employed in the early years of the 
occupation required the use of both direct and cultural violence to maintain it. The 
Palestinian people resisted Israeli colonial rule and the violence triangle implements 
throughout Israel’s conquests. Combating the violence triangle is a decolonial strategy. 
For Frantz Fanon, “Decolonization, therefore, implies the urgent need to thoroughly 
challenge the colonial situation” (1963: 2). Decolonization of Palestine was most feasible 
in the late 1980s, during the First Intifada of 1989. The unarmed, nonviolent, civil 
resistance campaign created an unstable situation for Israel. The movement started within 
the Occupied Territories, and Israel’s triangle of violence was no longer able to function 
in the same ways it had previously. Palestinian organizers resisted with marches, sit-ins 
and strikes, and they created an alternative system that could not be controlled by Israel’s 
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structural violence. As Mazin Qumsiyeh notes, “In addition to the well-known forms of 
resistance, there were many other novel forms. As Israel blocked roads to the besieged 
cities and towns in the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians reverted to old methods to 
transport over mountainous tracks on donkeys and mules” (2011: 142). When the Israeli 
military closed the schools, Palestinian people resisting Israeli structural violence 
established new schools in makeshift spaces. The internal system created an alternative 
way of living outside of Israel’s grasp. The use of unarmed methods combatted the 
cultural violence. International news represented Palestinians’ resistance as legitimate. 
Israel used direct violence to attempt to squash the powerful movement, yet the people 
endured it in masses. The resistance to the violence triangle weakened Israel’s grip on 
indigenous Palestinians.  
Combating the triangle of violence forced Israel to make concessions. The 
byproduct of the resistance was the 1993 Oslo Accords and the return of the exiled 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The negotiations did not decrease the triangle 
of violence; rather, it increased structural violence under the guise of a “peace 
agreement.” The newly established Palestinian Authority (PA) was now acting as the 
security guard for the state of Israel. The PA had little power to combat the occupation 
and a great desire to create an independent state. Israel essentially used the “peace 
agreement” to create the façade of Palestinian control while dominating the territory. The 
Accords solidified Israeli control and colonial objectives, while limiting future 
possibilities of resistance or a Palestinian state. The West Bank was split into three 
categories, creating Bantustans, which restricted Palestinian movement throughout the 
West Bank. Area C, which consisted of over 60% of the West Bank, was now under full 
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Israeli control. Area C is where most settlements are being illegally constructed. 
Palestinians living in Area C are required to access permits to build on the land. The 
Palestinian Center for Human Rights reported:  
IOF (Israeli Occupation Forces) require Palestinians to obtain building 
permits in East Jerusalem and areas located near Israeli settlements and 
bypass roads, but prolonged and complicated procedures must be followed 
to obtain such licenses, which are only granted in very rare cases. (2010: 
74) 
 
Oslo accelerated the apartheid system in the West Bank by increasing structural violence, 
through, for example, the permit system for Palestinians. After the First Intifada, 
checkpoints were established to track Palestinian movement. All entrances to and exits 
from the West Bank became more restricted. The ID system permitted some to travel 
through the checkpoints, while denying others. The Bantustanization of the West Bank 
made resistance against the occupation impossible. The triangle of violence was stronger 
than before the First Intifada. The Palestinian Authority worked with the Israeli 
government to streamline the structural violence. The PA provided a bureaucratic system 
to disburse travel and construction permits to Palestinians. After Oslo, the PLO 
leadership issued those residing in the West Bank Green ID cards instead of the previous 
orange (Tawil-Souri, 2011). 
 
	   84	  
 
West Bank residents using a Green ID to travel to Jerusalem to pray.  
Qalandia Checkpoint, July 2013 
 
The structural violence implements increased opportunities for direct violence to 
occur. The Palestinian people inside the West Bank endured daily acts of direct violence 
from the Israeli soldiers. They experienced this violence when traveling through the 
checkpoints and when the Israeli military conducted periodic village incursions and 
arrests. The direct violence was coupled with the structural violence of the continued 
construction of illegal Israeli settlements. Post Oslo, the Israeli settlers maintained more 
rights in the West Bank than prior. The settlement expansion confiscated more 
Palestinian land and resources inside the Occupied Territory than before. The triangle of 
violence, once limited in its aims during the First Intifada, had gained strength through 
the so-called “peace accord,” and further dominated the indigenous people for the sake of 
the settlers.  
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Israel’s use of the violence triangle continued to oppress the Palestinian people, 
and another uprising intending to achieve the same aims as in 1989 was initiated. In 
2000, the longing for the elimination of the violence triangle began through the Second 
Intifada. The ongoing direct and structural violence, the failed Oslo agreement, and the 
instigation by then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon brought forth this next Palestinian 
resistance. This partially armed movement resisted both structural and direct violence. 
Israel used Palestinians’ armed resistance tactics to label all Palestinians as “terrorists,” 
increasing cultural violence and portraying the Palestinians through the lens that they had 
always viewed them. The cultural violence was so strong that it obscured decades of 
direct and structural violence that Israel had imposed on the Palestinian people.   
Israel maintained their propaganda campaign of cultural violence, which made the 
direct and structural violence look justified. This campaign consisted of labeling all of the 
Palestinian people as potential terrorists. The attacks on Israeli civilians by armed 
Palestinian factions who blew up buses and cafes in major Israeli cities scared the 
majority of Israeli citizens. Israel used this image as a base for their cultural violence 
campaign. The reaction from the Israeli government was to implement more direct and 
structural violence onto the entirely of the Palestinian populations residing inside both 
Gaza and the West Bank. Checkpoints multiplied throughout the territory, and Palestinian 
people were constantly tracked and harassed when traveling between the territories. 
Palestinians of all ages were arrested in large numbers throughout the territories. 
Countless were tortured and killed. Israel also increased the settlements, stealing more 
land from the Palestinian people to secure the illegal Israeli communities inside the West 
Bank. Ultimately Israel decided the best way to secure the Israeli people from the 
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“violent” Palestinian was to build an open-air prison to keep the entire population locked 
up. The Apartheid Wall was viewed as necessary in the eyes of most Israelis – a “security 
measure” cultural violence.  
The establishment of the Apartheid Wall in 2002 enhanced the triangle of 
violence in the West Bank. The Wall integrated direct, structural, and cultural forms of 
violence to maintain the occupation. The violence triangle both controls the indigenous 
population inside the West Bank and restricts future resistance. Israel has utilized the 
violence triangle to segregate the Palestinian people in the West Bank from the incoming 
settler movement, while also repressing them. Structural violence maintains the 
occupation; in the case of Palestine, structural violence is at the pinnacle of the violence 
triangle, supported by both direct and cultural violence. 
 
 
Sign at the entrance of Hebron, located in Area A. Hebron, July 2013 
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Structural Violence in the West Bank 
Structural violence is invisible and built into the structure, creating vast 
inequalities between the settler Israeli population and the indigenous Palestinians living 
on the same land. Within the West Bank, structural violence takes numerous forms, 
dominates the Palestinian people, and enhances settler quality of life. The majority of 
structural violence inside the West Bank started soon after Israel began to occupy the 
territory, and has been used to maintain the overall occupation. Israel began to confiscate 
Palestinian land and water, taking the resources for the newly established settlements. 
Israeli-only bypass roads were also built, creating ease for Israeli settlers to move freely 
from illegal West Bank settlements into Israel proper, and heavily restricting Palestinian 
travel. Checkpoints are situated throughout the territory to track Palestinian movement. 
East Jerusalem is separated from the rest of the West Bank, and travel in and out is not 
permitted for Palestinians with the green West Bank ID. Numerous Palestinian people are 
arrested and detained, without charge, often for several months at a time. As a result of 
these processes, the Palestinian economy is unable to thrive, and Palestinian labor is 
exploited. These structural violence implements have increased with the establishment of 
the Wall. The Wall ultimately sealed the Palestinian people into the West Bank, enabling 
Israel to more easily control the West Bank population. They stole more land, restricted 
more movement, and isolated Jerusalem from the West Bank population.  
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Israeli soldier denying a Palestinian resident access. Hebron. March. 2004 Israeli soldier watching as Israeli settler children walk through Hebron. March 2004 
 
Israel had begun to implement structurally violent tactics after the Naksa in 1967 
to control the land. Since then, the confiscation of land and water resources has been the 
most detrimental for the Palestinian people. Israel’s overall plan when conquering the 
territories was to maintain control of all the land between the Jordan Valley and the 
Mediterranean Sea.  Once they began to occupy the West Bank in 1967, they quickly 
began to establish state rights over the land by building illegal settlements. Currently, 
there are 247 settlements and settlement outposts inside the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem (B'Tselem, 2011). Settlements are Israeli-authorized, built-up areas located 
inside the Green-Line and on Palestinian land. Settlement outposts are built-up areas that 
have not yet received Israeli authorization. Although outposts are illegal within the Israeli 
legal system, these communities typically become sanctioned Israeli settlements with 
time. Israeli settlements occupy large areas of Palestinian land, but only a small portion 
of this land is under settlement construction.  
Israel confiscates Palestinian land for the settlements and as a security measure. 
According to the Palestinian Center of Human Rights: 
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The other portions of land are devoted to the creation of buffer zones 
around settlements, establishing bypass roads for the transportation of 
settlers, and for future strategic expansion. Palestinian civilians living in 
communities located near Israeli settlements area are subject to severe 
Israeli practices, which seek to force them to leave their land, especially as 
IOF have continued to construct the Annexation Wall in the West Bank, 
which has seized large areas of Palestinian land. (2006: 28) 
 
The Wall confiscated more Palestinian land, zigzagging around the settlements to secure 
more land for settlement expansion. The land that was seized for the site of the Wall was 
Palestinian land. Israel’s claims of “security” permitted the government to steal 
Palestinian land for settlement expansion, by-pass roads, and the buffer zone. In phases 1 
and 2, according to the 2003 Palestinian Human Rights Report:  
Israeli occupying forces had appropriated lands from 26 Palestinian 
communities in Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Salfit 
following the issuing of military orders, and effectively confiscated areas 
of land from 18 other communities for the purpose of the construction of 
the wall. Israeli occupying forces confiscated approximately 40,460 
dunums of Palestinian public land, mostly in Jenin, and 124,323 dunums 
of privately owned land, mostly in Jerusalem. Much of this land was 
cultivated, and thus land owners/farmers also lost valuable income. (2004: 
24) 
 
Each year, more land was stolen from Palestinian farmers to build the Wall and to expand 
the Israeli settlements. In 2010, 13,149 dunums, in 2011, 20,987 dunums, and in 2012, 
28,000 dunums were confiscated from Palestinian communities (20% of which were in 
East Jerusalem). In 2013, 10,800 dunums of Palestinian land were confiscated, 198 
dunums of which were in East Jerusalem (Palestinian Center for Human Rights, 2003; 
2011; 2012; 2013; 2014). These numbers add up to a vast portion of West Bank land 
forcibly being transferred from the indigenous people to the settler population.  
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Elderly woman collecting water from a well outside of her village. South Hebron Hill. 2004 
 
The structural violence of transferring valuable resources from the Palestinians to 
the Israelis also occurred with underground resources. Water usage has differed between 
Israelis and Palestinian since the Oslo Accords, heavily exacerbating the inequality. 
According to the Israeli Human Rights organization B’Tselem: 
The Oslo Accords perpetuated the discrimination in allocation of water 
between Israel and the Palestinians. They allotted 80% of the water 
pumped from the mountain aquifer – one of three underground water 
reserves shared by Israel and the Palestinians – to Israel and only 20% to 
the Palestinians. (2014) 
 
The Oslo Accords solidified Israel’s domination over the West Bank’s underground 
water resources, creating a double standard for water usage between the two communities 
living in the West Bank. The indigenous Palestinian people were capped at using 118 
million cubic meters (mcm) to wells that existed before the signing of the Accords, and 
70-80 mcm to new wells drilled since the 1993 Accords (B’Tselem, 2014). The Israeli 
settler community’s water usage was not restricted. The difference in water rights is 
visible; Israeli settlements are lush and green, while the nearby Palestinian villages are 
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dry and barren due to the lack of water. The structural violence of the land and water 
confiscation is irreversible and affects the current and future existence of the Palestinian 
people. 
The 1967 occupation and the settlement building brought forth a need for Israeli-
only infrastructure inside the West Bank. Israeli-only roads were built to connect the 
settlements to each other and to Israel proper. These roads harmed Palestinians. They 
were forbidden from using them and their lands were taken to construct them. The road 
was built to aid settlers in avoiding Palestinian villages and towns when entering or 
exiting a settlement. They essentially “bypassed” the indigenous people when traveling 
through a territory. The settler population desired to live on the land inside the Green-
Line without having to encounter indigenous Palestinians. Israel began to build the new 
roads in the 1980s, but it was not until the Oslo Accords that the construction of the new 
road system was intensified (B’Tselem, 2004). The Israeli military had an increased 
presence because Israel maintained military control over Areas C and B. The roads cut 
off Palestinian areas from each other and Palestinian lands were confiscated for their 
construction. These roads that Palestinians used to travel on became major highways 
within the West Bank. Only Israelis and those with yellow Israeli license plates, not 
Palestinians with green license plates, were allowed to use the roads. According to 
B’Tselem, “In March 2015, there were 60.92 kilometers of roads in the West Bank that 
Israel had classified for the sole, or practically sole, use of Israelis, first and foremost of 
settlers” (2011). The roads ease Israeli travel through the territory they occupy and 
colonize. They also harm Palestinian communities through the loss of land and routes and 
the extra travel time it takes to move through the territory. 
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The Wall closed the bypass roads off to Palestinian traffic. New roads were built 
for Palestinian use, yet the new roads were not direct routes from Palestinian towns, and 
therefore travel took longer. The new Palestinian roads were also situated underneath the 
by-pass roads, as tunnel roads, with checkpoints along the route. The separate road 
system exposes the structural violence within the West Bank. The indigenous Palestinians 
were forced to concede land and travel farther and longer, while Israeli settlers built 
direct routes from the communities that were displacing the local inhabitants. 
Israel has been strategic in how it implements structural violence. The checkpoint 
system greatly benefited their aims of collectively controlling the Palestinian people. 
Shortly after the First Intifada, in 1987, Israel devised a permit system, requiring 
Palestinians to obtain permission to travel between the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, and 
from either of the Occupied Territories into the city of Jerusalem.  Checkpoints were 
soon established and were largely situated along the Green-Line. Along with checkpoints, 
roadblocks and dirt mounds were created to prevent Palestinian travel outside of the 
designated areas. As time passed, internal checkpoints within the West Bank were 
constructed to track Palestinian travel. Post the Apartheid Wall’s construction, more 
travel restrictions occurred. As documented by the Palestinian Center of Human Rights, 
in 2006, there were 528 obstructions to travel, consisting of roadblocks, dirt mounds, 
fixed checkpoints, and flying checkpoints (2006). As the years passed, the number of 
barriers increased and, by 2008, there were 630 obstructions to travel (Palestinian Center 
for Human Rights, 2008). The numbers varied each year, and by 2011 there were 522 
travel barriers. (Palestinian Center for Human Rights, 2011) Although the numbers 
decreased in 2011, the numerous checkpoints and barriers still existed, but they were not 
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staffed by the Israeli military. The Wall had successfully sealed in the communities. The 
Israeli military was not present at each checkpoint, yet the established checkpoints were 
ready to use by the Israeli military and not dismantled. According to B’Tselem, in April 
of 2015, there were 96 fixed checkpoints in the West Bank. Of these, 57 of them were 
situated inside the West Bank and not on the Green-Line (B'Tselem, 2015). The 
checkpoints inside the West Bank were situated close to the settlements as a way to 
“protect” the settler community from the Palestinians. The separation continued 
throughout the territory, securing the illegal settlements and the settlers from the 
indigenous people. 
 
     
Azariya checkpoint  into Jerusalem. December 2006. 
 
The structural violence inside Jerusalem allows Israel to disregard Palestinian 
claims for East Jerusalem to be their future capital. The Wall was not only used as a 
method for settlers to dominate the land; it was also used to prevent Palestinians from 
entering the city of Jerusalem. The Wall cut off access to West Bank ID holders, aiming 
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ultimately to transform the demographics of the city. As the Palestinian Center of Human 
Rights notes: 
IOF have continued to restrict access to occupied East Jerusalem for 
residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As a result, Palestinians 
have been denied access to advanced medical care only provided by 
hospitals in East Jerusalem, to family, education, to work places and to 
religious sites in the city. The construction of the Wall around East 
Jerusalem will establish a permanent barrier for Palestinians seeking to 
enter occupied East Jerusalem. (2005: 9) 
 
Israel cut off access to Jerusalem for West Bank ID holders, isolating them from the 
services only available inside the city. It also disconnected the people from the holy sites 
of the city, disregarding the religious aspects the city offered. 
 
 
Wall in Abu Dis under construction. Abu Dis. January 2004. 
 
The structural violence of the Wall around Jerusalem also attempts push 
Jerusalem ID holders out of the city and into the West Bank. The path zigzags between 
neighborhoods, forcing residents to move deeper inside the city or stay in their homes on 
the West Bank side of the Wall. If Jerusalemites are unable to provide documentation of 
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current residence inside the city, they lose their rights. For those who are able to stay, 
Israel has established different rights for Israelis and Palestinians inside Jerusalem, in 
terms of laws, regulations, and discrimination policies. Permits are needed to build inside 
the city. Palestinian homes are destroyed, yet no permits are given to them for building. 
In contrast, Israelis are free to build, just as in the case of Area C in the West Bank, with 
few instances of retribution by Israel. The Wall has essentially encircled the city, 
isolating Palestinian neighborhoods into the West Bank as a way to physically move the 
Palestinian population out of Jerusalem. Israel has successfully transformed the 
demographics and designed the city to only serve Israelis.  
 Direct violence is connected to every aspect of structural violence within the West 
Bank as a way to enforce it. Israel arrests Palestinians at an alarming rate to control the 
population. The majority of those arrested are held under the administrative detention 
law. This law allows Israel to arrest without charges and to detain without a defined time 
limit or the right of counsel. Israel claims that those who are arrested are a “security 
threat,” using cultural violence in an attempt to justify direct and structural violence. 
International law approves administrative detention, but only when there are no other 
avenues to take. International law is only to be used in extreme cases to prevent danger. 
Israel violates this stipulation, arresting numerous Palestinians under this law, including 
children and the elderly, by classifying all Palestinians as a security threat. According to 
Addameer, a Palestinian human rights organization focused on prisoner issues, in the 
single month of February 2015, 454 Palestinians were held in Israeli prisons in 
administrative detention.  In that same month, there were 6,000 Palestinians locked up in 
Israeli prisons defined as political prisoners; of those 6,000, 163 were children between 
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the ages of 13-16 (Addameer, 2015). Israel also defines children as a security threat; the 
institutions that enact the cultural violence does not differentiate between ages, but 
includes all those oppressed. As PCHR states:  
Administrative detention has been used by IOF to arrest and detain 
Palestinians without charge or trial for long periods. Current 
administrative detention orders permit for periods of detention of up to six 
months that are indefinitely renewable without reference to charge or trial. 
These orders are issued by Israeli district military commanders in the West 
Bank Administrative detention violates Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention which prohibits the use of this measure as a form of 
punishment rather than as an exceptional measure for "imperative reasons 
of security." (2005: 38) 
 
Although this use of administrative detention is illegal under international law, the Israeli 
government claims the arrests are essential to keep Israel safe. In 2002, at the height of 
the Second Intifada, Israel held 1,500 Palestinians in administrative detention alone. The 
number varied each year, decreasing to 650 in 2003, up to 850 in 2004, 700 in 2005, 750 
in 2006, and down to 214 by 2010. The Wall has aided Israel; with the imprisonment of 
an entire population in this open-air prison, it is no longer necessary to individually house 
Palestinians. The Wall holds, as the Israeli government see its, all “potential terrorists” 
inside; neither age nor gender matters for Palestinians. 
Inside the West Bank, as work options were limited; Palestinian people were 
dependent on the Israeli labor market for their income. Post 1967, Israel was lenient on 
Palestinian travel from the West Bank to beyond the Green-Line. Between 1967 and 
1987, the period known as the “open-bridges” years, Palestinians could easily travel into 
Israel work as day laborers. Employers treated Israeli workers and Palestinian workers 
differently, denying Palestinians insurance, paying them lower wages, and abusing them. 
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When the permit system began in the late 80s and increased in the 90s, travel became 
stricter, but Palestinians still found ways into Israel to work.  
 
 
Palestinian Grocer. Hebron. March 2004 
 
 
Structural violence inside the West Bank gravely affected the Palestinian 
economy. It was extremely difficult for Palestinian merchants to compete with the Israeli 
market. As PCHR notes: “Military checkpoints are an obstacle to the movement of cargo. 
This increases the cost of transportation, which is consequently reflected in the prices of 
goods, and adds to the financial hardship of consumers” (2006: 28). With a non-existent 
economy in the West Bank and the obstacles to employment in Israel, Palestinian 
unemployment rates were very high. In 1999, the West Bank had an unemployment rate 
of 19.9%, but by 2003, when the travel restrictions had increased and the Wall was being 
constructed, the unemployment rate in the West Bank rose to 32% (B’Tselem, 2011). 
Palestinians who were able to maintain a work permit inside Israel would have to stay at 
their work sites for days at a time, away from their families. The travel to work was long 
	   98	  
and expensive, and the hassle of passing through a checkpoint was avoided if possible. 
Structural violence harmed the Palestinian economy and maintained the Israeli economy 
through Palestinian labor exploitation and forcing Palestinian dependence on Israeli 
products. 
         
Closed shops in downtown Hebron. Hebron March 2004                 Shops closed in downtown Hebron. Hebron. March 2004 
 
Structural violence implements directly affected every West bank village and 
town. The lack of opportunity was enhanced through the restriction of movement, 
confiscation of land, and limitation of a future. Structural violence is only possible when 
direct violence is present to enforce it. In the violence triangle, direct violence is one of 
the legs keeping structural violence standing. 
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Direct Violence in the West Bank 
Direct violence occurs when an actor physically harms another. This violence can 
also be employed by a group of actors, such as an army. Unlike cultural or structural 
violence, as direct violence is visible, it is clear when it occurs. In the Occupied Territory 
of the West Bank, direct violence is used to exert force and maintain structural violence. 
Direct violence in the Occupied Territories works together with structural and cultural 
violence by maintaining repression through physical tactics. In the West Bank, these 
different forms of violence combine in negative checkpoint interactions, destruction of 
Palestinian property, arrests, curfews, incursions, sieges, beatings, abuse, murder, and the 
imprisonment of the Palestinian people behind the Wall. 
Direct violence against Palestinians is ongoing in the West Bank. Both the Israeli 
military and the Israeli settlers enact this violence. The Israeli military use violence to 
maintain the status quo and limit resistance amongst the Palestinian people. Although 
direct violence has always been used to repress the Palestinian people, since the Second 
Intifada in 2000, violence towards the Palestinian people by the Israeli forces has 
increased. According to B’Tselem: 
Violence against Palestinians by Israeli security forces is not new; it has 
accompanied the occupation for many years. With the outbreak of the al-
Aqsa intifada, however, a significant increase in the number of beatings 
and instances of abuse has occurred, in part because of increased friction 
between Palestinians and Israeli security forces. (2011)  
 
Friction occurs when Palestinians resist Israel’s oppressive actions. For Edward Said, the 
“unappreciative Arab” under British colonial rule in Egypt is more of “the agitator [who] 
wishes to raise ‘difficulties’ than the good native who overlooks the ‘difficulties’ of the 
foreign domination” (1979: 33). Israel uses Palestinian disobedience as an excuse to 
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increase direct violence. Israel uses direct violence as a way to maintain the structural 
violence of the occupation. With the establishment of the Wall, direct violence has 
increased. The Wall forces Palestinians to interact with the Israeli military more 
frequently.  
                         
                Soldier throwing a stunt grenade at Israeli                Soldier reloading tear gas canisters into the gun.  
              Protestors. Budrus 2004                 Budrus 2004 
 
Humiliation is one direct violence practice that the Israeli military uses to repress 
the Palestinian people. Humiliation and harassment typically occur during daily travel 
through checkpoints. Because checkpoints are situated throughout the West Bank, it is 
impossible to avoid an Israeli soldier when moving through the territory. According to 
The Palestinian Center of Human Rights. “In 2002, Israeli occupying forces escalated 
such practices. Israeli soldiers at military checkpoints and roadblocks forced some young 
Palestinian men to take off their clothes and remain in their underwear for long periods of 
time” (2003: 24).  
The meeting of direct and structural violence is dangerous. Traveling through 
mandatory, structurally violent checkpoints to reach any part of the West Bank makes 
	   101	  
Palestinians more vulnerable to direct violence. B’Tselem investigates abuse at 
checkpoints, noting, “Most cases involve a ‘small dose’ of ill treatment such as a slap, a 
kick, an insult, a pointless delay at checkpoints, or degrading treatment. These acts have 
become an integral part of Palestinian life in the Occupied Territories” (2011). These acts 
of aggression occur during daily travel, sometimes several times a day, and accumulating 
“small doses” amount to a great deal of daily harassment. The humiliation and 
harassment prevent Palestinian people from traveling. They attempt to avoid the direct 
violence. People remaining in their homes and not on the roads traveling are doing 
exactly what Israel needs to maintain an occupation, a complacent and fearful society, 
and essentially good “natives.” Staying home is logical in the face of such continual 
violence; it is dangerous for Palestinians to travel through these various structural 
violence implements. Palestinians experience continual harassment by both the Israeli 
soldiers and settlers, in which they encounter along their travel routes, and attempts to 
avoid this abuse is understandable. Although it is clear why people choose to stay home, 
this act unknowingly cooperates with Israel in the project of controlling and harassing 
travelers. 
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Palestinian drivers being stopped and checked by the Israeli military.  Salfit, 2005 
 
 
 
Investigative entities collect data to show the direct violence to the Israeli 
authorities, in hopes to stop it. B’Tselem collects incidents of ongoing abuse and attempts 
to use the information within the Israeli legal channels. “From September 2000 until the 
end of 2011, B’Tselem reported 473 cases to the law-enforcement authorities in which 
B'Tselem's investigation raised the suspicion that security forces used violence against 
Palestinians.” As these 473 cases account only for those incidents of violence reported to 
the Israeli authorities, this number does not represent the ongoing, daily abuse that goes 
unreported. Palestinians have no internal body to notify, and without an Israeli 
intermediary, they are not able to confront the abuse and be heard. Although B’Tselem 
heavily documents the abuse and notifies the Israeli authorities, there are rarely 
consequences for the direct violence. The courts are part of the structural violent system 
that B’Tselem is working against. The army and courts work within the same system and 
serve to maintain the occupation. Controlling the Palestinians for security measures is the 
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main aim of both of these entities. Cultural violence extends from the West Bank into the 
court system, which essentially legalizes the physical abuse.  
 
 
Resident of Shuhada St in an enclosed Balcony. Settlers threw stones  
at her window, she was unable to go onto the balcony until the  
protection was built. Hebron, June 2013 
 
Israeli settlers use direct violence as a way to maintain control over the areas they 
are colonizing. According to B’Tselem, “Israeli civilians have perpetrated various forms 
of violence against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, damaging their lands, their 
persons and their property” (2011). Israeli settlers face no repercussions for shooting 
Palestinians or running them over with their cars. In October of 2014, a five-year-old 
child, Einas Khalil, was run over and killed by a settler when walking near a by-pass road 
outside of her village with a friend (2014). These attacks are not isolated. In 2013 alone: 
PCHR documented 291 attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinian 
civilians in 2013. These attacks resulted in wounding 29 Palestinian 
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civilians, including 8 children, while 30 others, including 8 children, 
sustained bruises and glass shrapnel wounds. Moreover, 10 sheep died, 75 
Palestinian vehicles’ tires and windows were damaged and 3,535 trees 
were cut off and burnt. (2014: 55) 
 
PCHR reported that since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September of 2000 and 
until the end of 2012, Israeli settlers killed 63 Palestinians, including 14 children (2013). 
Like the army, the settlers are rarely punished for this behavior, and in most cases the 
Israeli military will protect them and punish the Palestinians. Although Israeli settlers are 
invading Palestinian lands, cultural violence is so strong in the settler communities, that 
even these killings are viewed as security measures. 
Destroying Palestinian property is another form of direct violence that is 
sanctioned by the Israeli authorities. Palestinian homes are demolished as punishment for 
those who are “wanted” by Israel. This practice is meant to deter others from using 
violence against the occupation. In some cases, the person wanted by the Israeli 
Authorities might already be in custody or killed, yet the home of their family is still 
demolished as punishment, leaving innocent people homeless. B’Tselem explains:  
The official objective of the house demolition policy is deterrence, based 
on the assumption that harming the relatives of Palestinians who 
perpetrated, or are suspected of involvement in, attacks against Israeli 
citizens and soldiers would deter others from carrying out such attacks. 
Since this constitutes deliberate harm to innocents, it is clear that even if 
house demolition had the desired deterrent effect, it would, nevertheless, 
remain unlawful. (2011)  
 
In 2005, the Minister of Defense in Israel halted this punitive practice, but during the 
summer of 2014, when three yeshiva students were kidnapped, it was used against the 
suspect’s family homes. Four homes were demolished, leaving 27 people homeless, 13 of 
them children. 
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In addition to threatening suspects, this direct violence tactic is also used against 
families who build homes without the proper permits issued by Israel. Palestinians living 
in Area C are not permitted to build additions to their homes or structures for their 
agricultural needs without approval from Israel. They are very rarely issued permits. 
Israel claims that it is state land designated for natural parks, nature reserves, firing 
ranges, and the expansion of Israeli settlements. Palestinians are forced to live in basic 
conditions if denied a building permit. Palestinians who choose to build without the 
permit risk the demolition of their home. Homes are not always demolished during the 
construction phase, but in several cases long after the structure has been completed and 
the family has moved in. This is a risk that families take while building. They do not have 
varying options. “From 2006 until 15 Dec. 2014, Israel demolished at least 
817 Palestinian residential units in the West Bank, causing 3,956 people – including at 
least 1,925 minors – to lose their homes” (B’Tselem, 2011). In Jerusalem, these numbers 
are much higher, due to Israel’s political aspirations to change the city’s demographics. 
The direct violence enforces the structural violence of unequal building rights. The goal 
is to displace the Palestinians and increase the number of Israeli residents. Building 
restrictions for Palestinians inside Jerusalem started in 1967, when the occupation began. 
Although there are building laws inside the city, Israelis living there continue to break 
these laws without the threat of home demolition, whereas Palestinians who break the law 
do experience the demolition of their homes. “The Jerusalem Municipality enforces the 
building laws on Palestinians much more stringently than on the Jewish population, even 
though the number of violations is much higher in the Jewish neighborhoods” (B’Tselem, 
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2011). In numerous cases, Palestinians are forced to demolish their own homes to avoid 
the municipal charges of demolition and the attached fines. 
In addition to individual and family levels of victimization, direct violence is also 
exacted on entire communities. Israel imposes curfews and incursions, which are forms 
of collective punishment that affect every person in the area. According to PCHR:  
In 2003, Israel controlled part of the West Bank town of Hebron, where at 
least 45000 Palestinians live, and had been under curfew for 130 days. The 
curfew sometimes continued for a period of several weeks. Such 
restrictions clearly affect every area of life; workers were not allowed 
access to their work places; traders were not able to open shops; 
approximately 13000 school children were not able to attend classes; 
patients were denied access to medical services. (2004: 31) 
 
Collective punishment is illegal under the 4th Geneva Convention, but Israel does not 
follow the guidelines of international law. For example, international law allows force 
when under threat, but Israel uses direct violence to maintain the structural violence of 
the occupation. B’Tselem highlights:  
Israeli law, like international law, allows security forces to use reasonable 
force in self-defense and for duty-related purposes such as dispersing 
rioters, arresting suspects resisting arrest, and preventing a detainee from 
fleeing. The law does not, however, allow beatings, degradation, or ill-
treatment of persons who are not rioting, resisting arrest, or fleeing. (2011) 
 
Israel violates international law by continually using direct violence on the Palestinian 
people. Using direct violence supports their goals of repressing the society though 
physical harm. 
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Israeli soldiers pushing a Palestinian man. Beit Ula. November 2004 
 
 
 
Direct violence is used to uphold the structural violence of the occupation. Each 
component of structural violence is enforced through the use of the numerous direct 
violence implements previously discussed. The Wall is one form of direct violence that 
imprisons the entire West Bank population. Although the structure itself is a form of 
direct violence, visible as an open-air prison, the effects of the Wall manifest various 
forms of structural violence. The violence triangle is enforced by way of direct violence 
and justified through the “security façade” of cultural violence. 
 
Cultural Violence in the West Bank 
Cultural violence is ingrained within the language, religion, and ideology of 
Israeli society. Israel was established as a Jewish state, promoting Jewish inhabitants over 
any other, including the indigenous population. The Law of Return grants Jewish people 
in diaspora the right to relocate to Israel and gain citizenship (Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 1950). In contrast, Palestinians who were exiled from their homes in 1948 are 
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rarely permitted to visit the country. Religion is often used as a way to differentiate 
superiority. In the eyes of the majority of Israelis, being Jewish is a superior status. 
Palestinians are largely Muslim, but there is a thriving Christian Palestinian population. 
Palestinians typically emphasize their Palestinian identity over their religion. Israelis 
typically identify first and foremost with their Jewish faith, whether or not they are 
currently practicing. Prioritizing Jewish identities over all others inhabiting the land 
provides the basis of cultural violence. Structural and direct violence are used to enforce 
rights based on identity. 
Differentiating between the two populations shapes every aspect of Israeli 
society. To ensure that structural and direct violence are not questioned, a cultural 
violence campaign is essential for Israel. Israeli rhetoric of Palestinians as “terrorists” 
supports the use of direct and structural violence as “security measures.” This thought 
process is built deep within Israeli society. Cultural violence creates an “Israeli as victim 
of Palestinian violence” narrative. This widespread perspective helps Israel in their 
attempt to justify to their citizens, and the international community, the need to control 
Palestinians. Israel exports dehumanizing propaganda to the global community to 
absolve the state of any responsibility for Palestinian lives. The website Jewish Virtual 
Library has a section on “Palestinian terrorism,” which claims that the obstacles to peace 
lie with the Palestinian side and fails to discuss the Israeli role or Israeli violence. This is 
one example of how Israel figures anti-Palestinian violence as a form of self-protection. 
The website suggests that the Palestinian governing body teaches hatred and violence in 
their community, stating:  
The culture of hatred cultivated by the Palestinian Authority (PA) against 
Israel undermines the chances for peace between Israel and the 
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Palestinians. Incitement has continued unabated for many years and 
despite the current negotiations between Israel and the PA that began on 
30 July 2013. (2014) 
 
For the majority of the global Jewish community, Palestinians are the obstacles to peace. 
This propaganda campaign erases the violence Israel has committed since its inception in 
1948. The campaign has successfully positions Israelis as the sole victims. The website 
continues to discuss the “terrorism and violence” within the larger Palestinian 
community. Importantly, the website claims that Israeli children want peace but that 
Palestinians are taught hate from a young age: “Incitement and peace do not go together. 
When the next generation of Palestinians is educated for peace and coexistence – as 
Israeli children already are – the chances for true peace will increase” (Jewish Virtual 
Library, 2014). This claim justifies Israel’s imprisonment and killing of Palestinian 
children. All Palestinians, regardless of age, are viewed as a product of their “violent” 
society and potential terrorists. This kind of propaganda is maintained in Israeli schools 
(Peled-Elhanan, 2012) and in pop culture and mainstream media. Politics and mainstream 
news portray Palestinians as violent people who want to “throw all the Jews into the sea.” 
This form of cultural violence encourages mainstream Israelis to hate Palestinians. These 
representations are dehumanizing and both attempt to excuse and obscure the everyday, 
directly violent, anti-Palestinian abuses and the larger system of structural violence. 
 This cultural violence also stems directly from the Israeli government. The state 
claimed that the Wall, which they called the “security barrier,” was needed to limit 
suicide bombings inside Israel. Before the Wall was constructed, militant Palestinian 
factions utilizing armed resistance against civilians completed numerous suicide 
bombings. Electronic Intifada journalist Ben White analyzed UN and Israeli government 
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statistics and found that the bombings decreased after the Wall’s construction began; 
however, he argues that the Wall was not the deterrent (2014). The number of attacks 
were as high as 55 in 2002 and then decreased to 25 in 2003, when the Wall was first 
being constructed, and continued to decrease over the years to 1 attack in 2007. White 
argues that various components and not the Wall created the decline of suicide bombings. 
First, the Wall was only 20% complete when the declines first began. The numbers 
dropped from 55 in 2002 to 14 in 2004, when there were still opportunities to more easily 
access Israel and perform an attack. He also noted that the numbers dropped drastically 
after the Hamas ceasefire in late 2004 (White, 2014). White essentially argues that the 
Wall was not the sole reason for the decline, and the militant group halted the attacks, 
which subsequently coincided with the construction of the Wall. However, Israel still 
used the armed Palestinian resistance as their motive to building the Wall. Although they 
claimed the Wall would secure the Israeli public, they did not build it on the Green-Line, 
the internationally recognized border, but deep inside the Occupied Territory. This 
demonstrates that Israel was not intending to build the Wall for security, but to obtain 
more land for the illegal settlements and colonial endeavors.  
 Vilifying Arabs is a theme beyond the establishment of the Wall. In the 2015 
Israeli elections, Benyamin Netanyahu, the incumbent and newly elected Prime 
Minister, based his campaign on protecting the Israeli public from the “Arabs.”  He 
urged his fellow Israelis to get to the polls and vote or the Arab takeover of the 
“democracy” would occur. He stated, “The right-wing government is in danger. Arab 
voters are heading to the polling stations in droves” (Zonszein, 2015). This statement 
reflected the Israeli government's perspectives and fears of the indigenous people.  
	   111	  
 Cultural violence positions one group as superior to another group. In Israeli 
media, Palestinians are commonly constructed as subhuman and therefore inferior. The 
newly appointed Deputy Defense Minister in Netanyahu’s 2015 elected right wing 
government expressed this view. Eli Ben Dahan, who leads the Israeli military’s Civil 
Administration in the West Bank, stated in a 2013 interview, “To me, they [Palestinians] 
are like animals, they aren’t human” (Pileggi, 2015). Dahan was appointed to a position 
where he is in direct control over the West Bank’s infrastructure in Area C and travel 
permits for Palestinians. Dahan, who thinks Palestinians are subhuman, is tasked with 
allocating them rights within the territory. His views explain the direct connection 
between how the Palestinians are viewed and how they are treated within the territory. 
 
 
 
Palestinian woman lying on the ground unconscience, while the  
Israeli ambulance was on site, yet unwilling to take her due to  
being Palestinien. Nil’in 2004 
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Conclusion 
 The violence triangle has been used inside the West Bank since Israel began 
occupying the territory. Structural violence has been the tip of the triangle, maintaining 
the ongoing cultural violence campaign and enforcing daily direct violence. Israel 
intensified this violence triangle, using more violence against the Palestinian people each 
year. The Wall, a structural form of violence, enhanced the triangle of violence to 
increase vulnerability to harm and inequality. 
The Wall’s construction intensified inequalities between Israelis and Palestinians. 
Israelis are able to travel freely and find gainful employment, while Palestinians exist in 
bantustans surrounded by a concrete Wall and an electric fence. Palestinian lands and 
livelihoods are being confiscated for Israeli settlements. Travel costs more money to 
Palestinians, as they have to use separate roads. Israelis have options for their medical 
care whereas Palestinians are limited to the few main hospitals and clinics located inside 
the West Bank. The Wall completely limits Palestinians’ use of Jerusalem. The Wall 
exacerbated the violence that already existed, leaving no options for people to thrive. The 
violence triangle in the Occupied Territory of the West Bank has been successful for 
Israel. The ongoing culturally violent propaganda campaign has made the direct and 
structural violence seem normal and deserved by the majority of Israeli citizens, as well 
as the international community. 
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Part 2 
The Wall’s Violence 
 
Israel has demonstrated a history of violence against the Palestinian people, 
ultimately aiming to conquer the lands and in turn dominate the indigenous people. 
Although Israel successfully employed the violence triangle for several decades, with 
each popular Palestinian uprising, an escalation on violence was required to maintain its 
occupation. In 2002, as a direct response to the Second Intifada, Israel began to establish 
the Apartheid Wall to monitor and control Palestinians in specific areas. The Wall 
traveled throughout the Occupied Territory of the West Bank, affecting not only the 
villages and towns that were in its direct path, but also those at a distance. The Wall 
essentially erased the Green-Line through the implementation of the violence triangle.  
The violence triangle was enacted through the establishment of the Wall for 
several political purposes. Part 2 of this dissertation is split into three separate chapters to 
discuss the use of the Wall by the state of Israel. The Wall’s violence is discussed 
throughout these chapters in descriptive detail to expose Israel’s use of the violence 
triangle. This detail is intentional as a way to explicitly highlight the numerous ways in 
which Israel uses violent against the Palestinian people, thus reframing the narrative. 
Each chapter in this section explores the effects of the Wall on the indigenous Palestinian 
people through first-hand accounts of dispossession, restricted movement, and the 
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Jerusalem Envelope. As the Wall impacted numerous aspects of social and political life 
for Palestinians, the chapters are divided into topic areas. However, as the distinct issues 
the chapters cover are also interrelated, the chapters analyze the complexity of the 
violence that the Wall imposes onto the occupied population. Focusing on each aspect of 
the Wall’s violence facilitates a thorough examination of how Israel utilizes the violence 
triangle in its persisting occupation. This analysis lays bare Israel’s true intentions in 
establishing the Wall. 
The dispossession of lands and resources exists in all areas where Israel constructs 
the Wall. This enables Israel to conquer more of the land in its colonizing efforts. Chapter 
3 specifically focuses on the dispossession of Palestinian lands in the West Bank, 
analyzing the establishment and construction of the Wall for the expansion of Israeli 
settlements. Investigating the dispossession of land and resources makes clear that 
Israel’s objective in the building of the Wall is not for security, but to extend its long-
lasting colonial plans. The path of the Wall weaving deep inside the West Bank around, 
between, and often directly through villages demonstrates Israel’s aim to dissolve the 
Green-Line and secure settlements into its expanding state. This route has enabled Israel 
to grab ever more Palestinian lands and resources, annexing them to the Israeli side of the 
Wall, and further creating an unequal environment for the two populations residing in the 
West Bank – indigenous Palestinians and the settler Israelis. The court cases that 
Palestinian villages and towns affected by the Wall brought forth to the Israeli military 
courts in the search for justice in this unjust environment illustrate the violence triangle in 
the form of the Wall and its related systems and practices of surveillance and control. The 
ways Israel informed the local Palestinian populations affected by the Wall of the 
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construction and the dispossession of their lands and thus their diminished livelihoods 
also illustrate the violence triangle. Part 2 investigates these issues to demonstrate that the 
triangle of violence is essential for Israel to utilize in their colonial endeavors as a means 
to dominate the lands and the occupied Palestinian population residing inside the Wall. 
The Wall’s path is strategic in not only in confiscating Palestinian lands, but also 
as a means of control over the people.  Chapter 4 examines how Israel uses the Wall to 
restrict Palestinian movement within the West Bank, essentially creating an open-air 
prison to track and monitor the occupied population. To accomplish this goal, Israel has 
developed enhanced structural violence implements, such as checkpoints, gates, road 
closures, and bypass and tunnel roads. Some of these implements have been in use since 
the occupation began in 1967, while others have been constructed in conjunction with the 
construction of the Apartheid Wall. These implements track and limit Palestinian 
movement within the West Bank and beyond the Wall, and they also directly prevent the 
Palestinian people from accessing labor, ultimately increasing the time and money it 
takes to travel inside the West Bank. The Palestinian people encounter daily harassment 
while traveling through these structurally violent implements, which pushes them to 
remain in their homes. The restriction of movement directly affects the possibility of 
collective action against the Israeli occupation, which is a political aim of Israel. They not 
only suppress the Palestinian people through the structural violence implements, they 
have also created an environment where it is difficult to collectively resist the occupation. 
This in turn allows room for individual violent resistance rather than collective 
nonviolent resistance. Through the path of the Wall, Israel has been able to unilaterally 
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dissolve the border, which further disconnects the Palestinian people from both their 
envisioned future state and the holy city of Jerusalem. 
The issues of dispossession and restricted movement are compounded in the area 
around Jerusalem, which is known as the Jerusalem Envelope. Chapter 5 explores the 
special case of the Jerusalem Envelope, where Israel has implemented an unequal ID 
system to further repress the local Palestinian population in an attempt to deport them 
into the West Bank. This measure also limits the access of those who reside in areas that 
were Palestinian suburban areas before the establishment of the Wall to services and 
medical care inside the city. The Wall affects the demographics of the city of Jerusalem. 
This is a visible result of Israel’s use of structural violence as a means to settle and 
colonize. Chapter 5 examines how in the Jerusalem Envelope, Israel enhances structural 
violence implements to transfer the local Palestinian population residing in East 
Jerusalem into the Palestinian side of the Wall in the West Bank.  In turn, the Wall 
around Jerusalem includes the built-up Israeli settlements located inside the West Bank 
into the city and considers them to be Jerusalem suburban areas, transforming the city’s 
makeup. This separation, and the use of the violence triangle, has turned to a boiling 
point for Palestinians and Israelis within the city. In Jerusalem, collective nonviolent 
action is difficult due to the ongoing violence triangle, and the minority of Palestinians 
within the city. The structural violence has resulted in individual acts of Palestinian 
violence towards Israelis, and direct violence enacted onto the Palestinian people at large 
by Israeli mobs as a byproduct of cultural violence.  The Jerusalem Envelope exposes 
how the use of the Wall has produced more direct violence, and supported by the use of 
increased structural and cultural violence. 
	   117	  
Part 2 of this dissertation uses personal testimonies to trace how Israel has used 
the Apartheid Wall to continue dispossessing the Palestinian people of their lands and 
resources, rendering the Green-Line obsolete with the aim to expand the settler colonial 
Israeli state. Examining these first-hand accounts shows that Israel has dealt with the 
“Palestinian problem” by trapping Palestinians inside the Wall to strategically employ 
structural violence implements, using both direct and cultural violence to control them. It 
is clear from the Palestinian perspective that Israel is executing a political strategy around 
the city of Jerusalem by establishing the Wall to isolate all Palestinian claims to the holy 
city as an envisioned future capital, further disconnecting the Palestinian people from 
their dreams of self-determination.  
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Chapter 3 
Dispossession from the Wall 
 
The Apartheid Wall is a form of structural violence: it dispossesses Palestinian 
people of their lands to expand the illegal Israeli settlements for further Israeli 
domination of the Occupied Territory. The Wall’s path intrudes far beyond the Green-
Line into the Occupied Palestinian Territory of the West Bank, essentially dissolving the 
1947 Armistice Line. The Wall annexes land and underground resources, and transfers 
them to the other side of the Wall, utilized by the Israeli settler populations. The triangle 
of violence enables the confiscation of Palestinian land by way of the Wall. Although 
Israel has always employed the violence triangle to maintain their occupation, the Wall 
introduces new implements of direct, structural and cultural violence. Interpreting the 
Wall’s dispossession through the framework of the triangle of violence supports the 
reframing of the mainstream narrative from “Palestinian as the aggressor” to one of 
“Palestinian as victim to Israeli violence”.  Reframing is accomplished through exposing 
Israel’s use of violence to dominate the land and the Palestinian people for political 
purposes.  
This chapter focuses on the dispossession of Palestinian land and resources for the 
construction of the Apartheid Wall as a means to highlight Israeli violence and reframe 
the mainstream narrative. Land dispossession is a form of structural violence that Israel 
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performs to expand their control. By stealing Palestinian land, Israel robs the indigenous 
population of their potential for the political aspirations of expanding the Israeli state by 
dissolving the Green-Line. While Palestinians suffer land and resource losses, the settler 
populations in the West Bank thrive. The triangle of violence has increased with the 
establishment of the Apartheid Wall to ensure this divide. Although the Wall is stealing 
Palestinian land, this is not the first time in history that Israel has confiscated Palestinian 
land for their colonial endeavors. By exposing Israeli violence, and reframing the 
narrative, activists’ communities have the potential to resist Israeli violence with 
additional international support. 
One purpose of the Wall is to isolate the Israeli settlements from the Palestinian 
areas that they are built on. The triangle of violence reinforces the establishment, and the 
preservation, of the Wall. The settlements started in 1967, when Israel began to occupy 
the West Bank. As the decades passed, Israel began to implement the violence triangle to 
repress the occupied peoples, and give more freedoms to the settler communities inside 
the West Bank. This established an inequality between the indigenous people and the 
settler population. This inequality is a form of structural violence. Structural violence is 
invisible, yet its effects are long lasting. In the case of the West Bank, the Israeli settler 
population has benefited by exploiting the Palestinian population. This inequality creates 
a disparity between the overall life chances of these two groups (Galtung, 1969: 168). It 
is significant to acknowledge the Israeli government’s positioning of Israeli settlers over 
the indigenous Palestinian residents through structural violence. This inequality increases 
hostility towards the other, and has the ability to develop into armed struggle.  
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Structural violence does not exist alone; it works in conjunction with direct and 
cultural violence to create the violence triangle. In the West Bank, a highly militarized 
army controls the Palestinian population. The Israeli army, situated throughout the West 
Bank, use direct violence towards the Palestinian people to dominate them. Physically 
harming the indigenous people is strategic for the Israeli military. The Palestinian people 
do not willingly accept the numerous forms of structural violence imposed on them, and 
have utilized resistance tactics against Israel’s triangle of violence. As a response, Israel 
employs direct violence to generate fear and coerces the Palestinian people to submit to 
the structural violence. Cultural violence reinforces direct and structural violence; it is 
used as an excuse by Israel to collectively punish the Palestinian people. By using 
Palestinian cultural attributes, and framing them as negative, Israel demonizes the 
Palestinian culture as a way to dehumanize the people. Thus, the Israeli government 
labels the Palestinian people as “dangerous terrorists” and position themselves as the 
victims. This propaganda enables Israel to implement various forms of structural violence 
in the name of security. Combatting this culturally violent false narrative is essential to 
support ongoing resistance. 
In the West Bank, structural and cultural violence meet to oppress the Palestinian 
people through contrasting governance. Identity-based legal rights differentiate how 
Palestinians and Israelis are able to live. These two groups also live under different 
judicial guidelines. For example, a Jewish settler residing inside the Occupied Territory is 
bound by Israeli civil law while indigenous Palestinians are subject to Israeli military law 
and Palestinian Authority law. These two populations essentially live in an apartheid 
system. In an apartheid system, structural violence works in accordance with cultural 
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violence, attributing more rights to one group while limiting the rights of the other. 
Apartheid systems also use direct violence to ensure the oppressed group obeys the 
structurally violent orders.  Israel’s use of apartheid supports their control over the 
Occupied Territory, and further agitates the oppressed population, who are living in the 
midst of extreme inequality.  
The Wall is a continuation of the violence triangle within the West Bank; it 
continues to confiscate Palestinian lands for Israeli colonial aspirations. By virtue of the 
Wall, Israel steals Palestinian land in the name of “security.” Israelis refer to the Wall as 
the “security Wall,” framing it as a form of safety for the Israeli people. This narrative 
positions the Israeli population as victimized by the Palestinian people. However, a more 
accurate name for the barrier is the Apartheid Wall. By reframing the name, and the 
purpose of the Wall, it is clear that it is a form of structural violence, and affects the 
Palestinian people in long-lasting ways. Acknowledging the Wall as a form of Apartheid 
reinforces the overall reframing of the narrative, highlighting Israel’s use of the violence 
triangle to allot rights to Israeli settlers while dispossessing Palestinians. The Wall was 
not built along the internationally recognized Green-Line, but encroaches deep into 
Palestinian villages and towns, well within the Green-Line, confiscating Palestinian land 
and resources, and securing Israeli settlements.  The Wall takes from the Palestinian, 
limiting their potential for the benefit of the Israeli settler. As Galtung notes, “If insight 
and/or resources are monopolized by a group or class or are used for other purposes, then 
the actual level falls below the potential level, and violence is present in the system” 
(Galtung, 1969: 169). The Apartheid Wall is an extreme form of structural violence, 
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stealing land from indigenous Palestinians, and unilaterally transferring it to Israel to 
expand their settler colony. 
 
Dispossession in the West Bank 
Structurally violent land confiscation has been a policy since Israel became a 
state, and continues to shrink the Palestinian Territories. This has had long-lasting effects 
on the indigenous people, for whom land is a significant component of their cultural 
identity. Histories of a land inform its future. Palestinian studies scholar Beshara 
Doumani highlights the connection the Palestinian people have towards their land.  
In rural areas, to give but a small example, every noticeable geological 
marker—whether a boulder, hillside, or spring—and every significant 
manifestation of human labor on the land—whether a garden, terrace, or 
olive grove—possessed a name that was passed down the generations. 
These named markers are sites of memories that anchor durable, discrete, 
and interlinked social spaces (especially in the hill areas) where 
individuals and communities are constituted. (2007: 53) 
 
Most Palestinians can narrate stories about their land, referencing their ancestors and 
their history. It was essential for the settler-colonists to break the indigenous people’s 
bond to their lands to successfully conquer them and to establish the state of Israel in 
1948. To accomplish this, Israel utilized direct violence tactics to physically remove the 
Palestinian people from their lands. This period was the beginning of land confiscations 
in service of the expanding settler colonial state.  
Dispossession of Palestinian lands, through the triangle of violence, was an 
integral historical strategy for Israel’s colonial project. The Palestinian people refer to the 
initial destruction of their land as the Nakba (catastrophe). The Palestinian inhabitants of 
the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea experienced calculated 
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forms of direct violence. They were forced out of their homes, massacred, exiled, and 
internally displaced into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Lands within Israel proper 
were annexed and the state of Israel was established on this land, erasing all aspects of 
Palestinian origins. Lands within the Green-Line, the internationally recognized border, 
known as the West Bank, were controlled by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from 
1948 until 1967. During these twenty years, Palestinians maintained control over their 
lands inside the West Bank. Records of land ownership were rarely kept under the 
Hashemite rule due to high taxes. In 1967, Israel conquered Jordan in the ‘Six Day War,’ 
also known as the Naksa, and began to occupy the West Bank and Gaza. Once Israel 
began to occupy the Palestinian territories, the triangle of violence was used to dominate 
the indigenous people, prefacing the long-standing practice of violence to maintain the 
occupation. Israeli settlers began to move into the territories, illegally establishing their 
own communities on the land. To secure these communities, Israel began to steal 
Palestinian lands, claiming the land as state land (Matar 1981: 101). Once settlements 
were constructed, by-pass roads were built to allow Israeli settlers direct pathways from 
their settlement communities, inside the West Bank, into Israel proper. The road system 
was devised to separate the settler population from the Palestinian communities they were 
dispossessing. An imbalanced system was developed, allotting rights to the settler 
community while exploiting the Palestinian people. Structural violence grew over the 
next several decades. To maintain the divisions, Israel positioned the Israeli military 
throughout the West Bank, with a heavy presence near the settlement communities. The 
Israeli military utilized direct violence techniques against the Palestinian people to get 
them to conform to the structural violence implements. Within the Israeli state, an 
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ongoing cultural violence campaign against the Palestinian people was underway. 
Palestinians were demonized, producing an excuse for the ongoing structural and direct 
violence occurring inside the West Bank. The presence of the military further 
exacerbated the frustrations Palestinians were feeling while living under the violence 
triangle of the occupation. 
The Wall’s establishment intensified Israel’s long history of land appropriation 
and the implementation of the triangle of violence was used as a means to confiscate 
more Palestinian land. The Wall disrupted the connection between the indigenous 
Palestinian people and their lands. It officially sealed the Palestinian people inside the 
Occupied Territory, leaving their lands on the other side to be conquered for the 
expansion of the settler colonial state of Israel. The Wall, the most contemporary aspect 
of ongoing structural violence, is disastrous for agricultural communities situated along 
the path. The majority of Palestinian villages in the West Bank relied on their lands as a 
source of income. Losing their land has hindered these villages’ growth and farmers’ 
livelihood. Israel’s colonial, continual, land confiscation has further displaced the 
Palestinian farmers from their history and their future. The indigenous inhabitants of the 
West Bank are striving to remain on their lands in the face of continued Israeli settler 
colonial violence, and its newest problem: the Apartheid Wall. As indigenous studies 
scholars Alfred and Corntassel explain, “It is this oppositional, place-based existence, 
along with the consciousness of being in struggle against the dispossessing and 
demeaning fact of colonization by foreign peoples, that fundamentally distinguishes 
Indigenous peoples from other peoples of the world” (2005: 597). The Palestinian people 
did not allow Israel to steal their land without a confrontation. This act of dispossession 
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prompted the Palestinian farmers to mobilize against the ongoing confiscation. The Wall 
has ultimately stolen land and livelihood from the indigenous Palestinian people for the 
Israeli settler population. The transfer of land and resources generate structural violence, 
which is upheld through Israeli and settler direct violence. The Wall was not built in the 
name of security, but as a continuation of Israel’s land grab. The path of the Wall 
provides ample proof that Israel’s intention was to claim more Palestinian land for the 
settler colonial state. 
 
 
The Wall next to houses. Azariya 2006 
 
The Violence of the Wall’s Path 
Although Israel has declared that the Wall is a security measure, its route exposes 
how “securing” the West Bank was not the goal, which directly draws attention to 
Israel’s violence. The Wall was not built along the Armistice Line (Green-Line), which is 
recognized internationally as a border. However, the Wall is located deep inside the 
Green-Line, weaving in between Palestinian villages and towns. If security were Israel’s 
intention, the route would not snake into settlement enclaves to include them into the 
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“Israeli” side of the Wall. The Wall’s route is the newest phase of the Israeli 
government’s unilateral dispossession of Palestinian land. The aim is to use the Wall to 
take more Palestinian land and expand the settler communities within the West Bank. As 
Catherine Cook points out,  
Israel argues that the wall is being constructed for security reasons, but the 
structure's meandering path betrays underlying territorial ambitions. In 
places, the barrier dips over three miles into the West Bank, leaving on the 
"Israeli" side settlements, fertile Palestinian land and valuable water 
resources. (2003) 
 
The path of the Wall weaves in and out of Palestinian areas, isolating the people from 
their land, which is confiscated on the side. The use of the triangle of violence, in the 
dispossession of Palestinian lands, signals Israel’s overall political aims of expansion.  
Using the Wall’s route, Israel has implemented a dangerous form of structural 
violence to colonize more Palestinian land, stealing it from Palestinians and transferring 
it to Israeli settlers. The land seized for the Wall was used for daily needs, such as 
personal food supply and livelihood. The West Bank lacks economic opportunities due to 
the occupation and the loss of land cannot be supplemented by additional work. Several 
villagers I interviewed stated that working the land has been the main source of income 
for farmers residing in West Bank villages. The Palestinian farmers who lose their lands 
are unable to make a living, forcing them into poverty. The Wall attempts to remove the 
Palestinian people from their lands, preventing them access to it, which affects their 
future potential. While the Wall limits Palestinians’ ability to prosper, it has increased the 
opportunities for the Israeli settlements. The settlements are expanding daily, growing the 
communities. The Wall is used to separate the Palestinian areas near the settlements for 
expansion purposes. The inequality of land usage is long lasting and affects every 
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Palestinian community residing within the West Bank. The violence of the Wall has 
affected all the villages and towns throughout the West Bank, trapping them inside the 
Occupied Territory into an open-air prison. Those villages situated in closer proximity to 
the Green-Line have not only been trapped into cantons, they have also experienced the 
dispossession of their lands for the construction of the Wall.  
The triangle of violence not only supports the land grab, and the erasure of the 
Green-Line, it also attempts to further restrict the Palestinian people’s future. The Wall’s 
construction separates the villages from their lands, isolating them, and restricting their 
access to harvest, thus limiting their economic potential. Villages that are located in the 
radius of the Green-Line have been the hardest hit. In the north of the West Bank, the 
agricultural lands were seized for the site of the Wall. These lands were the most fertile in 
the West Bank. In the middle region of the West Bank sits the Ariel settlement bloc. The 
Wall dips deep into the West Bank, into the Salfit region, to secure the settlement bloc 
into Israel, and separates it from the Palestinian villages in the area. Villages in the west 
Ramallah district, northwest Jerusalem district villages were dispossessed of their lands 
for settlement expansion. In the Bethlehem area, the Wall zigzags, cutting through the 
village of Al Walaja to illegally secure more Israeli settlements. The Wall extends all the 
way down the Green-Line, past the city of Hebron, running both parallel to the Green-
Line, as well as interjecting deep into Palestinian areas within the Occupied Territory. 
Each region in the West Bank has experienced loss of land due to the path of the Wall. 
The detail in which each area is discussed exposes the violence of the Wall within a 
peace frame, giving a human-interest perspective to the effects of the Wall. Emphasizing 
these areas, and using the testimonies, investigates individual dispossession from the 
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Wall’s. Examining these areas as a whole highlights the Wall’s purpose: to dispossess 
Palestinian villages and to foster Israeli settlements’ prosperity.  
 
 
The zigzagging of the Wall. Abu Dis 2013 
 
The North 
The history of the Wall started in the north, where the themes of the Wall’s 
dispossession originated. The Wall’s structural violence began in 2002 in the north, 
where it confiscated the most fertile Palestinian land. The Wall has greatly affected the 
economic needs of all areas in this region. It took land from the farmers and prevented 
them from harvesting, and in turn profiting, off of their lands. The stolen lands were used 
for the site of the Wall, the buffer zone, the army patrol roads, and ultimately to expand 
the settlements. The Wall weaves in and out, around the Israeli settlements, and in some 
cases isolating Palestinian villages into seam zones, areas located between the Wall and 
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the Green-Line. The path forced the people in the north into enclaves, imprisoned into 
their towns and villages. Farmers still cannot work their lands in the same way they did 
before the Wall was constructed. To reach their lands on the other side of the Wall, they 
must gain access through militarized entry points. The direct violence of the military is 
always present to enforce the regulations around the Wall. The Wall has changed every 
aspect of life for the people in the north, forcing them to adapt to the dispossession of 
their lands for the site of the Wall.  
The Wall affected the income of Palestinian farmers, and enforced a dynamic 
where people were without their basic needs. It cut through the north, confiscating the 
farmers’ lands, which were used for food supply and livelihood. The north is highly 
fertile, and agriculture is the main industry for resident Palestinians. The people in the 
northern region relied on their agriculture for income, including their green houses and 
citrus fruits, which the Wall seized. In Tulkarm, the farmers sold their products to Israelis 
because they offered a better price than the Israeli market, and were close to the Green-
Line and a major Israeli highway. Fayez from Tulkarm stated, “You can sell your 
vegetable direct to the Israeli side, big number from the Israeli people would come and 
buy my vegetable with good price, now nothing.”15 With the building of the Wall, the 
two populations were physically separated, leaving the farmers in the north selling their 
produce only to their own town, which consisted of numerous other farmers. Fayez 
explained that before the Wall, he would be able to sell a box of eggplant for 35-40 
Israeli shekels and never had to leave his farm. Now he sells one box for 12 shekels 
inside his town, he is competing with all the other farmers who also lost their business 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.  
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due to the Wall.  He now has costs of transporting his produce to the market in town and 
hiring an employee to sell it while he continues to harvest the remaining land. These costs 
diminish his income. The Wall has created a dire economic situation for the farmers of 
the north. 
To be more thorough about the Wall’s violence in the north, I will discuss two 
towns to emphasize how specific Palestinian areas were affected. The northwest area 
consists of two major towns, Tulkarm and Qalqilya, and numerous villages that utilize 
the services of the towns. The Wall’s construction started in the town of Tulkarm in the 
spring of 2002. Tulkarm is located near the Green-Line. The Wall was built on the 
Green-Line but confiscated Tulkarm land to create a buffer zone in the area. As Tulkarm 
is located near the Green-Line and is densely populated, a 26-feet tall, concrete Wall was 
constructed to isolate the area. This concrete Wall permanently separates highly-
populated areas from Israel proper and settlements. The construction of the Wall in 
Tulkarm took over a year to complete, and was finished in August 2003. In Tulkarm the 
Wall was built along the Green-Line, yet as it traveled south it began to dip deep inside 
the Occupied Territory. 
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The Wall in the farmlands of Tulkarm. Tulkarm. August 2013 
 
 
The meandering path of the Wall from Tulkarm to Qalqilya incorporated various 
villages, introducing them to the structural violence of land seizure. The construction of 
the Wall traveled in both directions from the town of Tulkarm, confiscating land to 
secure the illegal settlements. Fayez explained the Wall’s path from his town. “It started 
from Tulkarm and started to go to Jenin north and Qalqilya south, and after that 
continued to go to the south more, to Salfit, west Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, 
Hebron.”16 The Wall continued to move south from Tulkarm, sealing in the villages as it 
began to be constructed in the Qalqilya district. The Qalqilya district consists of mostly 
farmers. Agriculture is the main industry for a large community living there. In June 
2002, a few months after the construction started in Tulkarm, the bulldozers began to 
work in the town of Qalqilya, and the nearby, small, agricultural village of Jayyus. The 
Wall eventually travelled 100 meters into Jayyus lands, isolating residents from their 
lands. In this area, the Wall is an electric fence, with a buffer zone on each side. The 
people of Jayyus were unable to cultivate their lands due to the path of the Wall, and have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.  
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been economically affected since it was constructed, with few work opportunities. This 
lack of economic prospects positions Palestinians as below their potential, and is a direct 
form of structural violence. 
When the Wall arrived to Qalqilya it introduced the highly populated town to 
structural isolation from their agricultural lands. Qalqilya is a big town, yet the residents 
still rely on their lands as a source of livelihood. Numerous people in the town of 
Qalqilya own land outside of the urban center and in the larger district of Qalqilya. 
Mohammed, a resident of Qalqilya, described when the Wall started in his town. “They 
started building it around Qalqilya in June 2002, during the military operation that they 
called ‘Security Fence Operation,’ and they finished building it in one year.”17 At this 
time, Mohammed was working in the municipality with several organizations, such as the 
Red Cross. He explained how he worked to find solutions to help farmers with their land 
because the Wall encircled them. He shared, 
As an employee for the [Qalqilya] district, I follow the cases in terms of 
damages in statistics that have been done by building the Wall, and the 
problems that the residents face. We try to help, and support with the help 
of lawyers, and other concerned governmental institutions, the Red Cross 
too, to reach out to people who are suffering from the Wall, and see what 
kind of services they need.18 
  
The path also personally affected Mohammed; all of his land is now behind the Wall. 
According to him, the most important aspect of his work is farming, the Wall has directly 
affected him. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Interview with Mohammed Abd el-Raheem. Qalqilya, Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
December 2006.  
18 Interview with Mohammed Abd el-Raheem. Qalqilya, Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
December 2006.	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The structural and cultural violence made it nearly impossible for Palestinians to 
gain assistance around the dangers of the Wall. The Israeli legal system was in 
accordance with the Wall’s vision. The Palestinian identity was viewed as the aggressor 
by way of cultural violence, and this excuse for the Wall limited prospects of accessing 
support. The Wall in Qalqilya is built completely around the town of Qalqilya, isolating it 
into an open-air prison. On one side, the Wall is built on the Green-Line, and on the other 
two sides the Wall intrudes into the West Bank, encircling Qalqilya into a concrete 
enclave. The Wall’s path secured two Israeli settlements: Alfe Menashe settlement, 
southeast of Qalqilya, and the Zufin settlement, in the northeast. The Wall strategically 
dips into the West Bank, connecting these two settlements into the larger state of Israel. 
Trapping Qalqilya benefits these settler communities. As a Palestinian, Mohammed has 
no rights, even in regards to his own land. Ultimately the occupation does not listen to the 
complaints of the occupied. Israel justifies the Wall as a security measure; therefore, 
Mohammed and his colleagues have no authority to combat the land grab, and are forced 
to find ways to live in this open-air prison and off of less land. 
The structural violence of the Wall’s path trapped some villages in the north into 
the seam zone. The Wall was built on three sides of Jubara village, isolating the village 
from the rest of the West Bank. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights explains the 
seam zone: 
On 2 October 2003, the Israeli military commander in the West Bank 
issued a military order declaring all areas located between the wall and 
Israel’s 1967 border in the north of the West Bank “closed areas.” 
According to the order, Palestinians are not permitted to enter the area. 
With regard to Palestinian civilians living in these areas, their entry into, 
and presence in the area would be conditioned by obtaining permits from 
the Israeli military commander (2004: 25). 
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The people situated in the seam zones were not only isolated from their lands, they were 
also physically trapped inside their villages. To access the West Bank, they needed 
approval from the Israeli military, who kept a constant presence outside of their village. 
The path of the Wall in the north isolated people into enclaves. It confiscated farmers’ 
lands, limiting their potential. The violence of the Wall continued as the construction 
invaded the villages south of Qalqilya. Israeli settlements were deeper inside the West 
Bank, and the Wall extended to ensure they were secured into Israel. 
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Salfit Region 
Highlighting each section of the West Bank ensures the violence triangle is not 
seen as an isolated case, but widespread devastation for the Palestinian people. The Wall 
continued to appropriate Palestinian land for Israeli settlements in the Salfit region. 
Located in the middle of the West Bank, the Salfit region is comprised of numerous 
Palestinian villages. The Wall in this area encroaches deep into the West Bank, securing 
the Ariel settlement bloc into Israel. In addition to the Ariel settlements in the mid 
section, it also weaves in and out of Palestinian villages to include more settlements near 
the Green-Line. By June 2003, the construction of the Wall began in the village of 
Mas’ha to secure El Qana settlement, eventually isolating Mas’ha.  
The Wall injures each Palestinian that is in close proximity, as well as those who 
are in distance due to the restrictions it causes. With that said, there are some situations 
that are more extreme than others. The case of the Amer family illustrates the violence of 
the Wall. When the Wall approached their house, Israeli authorities told the family to 
move. The family refused, and the Wall was built anyway, imprisoning their house 
between El Qana settlement and their village of Mas’ha. 
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The Amer house across from the piece of the wall in front of their house. The road is for  
military use only. Mas’ha. August 2005. 
 
 
The Amer family had lived in their house for decades and had already been displaced 
during the Nakba. Their patriarch was not willing to forcibly be moved again. Hani Amer 
and his wife Maniera blatantly refused to self-transfer their family. Israel responded by 
imprisoning the family between a concrete Wall, gates, and fences. Their home was 
completely surrounded by structural violence implements to limit their movement, which 
restricted their overall abilities to prosper. Mas’ha is a rural area, but instead of erecting 
an electric fence along the path, the Israeli authorities constructed the Wall directly in 
front of Hani’s home and connected it to the electric fence on both sides, inhibiting 
access to the village and obscuring any view of it. A patrol road for the army was also 
built through Hani’s front yard along with the Wall. By utilizing a constant army 
presence (direct violence), and forcing the Amer family inside a confined space 
(structural violence), Israel pressured them to move. Hani describes how this decision 
affected him and his family.  
When they built the Wall, they started implementing their plan against me, 
which is trying to force me out of the house, pressuring me 
psychologically. One of the things they did was sending people from the 
	   137	  
intelligence to jump over the Wall, between my house and the settlement, 
into my house and ask me forcibly to open the gates for them so that they 
can pass through, in order to catch me in act that I let people through and 
use it against me as an excuse to kick me out of my house. I wasn’t lenient 
with them and I kicked them out many times, and I told them that I know 
who they are. Now they stopped that plan and started something new, 
there is a road between my house and the settlement. The settlers started 
coming to that road, about twenty or thirty settlers, and started swearing 
and throwing stones at us round the clock, sometimes at six in the morning 
or at midnight, sometimes at noon or at nine o’clock at night.19 
 
This case shows how Israeli military soldiers and settler populations collaboratively used 
direct violence to coerce Palestinians into abiding structural violence. El Qana settlers 
exacted direct violence against Hani and his family for not obeying the Israeli military 
orders to move and both settlers and soldiers constantly harassed the family. They 
imposed several forms of violence onto the Amer family, pressuring them to move, in an 
attempt to steal their land. Hani’s case is severe, but using direct violent to isolate 
Palestinians from their land is a common Israeli military practice. Hani did not give in to 
this direct violence from the settler community located near his house or from Israeli 
military soldiers. The Wall in Mas’ha was completed within five months, by October 
2003. The Amer family remained on their land, but it has not been easy for them. Hani’s 
oldest child is now thirty and has moved to the main village; his youngest child of 
fourteen has grown up behind the Wall over the past eleven years. Hani and his family 
still live in the house isolated by the Wall. This decision has been costly in various ways, 
but they have gained notoriety for their steadfastness. 
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  Interview with Hani Amer. Mas’ha, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.  
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Boy with the paved route of the Wall in the background. Deir Ballut . December 2006 
 
 
Most villages in the Salfit region have experienced some form of dispossession 
due to the Wall cutting through this area for the expansion of the Israeli settlement blocs. 
The path intrudes so deep into the West Bank that villages situated away from the Green-
Line are also affected. This deep intrusion into the West Bank provides more evidence 
that the Wall was not a security measure, yet it was a land grab. South of Mas’ha, Deir 
Ballut village planned to build a school in 2003, but the Israeli authorities informed the 
village municipality that it would be in the Wall’s route, and could not be built. This 
conflict led to a court case in the Israeli high court, which delayed the Wall’s construction 
in Deir Ballut. The ruling in September 15, 2005, approved the Wall’s construction, but 
changed its route. The Wall was going to take most of Deir Ballut’s land from the west, 
yet the court moved it further west towards the Green-Line; it is still not situated on the 
Green-Line. The Wall on the west side of the village was completed in March of 2006, a 
year after the construction started. The speed that Israel completed the Wall in the 
beginning inhibited knowledge sharing about the structure, and thus widespread dissent. 
The south of Deir Ballut village is currently under construction. To the east construction 
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has not begun, yet there is a planned route, which will secure the large settlement of Ariel 
into Israel. The Wall’s construction has not stopped since it started in Tulkarm. It sealed 
in some areas completely, while others were left partially completed. The Wall moved 
south, and the construction eventually resumed.  
 
  
 
West Ramallah District 
Detailed accounts of the Wall’s violence, as it traveled south, provide a theme of 
Israel’s use of violence in each region. The West Ramallah villages were exposed to the 
concept of the Wall from the northern villages, and this knowledge sharing supported 
them to defend their lands. Situated between the Green-Line and the main Palestinian city 
of Ramallah, the West Ramallah villages are small. Traveling south, the Wall arrived in 
Budrus village in November of 2003. Budrus sits very close to the Green-Line, and one 
side of the Wall was built along the Green-Line, due to high resistance against the Wall 
in the initial construction phase (for further discussion, see chapter 6). After several 
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months of construction in Budrus, a section of the Wall was complete. The construction 
stopped in Budrus and continued in areas to the south, only to return to Budrus in 
September of 2004. The construction was ultimately completed in Budrus in a few 
months. Israel strategically constructed portions of the Wall at different times, arriving in 
new areas, uprooting trees, paving lands and returning when people least expected it. 
 
 
Farmer standing in front of a bulldozer that is paving land for the site of the Wall. Budrus.  
September 2004 
 
 
The violence of the Wall was unpredictable and did not travel in a successive 
route. The path could bypass an entire village only to return at a later date. The village of 
Nil’in was able to push off the construction far longer than the other villages in the area. 
In February of 2004, after several months of construction in Budrus, the Wall’s 
construction started in the adjacent village of Nil’in. In this location, the construction 
lasted for only a few days. The civil resistance movement in Nil’in compelled the Israeli 
authorities to move further south and return to Nil’in later. On May 17, 2008, 
construction workers returned to Ni’lin village to finish uprooting the trees for the site of 
the Wall. On May 21, 2008, the construction officially started from the village of Midya, 
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to the west of Ni’lin, towards Deir Qaddis to the east, passing the village of Ni’lin along 
its path and completing the area. Workers completed the Wall in the Nil’in village in 
2010, taking two years to completely seal in the area. 
 
 
Mehatyahu settlement on the other side of the Wall of Bil’in. Bil’in August 2013 
 
 
Israeli settlement expansion has been one of the aims for the path of the Wall, 
continuing the fallacy of security. The Wall is a form of protection for the settler 
communities, illegally residing in the West Bank, as it steals Palestinian lands for their 
settlement expansion. In the West Ramallah villages, the large Israeli settlement of 
Modin Ilit determined the Wall’s path. Modin Illit is located deep inside the Green-Line 
in the Occupied Territory, with direct access to Israel proper. Residents of Bil’in, a 
village near Modin Ilit, learned about plans to build the Wall on their lands in the spring 
of 2004 for the expansion of the settlement. They were aware that the construction would 
begin, and had learned from residents of other villages about the Wall’s damaging 
impact, long before it arrived on their lands. The Wall’s construction began in Bil’in 
during the spring of 2005. Abdulla, a resident of the village, explained, “It means all of 
the land behind the Wall, they are planning to fill it with a big settlement there. For this 
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we start to think to be or not to be, it means, if they built the Wall to build a settlement 
and we will lose all of our land from there.”20 The village of Bil’in appealed to the Israeli 
High Court, and construction stopped in the area while the case was being reviewed. The 
court ruled to move the Wall, but sustained that it must be built for Israel’s “security” 
concerns. The Wall was completed in 2011 in the village of Bil’in for Modin Illit 
settlement. 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Interview with Abdulla Abu Rahma. Bil’in, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.  
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Northwest Jerusalem Villages 
The Wall did not only restrict access to Israel proper or settlements; it also 
isolated villages from other Palestinian areas of the West Bank, exposing the myth of 
security. The separation of Palestinian areas limits connection between Palestinian 
residents, and supports Israel’s control through this form of structural violence. The 
Northwest Jerusalem villages are situated near the Green-Line, between the city of 
Ramallah and the city of Jerusalem. The Northwest Jerusalem villages were in a 
precarious situation due to the Wall’s path. The people living in this region were 
completely cut off from the Palestinian areas around them. The Wall was going to 
strategically isolate all the villages. Biddo was the first village in this area where 
construction workers paved land to prepare for constructing the Wall. During February of 
2004, they began to uproot village land for the path of the Wall. The construction also 
began in the neighboring villages in the area, including Beit Duqu, Beit Suriq and Beit 
Liqia. These villages were the first to appeal to the Israeli High Court and receive a 
decision before the Wall was built in an attempt to disrupt the structural violence. 
Various villages in the area and nearby Israeli neighborhoods collaborated in order to 
make the case. The Palestinian villages involved included Qatana, Beit Suriq, Beit Iqsa, 
Beit Duqu, Beit Ijza, Beit Liqia and Biddo. The Wall’s construction stopped around 
Biddo for five months during the court proceedings, but resumed in 2005. According to 
the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 
On 30 June 2004, the Israeli High Court decided to stop the construction 
of 30 kilometers of a section of the Wall in the villages located to the 
northwest of Jerusalem: Beit Diqqu; Beit Ejza; Biddu; Beit Sourik; Qutna; 
Beit 'Anan; Um al-Lahem; and al-Qebia. The Court demanded that IOF 
redraw the route of the Wall in these villages taking into consideration the 
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"humanitarian needs" of the Palestinian population, while at the same time 
keeping “security” interests (2004: 27). 
 
The Beit Suriq court case successfully rerouted the Wall. However by the time the 
decision was made, most of the trees were uprooted and the land had been paved for the 
original route. The farmers were unable to harvest the trees, as they were confiscated for 
the initial site of the Wall.  
In 2006, the new route of the Wall was completed, enclosing the entire area and 
trapping the villages into a large ghetto. The Wall confiscated land from Beit Duqu, 
Biddo, and the neighboring villages for the Israeli settlements of Giv’at Ze’ev and Giv’on 
Hahadasha. Although the court did not put the Wall on the Green-Line (as it did not 
intend to protect Palestinians), it aimed to demonstrate support for Palestinian interests. 
However, the court’s approval of building the Wall on Palestinian lands demonstrated its 
main concern: settlements’ interests. 
 
    
Giv’at Ze’ev settlement on the other side of the winding fence and by-pass road.               The settlement of Giv’on Hahadasha on the other side of the fence. Biddo, August  
Beit Duqu, August 2013         2013    
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Al Walaja/Bethlehem 
Bethlehem and Jerusalem are known for their spiritual histories, and include 
spiritual sites where Israeli’s are able to visit, such as Rachel’s Tomb, but Palestinian are 
prohibited. The Wall’s construction started in Bethlehem in 2004, constructing a concrete 
barrier between the two holy cities. In 2010, construction started northwest of Bethlehem 
in the village of Al Walaja. Al Walaja residents and experts brought twenty-two cases to 
the Israeli High Court to show the impact of the Wall and gate system on their land. They 
argued that contractors should build the Wall on the open and empty valley next to the 
village rather than inside it. This discrepancy laid bare the fact that the Wall was meant to 
secure Israeli settlements. Omar, a local from Al Walaja whose land was in the path of 
the Wall, made it clear that Israel could have put the Wall in the valley, but instead they 
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planned for it to go through the middle of the village. The court decided to change the 
Wall’s path, but not for the good of the village. Palestinian injury as a result of the Wall is 
not of importance due to Israel’s cultural violence. The Wall was rerouted as a byproduct 
of international well being in the area, highlighting how structural and cultural violence 
oppress Palestinian people.  
Structural violence is achievable when cultural violence makes it seem normal, 
which is why Palestinians experience such high doses of structural violence. Structural 
violence on communities where cultural violence is not present draws attention to the 
structural violence. This detail provides more proof that Israel uses indiscriminate 
violence onto the Palestinian people where they would not wish to use it on another. For 
example, the internationals at the nunnery in the area of al Walaja were aware of the 
Wall’s violence, and made a claim to Israel about its harm to them and their visitors. It 
would limit their movement and trap them. Residents at the Cremisan nunnery up the 
road from the village of Al Walaja objected to the path of the Wall, anticipating that it 
would impede travel and visitors. Omar shared, “The nunnery wanted a street direct into 
Jerusalem for their visitors.”21 Nunnery residents were clearly more concerned about their 
visitors’ access than the Palestinian villagers’ situation. The route was changed to place 
the nunnery in Jerusalem’s side of the Wall, highlighting the cultural and structural 
violence at play. Road systems were also designed to ease Israeli travel from settlements 
into Israel proper by confiscating Omar’s and Al Walaja’s land. According to the 
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights,  
On 03 October 2011, IOF started the implementation of bulldozing 
activities in farms and uprooting of trees in targeted lands in Ein al-Hadfa 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Interview with Omar. Al Walaja, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.  
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area, Khellet al-Samak area and Ein Jweiza area in al-Walaja village. 
These bulldozing activities were aimed at preparing infrastructures for the 
construction of a new part of the annexation wall and for the extension of 
a road along the annexation wall in the west and northwest of al-Walaja 
village (2004: 60). 
 
The Wall was completed in Al Walaja during the winter of 2012-2013. A tunnel road and 
an electric fence now separates Omar’s house from the rest of his village. The Wall in the 
Bethlehem area took several years to complete, and construction is still ongoing. Israel’s 
ongoing establishment of the Wall, and the use of the triangle of violence in each region 
of the West Bank, needs to be noted if the reframing of the narrative is to be achieved.  
These profiles are evidence that the Wall is dispossessing the Palestinian people of their 
lands for Israeli settlements, and not security. Palestinian villagers have tried several 
conventional routes to halt the Wall, even attempting to penetrate the structural violence 
upholding the occupation, the Israeli legal system. 
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Court Cases 
Several Palestinian villages have taken the issue of the Wall to the Israeli High 
Court in an attempt to infiltrate the Israeli legal system and stop the Wall. The High 
Court is structurally violent, working for the well being of Israel, and viewing the 
Palestinian through the cultural violence lens as the aggressor. These cases provide 
evidence that Palestinians were attempting to utilize the mainstream channels of the legal 
arena to stop the Wall, even if confronting the violence triangle. In 2004, northwest 
Jerusalem villages worked with the Israeli neighborhoods in the area to bring the first 
case against the Wall to the Israeli High Court. The work was halted on the Wall for a 
few months while the courts were reviewing the case. Ultimately, the Wall’s route was 
re-routed. In 2005, the Salfit area brought the Alfe Menashe case against the Wall, 
rerouting the Wall. In Bil’in, the rerouting of the Wall saved hundreds of dunums22 of 
land (Stop the Wall Campaign, 2003). As Abdulla states, “When they put the Wall in our 
land, the plan of the Wall, they will confiscate in the beginning, in 2005, they will 
confiscate 2,200 dunums from 4000. It means 58% of our land will be behind the Wall.”23 
Bil’in’s land remained behind the Wall, until the court case ruling in 2010. Eventually 
650 dunums of Bil’in land was on the other side of the Wall, saving nearly 1600 dunums 
of land. Although these villages won cases against the Wall and the settlements, the only 
successful impact of the cases was the rerouting of the Wall. Several villages learned 
about the Wall too late or could not afford to go to court. The villages that went to court 
got the Wall rerouted, but they were not able to stop the larger project of the Wall. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 1 dunum is equal to 1/4 acre, or 1,000 square meters.  
23 Interview with Abdulla Abu Rahma. Bil’in, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.  
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A village’s location played an important role in court decisions; the perception of 
defense was essential for how Israel responded to each case. Due to the narrative that the 
Wall was a form of security, and in turn there was a need to support the cultural violence 
agenda of painting all Palestinians as terrorists, the proximity of the village to major 
Israeli cities or settlements was seen as a threat to the Israeli’s living in them. Al Walaja 
village sits close to Jerusalem. They unsuccessfully attempted to save their lands by using 
the court system. The location of the village made it more difficult to make a claim 
through the courts. In the seam zone, Jubara village took their case to the courts in 2003, 
when the construction started. It was not until 2011, eight years after the initial 
construction of the Wall, that the court ruled to destroy the Wall around Jubara. In this 
case, villagers proved that the checkpoint and the forced living situation of those existing 
within the seam zone were violent and limited their potential. If the people of Jubara had 
left the area due to the inhumane living environment they experienced, the structural 
violence would have been successful. The case took several years because the goal was to 
rid the area of Palestinian people and take the land. The Israeli authorities tore down a 
section of the Wall and rebuilt it in another location closer to the Green-Line. 
Mohammed, a local from Jubara recalled, “The people here complained to the court, to 
the Israeli court, to the military court.”24 To secure the area, Israel decided a new Wall 
would need to be built. The new Wall would allow the village access into the West Bank. 
Mohammed explained, “The new Wall started in 2011, and they finished completely in 
2013. At the time they finished the new Wall they started removing the old Wall. And 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Interview with Mohammed. Jubara, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.  
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they opened it for us in 2013 June.”25 The old part of the Wall was removed, and the 
checkpoint, the only entrance point to the seam zone was also removed. This example of 
success is due to the resilience of the Palestinian people in Jubara in the face of the 
violence triangle. The people of Jubara endured eight years of imprisonment in their 
village, and then they waited two more years for the new Wall to be constructed, to 
restore their basic freedom of movement into the Occupied Territory. For ten years, the 
people of Jubara waited to regain access to the West Bank. The Wall was moved to a new 
location, yet it still remains on Jubara land. Although Israel enacted structural violence to 
push the Palestinian people to self-transfer, Jubara village resisted. 
The Wall as a case in the Israeli High Court was not an avenue for justice; the 
court was an extension of the occupation, which needed the triangle of violence to 
function. Although a few of these cases have been successful in moving the route of the 
Wall, Muhin from the PLO expressed his concern about this method of going to the High 
Court. He stated, “Even if this court has a small decision to changing the path of the Wall 
it looks at it according to the benefits of the Israeli occupation.”26 The occupation relies 
on structural violence to maintain itself and the courts aim to uphold the government’s 
agenda. The Israeli legal system ruled to move the Wall in a few cases, but rerouting 
creates a false sense that the Israeli authorities work for the rights of Palestinians, when in 
reality, courts instate Israel’s interest. As Muhin explains, no matter where the Wall is, it 
is illegal for the Palestinian people: “The legal courts, even if they move it, it is not 
accepted. The Israeli court is another hand of the Israeli occupation that makes the Wall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Interview with Mohammed. Jubara, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013. 
26 Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.	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accepted.”27 Although Israel claims the Wall is for security, it is clear that if this were 
true then the Wall would have been built on the Green-Line. The Wall’s path dips deep 
into the Occupied Territory to secure the illegal settlements into Israel, even if this means 
isolating Palestinian villages and stealing their lands. The Wall’s path was intended to 
make life more difficult for the indigenous Palestinian people without the concern of their 
well-being.  
The theft of Palestinian land is not a new concept for Israel; they stole Palestinian 
land in 1948, and again in 1967, utilizing the triangle of violence. The Wall is merely the 
newest method to exploit Palestinian lands. Structural violence proved useful for the 
occupation forces, taking from the Palestinian people for the benefit of the Israeli settlers. 
This allocation of land substantiates my claim that Israel did not intend the Wall to be a 
security measure, but as a means for colonial expansion through the use of the violence 
triangle. Utilizing cultural violence, and blaming Palestinians for their plight, Israel 
excused their egregious land grab, making the structural violence look acceptable. The 
Wall’s construction has lasted over a decade, and is still actively uprooting Palestinian 
trees for new sections of the Wall. Starting in 2002 in the north, the Wall continues to 
dispossess the Palestinian people of their lands. The Wall is currently situated along the 
western portion of the West Bank, and runs from Jenin in the north, to the Hebron Hills 
in the south. An internal eastern portion of the Wall is planned to dispossess more 
Palestinian villages of their lands. As the Wall is built far into the Occupied Territory, 
any village located in the West Bank is at risk. Structural violence is one aspect of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.	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Wall’s violence, yet the methods employed by Israel through cultural violence are also 
important to note in regards to the Wall. 
 
Discovering the Wall’s Violence 
Cultural violence permits Israel to view the Palestinian as inferior to them, and 
due to their belief of superiority, combined with their military authority, Israel began 
destroying Palestinian lands without informing the landowners. The building of the Wall 
is random, and the Palestinian people are not informed of when the Wall will arrive in 
their village or town. For Israel, this is a unilateral move, and the Israeli governments 
culturally violent perceptions of Palestinians as lesser to them cast the Palestinian as 
unworthy of this information. Israel does not discuss the timing of villagers’ lands’ 
confiscation with them, as the aim is to avoid dissent. This objective was proven 
ineffective, as shown in Chapter 6, through Palestinian resistance against the Wall’s 
construction.  
Cultural violence is an excuse for the Wall, but structural violence is the process 
wherein the Wall was established. This was apparent in the town of Tulkarm, which was 
the first to encounter the violence of the Wall. The initial construction of the Wall was a 
complete surprise to the town, especially the farmers who were going to lose their lands. 
The construction started in April of 2002, and as the Second Intifada was still looming, 
the people in Tulkarm assumed that the military presence on their lands was a response to 
the Second Intifada. The Israeli military presence during the construction of the Wall 
aimed to intimidate the villagers, threatening direct violence if people were to resist. The 
town of Tulkarm could not fathom another reason for the Israeli military to be present on 
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their land other than to show force against the Intifada. Fayez, a farmer from Tulkarm, 
describes when his town learned there would be a Wall. 
April 2002, one morning we were hearing the microphone from the 
Israel’s’ jeeps. They were speaking to the people of Far’un village. Far’un 
is only 2 kilometers from my home. It’s very close to us. We were hearing 
the Israeli army telling the people there that no one can go outside from 
their house. Our belief, the first minute that we hear, is that it’s about the 
occupation, about the Intifada, but a short time after, we understood why a 
big number of Israeli bulldozers stood between the farm. They started to 
uproot a number of the trees.28  
 
The Israeli authorities put the people of Tulkarm and the neighboring villages on a 
mandated curfew. Curfew, another form of direct violence Israel used against the towns 
and villages, limited villagers’ opposition during Wall construction. According to Adam 
Hanieh, reporting for the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), 
curfew is when,  
Israeli tanks, military jeeps and snipers patrol the streets of Palestinian 
towns confining residents to their houses. Anyone seen outside their home 
can be shot dead or arrested. The streets are eerily quiet, there is no 
movement of cars, no one can get to work or school and every shop is 
closed (2002). 
 
In this way, the Israeli military forced the people in Tulkarm into their homes while the 
work began on the Wall. Fayez explained that when the curfew was lifted two weeks 
later, he went to the site where the Wall was going to be constructed and found letters 
attached to trees and on the ground. The letters stated that the land would now be 
confiscated for the site of the Wall. Fayez recalled, “They uprooted trees and we found a 
letter and a map from the Israeli army, sometimes near the stones, and sometimes they 
put it on the trees. They write to the people that they need to take our [Palestinian] land to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.  
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build the Wall for security to help [Israeli] people.”29 No formal discussion occurred 
around the confiscation of Palestinian land for the site of the Wall. The methods the 
Israeli military used to inform the villages of the land confiscation clearly demonstrates 
the Israeli military’s culturally violent view of Palestinians as inferior. For the Israeli 
military, there was no need for a formal discussion about the land grab. The letters were 
the only form of information that the people in Tulkarm were given, and they were tasked 
with figuring out what this meant for them, as villagers and as farmers, all within the 
domain of structural violence. 
As the Wall moved south, Palestinian farmers continued to discover Israel’s plans 
to confiscate their lands. In the case of Jayyus, the Israeli military left letters in the village 
streets, posted them on the stores, and delivered them to the municipality building to 
inform the residents that their land would be confiscated for the site of the Wall. The 
notices stated that the Israeli authorities have the right to confiscate parts of the land in 
order to build the Wall and protect the borders of Israel. The people of Jayyus searched 
for outside support, hoping the identities of others could assist them with gaining 
information due to the cultural violence they experienced. Israelis, Europeans and 
Americans have higher status than Palestinians in the eyes of Israel, and the people of 
Jayyus thought this avenue of support would help them learn more. Adwan, a local from 
Jayyus, shared, “We were confused, asking a lot of questions and started contacting a lot 
of people about what was going on. We contacted human rights organizations in Israel, 
and human rights organizations in Europe and the States. We even contacted Israeli 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013. 
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military officials just to find out what was going on.”30 The uncertainty about the Wall's 
construction left people living inside the affected villages feeling aggravated; this was a 
result of the extreme structural violence that limited their chances of transforming the 
situation.  
Structural violence limited access for debating the Wall or land confiscation 
because the decision was unilateral for Israel’s “security concerns,” which prioritized 
cultural violence allegations over the true harm that the Wall caused. Detailing numerous 
cases provides sufficient testimony of how Israel used the triangle of violence in various 
Palestinian areas. Just as in Tulkarm, the people in Jayyus did not know what was 
happening, whom to talk to about the situation, or how much of their land would 
eventually be taken for the Wall. The construction in Jayyus did not start immediately. 
The letters here warned villagers to prepare for the future destruction to their land. Most 
villagers initially assumed that the fliers might just be a threat, another form of Israeli 
military harassment. Two months after the orders were given, the Israeli military came 
back to the village and began putting up markers. Adwan described how his village was 
affected during the construction: “Every day something new would come up, a new 
military mark, new bulldozers rolling in, and it remained unclear what exactly was going 
to happen in our land, in our village.”31 Once the markers were on the land, people knew 
that it was no longer a threat; the construction of the Wall had begun and structural 
violence was being implemented. The initial construction was extremely difficult for the 
farmers of the village. They were forced to watch helplessly as their lands were paved for 
the site of the Wall. Adwan described the construction: “The cutting of trees, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007.  
31 Ibid. 
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destruction of land, and the separation of people from their land.”32 Adwan explained 
how the destruction of the land was the hardest for the elderly in the village, for whom 
the land had great significance. The elderly were emotionally affected by the 
confiscation, as they cultivated this land with their parents and children for generations 
and saw the passing down of the family land as an integral part of their indigenous family 
history. The construction of the Wall made passing down family lands impossible, 
dispossessing the Palestinian people of their land rights. Israel not only took the history 
with the establishment of the Wall, they eliminated the prospect of a future for the 
Palestinian people within the 1967 borders. 
 
 
Uprooting of olive tree. Biddo 2004 
 
Israel did not make a formal announcement indicating where the Wall would be 
built or when villages should expect it, so Palestinian villages shared with each other 
what was occurring. This information sharing was a form of resistance to the Wall, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007. 
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enabling those living further south to mentally prepare for the land grab. This act of 
information sharing was part of the collective resistance the people affected by the Wall 
employed. Budrus village did not learn about the Wall through letters; they were woken 
up with the sounds of the bulldozers plowing their land. A local from Budrus, Safiyah, 
recounts her family’s experience learning about the Wall on their land:  
When they came to uproot the olive trees, they told my husband that they 
wouldn’t uproot the trees if we were able to bring the tabbo33 from 
Ramallah; this was 20-40,000 olive trees that we used to make olive oil 
from. My husband is alone, he doesn’t have any brothers but has nine 
sisters, so we decided that next morning he will go to Ramallah to bring 
the tabbo. In the morning he left to go to Ramallah at around 6-6:30 am. 
He heard the sound of bulldozers, he went to look and he found out that 
the bulldozers were uprooting the trees, all of them; apparently they were 
working at night. He tried to go down to see but they didn’t let him, but he 
refused to not go down to the land, he didn’t know what to do. They 
already uprooted everything. We all followed and we started fighting with 
them, my brother went under the tractor and told them to uproot him with 
the trees. We are better dead because now living and dying are the same. 
We have nothing left; they took our land and our olives.34   
 
Land was the main source of income for the farmers. Losing their trees symbolized the 
death of their futures. For Palestinian identity, land was part of their historical ancestry. 
The uprooting of the trees was an extension of the trauma their families had suffered over 
decades under Israel rule. Safiyah’s husband immediately recognized the destruction the 
uprooting of his trees meant for his future. The documentation of his land ownership was 
no longer enough to save his land. The Tabbo was a binding document that was issued 
during the Ottoman period to show land ownership, and it was recognized during the 
Jordanian rule of the West Bank. Israel claimed land from farmers in 1967 as “state land” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Tabbo are official documents that clarify the owners of the land dated from the 
Ottoman period. 
34 Interview with Safiyah Khalaf Ismael Awad. Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
January 2007.  
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because they did not pay the Ottoman taxes; therefore, there was no paper trail of their 
ownership. In constructing the Wall, Israel did not concern itself with proof of ownership 
because it was stealing lands for security. With no way to save lands from the Wall, the 
people were awakened to the destruction of their future. 
 Israel continued to wake up villages with the sound of bulldozers, uprooting their 
trees for the establishment of the Apartheid Wall. In early February of 2004, the Israeli 
military came into the Nil’in village without warning, uprooting trees for the site of the 
Wall. As Budrus and Nil’in were in constant communication in their collective resistance, 
Nil’in villagers knew that sooner or later, their lands would be destroyed as well, but they 
did not know when it would happen. They responded to the destruction by sitting on the 
land with the recently uprooted trees. Knowing the land would be taken was very 
different than seeing it get destroyed. This act was a form of resistance to not only the 
structural violence of the Wall, but also as a symbolic resistance to the cultural violence. 
Palestinians connected with their land, and they would be uprooted too if their land were 
to be lost. Their bodies on the site where the trees were cut symbolized this loss of their 
history, and their future. 
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  Villagers sitting near the newly cut trees for the site of the Wall.  
   Nil’in. March 2004. 
 
 
 
Israel did not want Palestinians to actively resist the destruction of the lands, and 
tried to bypass this through strategic means. In an attempt to avoid the villagers and get 
more land paved without dissent, Israel began uprooting trees early in the morning on 
February 26, 2004. The bulldozers started working in the village of Biddo at 5:00 am. In 
Bil’in, the same tactics were used. Abdullah described, “On February 20, 2005, the 
bulldozers started to uproot our trees and destroy the land here.”35  Bil’in had learned 
about the Wall coming to their land in late 2004, and therefore had several months to 
prepare. The early morning wake-up call by Israel was how they learned the Wall had 
arrived on their land. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Interview with Abdulla Abu Rahma. Bil’in, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.  
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Israel made a unilateral decision to where the Wall would be situated as the 
occupying power and the employer of the violence triangle. Landowners who had land in 
the path of the Wall were left with little control over their lands. The power imbalance 
between Israelis and Palestinians, through a structurally violence governing system, 
caused Palestinians to feel helpless. Very few people sold their lands to Israel secretly, 
and this act was seen as collaboration with the occupying forces and not tolerated by the 
majority of the Palestinian population. The majority of Palestinians experienced land 
seizure and had few options to change the situation. For Saleh, “The strategy of the 
Zionists has been to obtain land for settlement either by seizure, expropriation, or by 
purchase” (1990: 342). Marian, a landowner from Beit Duqu explained that she learned 
from people in the village that Israel was coming to take the land for a settlement. She 
stated that she had not sold any piece of her land; Israel stole it from her. Marian lost over 
100 dunums of her land, which produced olives, grapes, and figs for her family. 
Throughout the path of the Wall, the Palestinian people learned of their fate through the 
violence already occurring on their lands. Structural violence, by way of land 
confiscation, is part of the political aims of Israel to steal from the Palestinian, all the 
while treating them as the aggressor.  
 
The Result of the Wall’s Dispossession 
Israeli land confiscation was not new to Palestinian villagers, but the 
establishment of the Wall cutting them off from their lands was something they had never 
experienced before. It left the Palestinian people economically destroyed as a byproduct 
of structural violence. The structural violence was enforced through the Israeli military 
by way of direct violence. According to Saleh, “Expropriation has generally been carried 
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out by the army, which simply closes off Arab cultivated lands, either for its own security 
purposes or for subsequent conversion to a civilian settlement” (1990: 344). Every town 
and village along the path of the Wall experienced the land appropriation. The 
confiscation of Palestinian lands limit the prospects of a future Palestinian state, the 
Occupied Territory is constantly shrinking through the establishment of the Wall. In 
Jayyus, 9,000 dunums were stolen for the site of the Wall, including 8,000 olives trees. 
As the majority of Jayyus relied on agriculture as their main livelihood, 1,000 of the 
3,500 people inhabiting the village were farmers, and the Wall’s destruction gravely 
affected them economically. The economic effects of the Wall are a form of structural 
violence.  
Structural violence forced Palestinian populations to live in small areas, without 
the option to expand, while Israeli settlers expanded their settlements on Palestinian land. 
Mohammed of Qalqilya explained that the city used to reach out all the way to the sea, 
until the Nakba, in 1948. This was when Qalqilya initially lost around 49,000 dunums of 
their land in the first round of land dispossession. Mohammed continued to discuss the 
more recent land grab for the site of the Wall, stating that the city lost 70% of their 
remaining agricultural lands for the Wall.36 The path of the Wall limits Palestinian 
growth, confining communities into tight spaces, with little room to expand. The 
settlements surrounding Qalqilya, such as Zufin and Alfe Menashe, are built on 
Qalqilya’s land. Qalqilya had 7,000 dunums stolen for the site of the Wall, out of the 
12,000 in that area, leaving 5,000 dunums for the city of Qalqilya. 4,000 of the remaining 
dunums were left in an area where residential building was not allowed, leaving only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Interview with Mohammed Abd el-Raheem. Qalqilya, Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
December 2006.  
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1,000 dunums for future expansion of the city. The security buffer zone also limited some 
of this growth, so that only 500 dunums of Qalqilya land could be used to expand the 
city. In the end, Qalqilya lost 7,000 dunums for the site of the Wall, and 30,000-40,000 
dunums to the other side of the Wall. Similarly, in Beit Liqia, due to the Wall, residents 
cannot build on their lands or expand their town. Beit Liqia’s population of 11,000 has 
been condensed into two kilometers of space. They have more open lands near the Wall, 
but it is illegal to build on the agricultural lands due to its location near the Green-Line 
and Israel’s “security” concerns. The people in Beit Liqia are forced to live in a confined 
space without the option to expand the city. This form of structural violence is evident 
throughout the Occupied Territory. Through the use of the Wall, Israel blocks 
Palestinians’ access to their lands, confiscating it and prohibiting them from using the 
little land that is left to build on. Comparatively, in Israeli settlements, there are looser 
restrictions on building. This disparity creates a distinct inequality between the two 
peoples. 
Israel had not only been stealing Palestinian land since it began occupying the 
West Bank, it also immediately started confiscating Palestinian resources and allocating 
them to the settlers. During the Oslo Accords, Israel was able to continue their 
exploitation of water rights within the West Bank, restricting Palestinians’ but not 
Israelis’ water access. As Ibrahim Matar explained, “The Israeli colonization process in 
the West Bank has not been restricted to land seizure. It has also involved the exploitation 
of the scarce underground water resources by the Israeli occupation authorities who have 
been drilling deep-bore holes and installing powerful pumps in all areas of the West 
Bank” (1981: 102). Israel has prevented Palestinians from building new wells and has 
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restricted via meters the amount of water they could pump from existing wells. If 
Palestinians go over their limit they are penalized. In contrast, Israeli settlers are 
permitted to drill new wells and to access water without restrictions. 
The Wall’s path has exacerbated the exploitation of water rights between the 
indigenous Palestinians and the Israeli settlers through the usage laws. Israel used the 
Wall to steal the underground resources, controlling these resources for the Israeli 
population and further limiting Palestinians’ usage. The Wall facilitated a new level of 
Israeli domination over the underground resources. The Wall enabled Israel to steal 
Palestinian land and confiscate underground resources, enforcing Palestinians’ 
dependency on Israel, which enabled Israel to maintain more control over the Palestinian 
people. Controlling Palestinians inside the West Bank through dependency supports 
Israel’s colonial conquests. They are able to profit off of the resources that they are 
stealing, and use them for free for their own communities while simultaneously 
repressing the occupied population. 
 
 
Farmer harvesting his land in front of the Israeli military. Budrus 2004 
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Several areas of the West Bank were directly affected by structural violence 
through the theft of resources, and are detailed within this section to provide context to 
Israel’s capacity to steal underground resources. The north of the West Bank is highly 
agricultural because of their underground water supply. Within the first phase of the 
Wall’s construction in the north, thirty wells, which accounted for 50% of the water in 
the West Bank, were taken.37 In Jayyus alone, the path of the Wall enabled Israel to seize 
five water wells. The underground water resources and the wells to access the Water 
were taken to the Israeli side of the Wall. The Wall’s construction continued the 
discriminatory policy. Ahmed, from Deir Ballut, shared, “80% of drinking water in Israel 
comes from Ras el-Ein area, which is 3-4 km away from the Wall, it is like an 
underground lake of drinking water.” 38  Ahmed illustrated here how Israel has 
appropriated resources from Palestinian areas, while restricting Palestinians’ use of these 
resources – a form of structural violence.  
Various areas of the West Bank provided aquifer capabilities, and Israel sought to 
confiscate them all by way of the violence triangle. The north was not the only area in the 
West Bank with plentiful underground resources. Underneath Beit Liqia lies an 
underground aquifer. Palestinian people who live in this area are not allowed to use this 
water supply. Mahmoud Asi from Beit Liqia stated, “A third of the water storage is in 
these villages for the West Bank, but Israel named these village Atron villages.”39 
Although the water supply sits underneath Beit Liqia, the Israeli kibbutz on the other side 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007.  
38 Interview with Ahmed Mustafa. Deir Ballut, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 
2006.  
39 Interview with Mahmoud Asi. Beit Liqia, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.  
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of the Green-Line controls it. Mahmoud Asi asserted, “We had three wells here, but they 
closed them. We are not allowed to dig a well, or try to take the water.”40 The water from 
this area is sold back to Beit Liqia by the Palestinian municipality located in Ramallah. 
The Palestinian Authority works with the Israeli Authorities to grant Palestinians access 
to their own water supply, yet the nearby kibbutz is able to freely utilize the water supply.  
 
 
Mahmoud Asi showing the fence, the green land in the distance is the Israeli side of the 
fence. Beit Liqia, August 2013 
 
The structural violence of water usage affects numerous aspects of Palestinian life 
that limit Palestinian potential, while Israeli settlers thrive. Villages with an underground 
water supply are restricted from using their own underground resource. Biddo villagers 
were gravely affected by the confiscation of water resources under their village. 
Mohammed Mansour from Biddo recalled, “We had eight water springs that we used to 
used for the lands, now it’s behind the Wall, no water for the farmers.”41 Due to the lack 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Interview with Mahmoud Asi. Beit Liqia, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013. 
41 Interview with Mohamed Mansour. Biddo, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.  
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of water, some of the farmers in Biddo sold their animals, as they could no longer pay for 
outside water resources to continue herding their sheep. Showers are limited, crops are 
dry, and drinking water for livestock is non-existent. The lack of economic opportunity 
also makes it extremely difficult for people to pay for the water. The restrictions on water 
usage coupled with the seizure of wells for the Wall left the Palestinian population inside 
the West Bank dependent on Israel to access their own water supply underneath their 
villages.  
 
Conclusion 
Israel has effectively utilized the triangle of violence to dispossess the Palestinian 
people of their lands and resources. Israel’s use of the Wall not only transfers land from 
Palestinians to Israeli settlers, further violating Palestinians structurally, the route also 
dissolves the Green-Line. This undertaking directly affects the future of a Palestinian 
state. Building the Wall allowed Israel to unilaterally dominate more lands since the 
occupation began in 1967. The path of the Wall encroaches deep into the West Bank, 
securing the illegal settlements and creating more room for their expansion. The route of 
the Wall vanishes the Green-Line, making it obsolete. This land theft is a component of 
the Israeli strategy of settlement expansion and control of the West Bank. According to 
Catherine Cook of MERIP, “By carefully tailoring the path of the wall to place existing 
settlements on the "Israeli" side, Israel can effectively maintain control over much of the 
land, resources and, subsequently, the population and economy, of the West Bank” 
(2003). This land grab further robs Palestinians of their land, while Israeli settlers prosper 
illegally within the West Bank. For Muhin, “The Wall is the most dangerous project that 
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Israel established. Whatever the name, or the excuse of building it, it is a colonialist 
project, and it is the most dangerous colonialist project that Israel started to build in our 
land.”42 From the PLO’s perspective, the path of the Wall prevents the Palestinian people 
from building an independent state on the land that resides within the 1967 borders. From 
the farmer’s perspective, they are trapped within their villages and their form of 
livelihood is destroyed.  
The increase in the violence triangle, through the establishment of the Wall, was 
the tipping point for villages initially experiencing the Wall’s wrath. Palestinian farmers 
did not allow Israel’s triangle of violence to steal their land without contention. Land is 
an essential part of Palestinian identity; thus Israel’s dispossession of Palestinian land 
inspired a nonviolent movement in an attempt to save the dispossessed lands from 
Israel’s violence triangle. Although Israel established protocols to limit Palestinian 
dissent, as was proven within this chapter, the act of uprooting Palestinian trees, and 
confiscating their lands motivated the indigenous people to rise up. As previously 
discussed, the loss of land was the loss of part of the Palestinian identity. Uprooting the 
trees left Palestinians with the reality that their identity was being attacked through the 
destruction of their villages and towns. Even in the face of this large-scale Israeli 
aggression, Palestinians continued to look for conventional avenues to transform their 
plight, as proven throughout this chapter. Through the focus of dispossession of 
Palestinian land, as a result of the Apartheid Wall, I have provided detailed accounts of 
Israeli violence from the north of the West Bank down to the Bethlehem area. Numerous 
Palestinians affected by the Wall expressed through their personal stories that Israel’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.  
	   168	  
claim of security is a false narrative. Using the framework of the violence triangle I was 
able to detail various aspects of Israeli violence to support my claim that Israel is the 
source of the violence. These testimonies demonstrate that Israel is the perpetrator of the 
violence, and not the Palestinians, as is commonly assumed. The images throughout the 
chapter also support this statement by visually exposing Israeli land confiscation, thus 
enhancing the need to reframe the narrative of Israel as the aggressor utilizing violence to 
repress the Palestinian people. 
 
 
Uprooting trees for the path of the Wall. Biddo, February 2004 
 
Israeli violence extends beyond the dispossession of land, this is merely one 
aspect of how the triangle of violence functions to oppress the Palestinian people. The 
path strategically controls the entirety of the Occupied Territory, and the people 
inhabiting it, and is far more dangerous that the egregious land and resource confiscation. 
Muhin affirmed that, “Building the Wall is a strategic plan for them [Israel], maybe the 
individual affects for the farmers, workers, it is the less issues, because the most 
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dangerous issue is the strategic issue that Israel planned to gain from the construction of 
the Wall.”43 The path of the Wall confines the indigenous population into enclaves, 
imprisoning them in their towns and villages. The isolation from their lands limits their 
ability to thrive, and destroys the already ruined economy. The Wall’s initial violence is 
stealing the land and disconnecting the Palestinian communities from each other, which 
has been detailed throughout this chapter. Once the Palestinian people have been 
dispossessed of their lands, Israel has maintained total control over the West Bank 
population by restricting Palestinian movement. The structural violence implements 
Israel uses are situated throughout the West Bank, and they prohibit Palestinian 
movement, further dominating the occupied people with the violence triangle. Structural 
violence is essential for Israel to maintain control over the land, and the people, affecting 
each individual Palestinian, as well as the indigenous population as a whole.  
 
 
 
                        
House with a watchtower above it. Azariya 2006            House near the Palestinian side of the Wall. Al Ram 2006 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.  
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Chapter 4 
Restricted Movement 
 
A network of Israeli structural violence implements are employed in the West 
Bank to monitor and control Palestinian movement, ultimately as a means to maintain the 
ongoing occupation and dominate the Palestinian people. Integrated into the 
establishment of the Apartheid Wall, these implements have created an open-air prison 
for the Palestinian inhabitants, whereas the Israeli settlers are not confined to them. The 
restriction of Palestinian movement supports the argument that the Wall was not built for 
security, as Israel has claimed, but for Israel’s to control the Palestinian people and steal 
their land. To move within the West Bank, Palestinians must move through this 
interconnected system, which is controlled by the heavily armed Israeli military. Not 
subject to these implements, the Israeli settler population moves freely throughout the 
Occupied Territory, exposing the structural violence enacted between the two 
populations. This disparity in movement harms the Palestinian populations’ potential, 
while benefiting the settler population. Israeli violence is demonstrated by emphasizing 
the use of the violence triangle to restrict Palestinian movement within the West Bank. 
Detailing the various forms of violence used to dominate the Palestinian residents 
supports the argument that the Wall is not for security, and is employed for Israel’s 
political interest. This evidence can be used to transform the mainstream narrative from 
‘Palestinian as aggressor’, to one of ‘Palestinian victim to Israeli violence’.  
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Maintaining control over the occupied population has been integral for Israel, and 
to accomplish this the violence triangle has been active inside the West Bank since Israel 
began to occupy the territory in 1967. Structural violence at the apex of the triangle has 
slowly formed a network to control the Palestinian people. The Wall has joined these 
existing mechanisms, incarcerating the West Bank. Israel’s intention is to utilize the 
violence triangle to remove the indigenous population and gain control over all in the 
land. The violence triangle produces an environment so devastating, that the people 
affected are forced to evacuate to survive. Structural violence works slowly and is 
invisible, yet it causes more damaging and long-lasting harm than direct violence. 
Structural violence is engrained within the system, creating unequal life chances and 
injuring the entire population (Galtung, 1969: 168). Direct violence is used to enforce the 
tools of structural violence. As structural violence is part of the system, it is viewed as 
normal, whereas direct violence is identified as harmful. Cultural violence is employed to 
demean the oppressed population and render both direct and structural violence 
acceptable. Israel’s cultural violence frames the narrative, permitting the Israeli 
government to employ structural violence throughout the Occupied Territory without 
widespread opposition from mainstream Israelis or American media outlets. Israel has 
deemed all Palestinians as aggressors, and potential terrorists, and thus excuses the 
continual surveillance through structural violence implements. Restricting Palestinian 
movement through structural violence enables Israel to isolate the indigenous people 
from the settler population. The exclusion of Palestinians from various areas of the West 
Bank aids Israel in redistributing the land to their settler population, hence eliminating the 
1967 Green-Line for colonial domination.  
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Israel’s network of structural violence occurs through various elements 
connecting, and further dominating the Palestinian inhabitants, by way of the 
establishment of the Wall. Checkpoints and gates are situated throughout the structure of 
the Wall to limit movement. These implements are the only means to access the other 
side of the Wall and are controlled by the Israeli military. Checkpoints are also situated 
deep inside the West Bank to control the Palestinian population, exposing the fallacy that 
the structural violence implements are constructed to secure the West Bank from Israel 
proper. The Israeli military utilize direct violence when encountering Palestinians at the 
checkpoints and gates. As Palestinians pass through, they are thoroughly inspected and 
must produce an ID and an Israeli-issued permit if attempting to access the land beyond 
the Wall. However, although permits are required for Palestinians to enter their lands on 
the other side of the Wall, the Israeli bureaucratic system impedes the process for 
Palestinian seeking access through the checkpoints or gates. This use of structural 
violence is intended to restrict Palestinians from their lands, and other areas of the West 
Bank, including Jerusalem. Israeli settlers are not bound to these same rules; they travel 
freely throughout the territory, never encountering barriers to their movement. To 
advance the colonization of the West Bank, Israelis travel on a separate road system than 
Palestinians. Bypass roads were developed as direct routes from settlements inside the 
West Bank into Israel proper. To further the segregation, another road system was created 
for the Palestinian people. Palestinians are forced to travel on tunnel roads, which are 
built underneath the bypass roads. Israel’s use of cultural violence, viewing Palestinians 
as beneath Israelis, is enacted in the physical nature of the structurally violent road 
system. Palestinians are literally forced to travel underneath Israeli roads, while Israeli 
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roads and settlements are situated on higher grounds, enforcing more surveillance onto 
the indigenous people. Palestinians are not permitted to travel on the Israeli road system 
inside the West Bank. This blatant inequality limits Palestinian health, employment, 
education, and overall quality of life. Without the violence triangle of the occupation, 
Palestinians would have the ability to develop, and not be limited by the structural 
violence implements that dominate their existence. 
Structural violence works in accordance with cultural violence to reinforce 
systemic inequalities, and without a strong cultural violence campaign by Israel, the 
structural violence would be viewed as violence and not “security”. Israel classifies 
Palestinians as probable terrorists to be controlled and occupied. Although the entire 
Palestinian population inside the West Bank is subject to Israeli military rule, the settler 
populations there are subject to Israeli civil law. Geographer Shaul Cohen reiterates this 
point when stating, “Those within the West Bank who are not Israeli citizens —that is, all 
of the territory’s residents except the settlers – are beyond Israeli civil law, subject 
instead to the military occupation and/or to the nascent and limited Palestinian 
administration” (2006: 690). The variances in regulation enable Israel to extend the 
colony into the occupied lands. Cultural violence assists Israel with framing the narrative, 
and differentiating between the two populations, segregating them in the name of 
security, all by way of structural violence implements.  
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West Bank residents sneaking into the Israeli side of the Wall before it was fully  
constructed. Abu Dis. 2006 
 
The structurally violent implements are strategically placed in the meandering 
path of the Wall, fragmenting the land into enclaves and further disconnecting the 
indigenous people from each other. The path of the Wall forces people to utilize the 
implements to move between enclaves. This structurally violent settler colonial 
domination is a technique to detach the indigenous people from their lands. As Alfred 
and Corntassel observed, “The instruments of domination are evolving and inventing new 
methods to erase Indigenous histories and senses of place” (2005: 601). The expansion of 
the state of Israel relies on arresting Palestinian claims. The disjointed enclaves create 
Bantustans, or small homelands, of Palestinian areas. The Palestinian sense of place is 
increasingly being erased with the Bantustanization of the West Bank. As Palestine 
studies scholar Leila Farsakh describes, “By institutionalizing the contradictory processes 
of societal separation and territorial integration that Israel created between 1967 and 
1993, the Oslo process has actually paved the way for the "Bantustanization" of the 
WBGS (West Bank Gaza Strip)” (2005: 238). The separation of the Bantustans enforces 
compliance with structural violence. During the initial stages of the Wall, then Prime 
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Minister Ariel Sharon referred to the differing Palestinian homelands inside the West 
Bank, which Usher Graham highlighted:  
His Bantustan plan at the time, since it concentrates the Palestinians into 
three disconnected enclaves or “homelands”: Jenin and Ramallah (with a 
corridor to Jericho); Bethlehem and Hebron (with no connection to East 
Jerusalem); and Gaza (with no land corridor to the West Bank). (2005: 35)  
 
The Wall surrounded the Bantustans in the West Bank, intensifying the structural 
violence and solidifying the Apartheid system. Israel used the structural violence of the 
Wall to continue fragmenting the already disconnected West Bank, creating an easier 
environment for them to monitor the Palestinian people under the guise of security. 
Separation of people from land has been a strategic move for Israel to limit the possibility 
of a future Palestinian state, while simultaneously expanding the state of Israel. 
The structural violence that manifested after the establishment of the Wall created 
a more oppressive situation for the Palestinian people. The Wall’s violence does not 
account for the harm imposed onto the Palestinian people as they are viewed as the 
source of violence through cultural violence. For Jamal Juma from the Stop the Wall 
Campaign,  
The “apartheid” security wall, with its coruscating effects on Palestinian 
life and land, is not an isolated policy stand on the part of Israel, it is but 
part of the long-standing Israeli settlement policy, and the creation of a 
Jewish only infrastructure based on a comprehensive scheme for colonial 
domination and conquest. (2005: 356) 
 
The path of the Wall is strategic in unilaterally eliminating the borders, and controlling 
the inhabitants within the Bantustans. The numerous direct, structural, and cultural 
violence tools employed in the West Bank oppress the Palestinian people and support 
Israel’s political objectives.  The Wall erases the Green-Line, while simultaneously 
repressing the occupied population by removing them from the majority of the West 
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Bank. Restricting Palestinian movement is an essential tool for Israel’s domination over 
indigenous Palestinians, and is accomplished through structural violence implements. 
 
 
Elderly woman sneaking into Jerusalem. Abu Dis 2006 
 
Structural Violence Implements 
Thoroughly examining the numerous structural violence implements used to 
repress the Palestinian people is imperative for reframing the narrative. Stressing the 
processes in which Israel uses these instruments demonstrates the violent nature of them, 
which makes them seem less required and more oppressive. Israel utilizes countless 
mechanisms to restrict Palestinian movement throughout the West Bank. These 
implements aid Israel in controlling the occupied population. Checkpoints, gates, road 
closures and tunnel roads are the only means of passage through the West Bank 
Bantustans. Palestinians must conform to the system or experience direct violence 
consequences from the Israeli military. If Palestinians resist these implements they are 
marked within the mainstream narrative of “terrorists,” therefore to ensure their own 
safety they must conform to the violence triangle as a means of self-preservation. 
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Bethlehem checkpoint in 2004 
 
Checkpoints 
Israel utilizes various methods of structural violence to ensure dominance over the 
occupied Palestinian people; checkpoints are a common means of surveillance, and with 
the establishment of the Wall are impossible to by-pass. Checkpoints are mandated 
stations throughout the West Bank that allow passage for Palestinian travelers. They are 
used to monitor and control the Palestinian people as they move through the Occupied 
Territory. Checkpoints started in the early 1990s as a result of cultural violence concerns. 
The Gulf War was starting, and due to the Arab link and the recent uprising, implements 
to monitor the indigenous population were developed as a way to combat the Israeli fear 
that another Palestinian uprising would spawn from the regional crisis. The checkpoints 
were central entry points for the newly cut-up Bantustans. As Leila Farsakh highlighted, 
“The essence of the Bantustans has been to create territorially demarcated and politically 
autonomous areas for the indigenous population while controlling their mobility through 
a complex system of pass permits and security control” (2005: 238). To move through the 
checkpoint system into Israel proper, an Israeli-issued permit must first be obtained. The 
	   178	  
permit informs Israel that the Palestinian in question is not a threat to the state, i.e., has 
expressed no dissent against living under occupation. To obtain a permit, through the 
avenues of structural violence, the level of  “threat” is questioned, reinforcing the cultural 
violence. 
Israel enforced more structural violence as a means to limit dissent, and control 
the occupied population. Direct violence is exercised within the structural violence 
implements to ensure that dissent is not appealing for Palestinian travelers. As Israel’s 
occupation continued, more methods to control the indigenous people developed. The 
number of checkpoints throughout the West Bank rapidly increased. According to the 
Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem, “In February 2014, there were 99 fixed 
checkpoints in the West Bank. 59 are internal checkpoints, located well within the West 
Bank” (2014). Checkpoints are used not only as a way to track Palestinian people 
entering Jerusalem City or Israel proper, but also to monitor movement within the 
territory itself, refuting the assumption that structural violence is used for security 
concerns. In actuality, the checkpoints inside the West Bank are established for Israel to 
expand their authority over the Palestinian people. Israel positions the numerous 
checkpoints around heavily populated Palestinian areas, and areas near the settlements 
and the Green-Line. The Palestinian Center on Human Rights reported several 
checkpoints:  
In the Bethlehem district, for instance, Israeli forces have 41 checkpoints, 
observation points and barriers; including the Container checkpoint, 
northeast of the town, checkpoint #300 and Rachel Tomb, north of the 
town, al-Nashash, al-Walaja, Wad Foukin, Beit Jala DCO and Gush 
Etzion checkpoints. (2011)  
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Palestinians are forced to move through the checkpoints to access all areas inside the 
West Bank. Israel uses the checkpoints to not only track the people, but also to intimidate 
them and deter them from traveling. Incidents of direct violence are highest at 
checkpoints. Israeli soldiers routinely harass Palestinians there, forcing them to stand in 
long lines and sometimes shutting the checkpoint in spite of the traveler. The use of direct 
violence, in combination with the structural violence of the checkpoints, inhibits 
Palestinian potential by trapping them inside their enclaves. Countless Palestinians do not 
travel, as it can become very dangerous to encounter an Israeli soldier. 
As a means of total control, the Wall’s construction has integrated the checkpoints 
into its path, serving as the only access point through the Wall, thus prohibiting 
alternative travel. Villagers located in the seam-zone must travel through a single 
checkpoint to access their homes. In Jubara village, a checkpoint was established when 
the Wall was constructed in 2003. The checkpoint was the only entrance point between 
the village and the rest of the West Bank. The people who reside in Jubara could not 
leave their village without an Israeli-issued permit to travel through the checkpoint. As 
reported by Human Rights Watch, “Palestinians may enter the seam zone only with 
special permits from the Israeli military, which must be renewed and are granted only to 
persons who can prove “permanent residence” in the area” (2010: 15). This permit 
system isolated the people of Jubara in their village and restricted visitors. The structural 
violence created a very difficult situation for those residing in the village, including the 
children of the village. The children of Jubara were forced to travel daily through the 
militarized checkpoint to reach their school in the adjacent village. Several residents of 
the village contemplated moving. They experienced daily direct violence through 
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harassment from Israeli military soldiers that staffed the checkpoint. Travel through the 
checkpoint also took more time; it was extremely difficult to trek from the village to the 
rest of the West Bank. Mohammed, a resident of Jubara, explained how he was denied 
entry into his own village and had to sleep at the checkpoint until the next morning when 
he was allowed passage through. He also highlighted how transporting anything into the 
village through the checkpoint was difficult, sharing: 
Nobody is allowed to go sometimes outside or inside. Luggage for people, 
even if you want to bring anything you are not, until they allow you [to 
go] through. Sometimes you bought some chicken, 3 or 4, and they oppose 
them, they don’t let them inside. You are not allowed to bring anything for 
your home even, even furniture for your home is not allowed.44  
 
 
Palestinians vacating their villages to move to other areas of the West Bank would serve 
the interests of the Israeli authorities, as the seam-zone areas were significant to Israel’s 
colonial plans. The goal was to push the indigenous Palestinian populations into smaller 
Bantustans, while incorporating more of their land into Israel. However, the people of 
Jubara remained in their village, and through a successful court case, they were able to 
have the checkpoint removed and the Wall rerouted. This has allowed the villagers easier 
access to the West Bank and, more importantly, a safer environment for children. With 
that said, the people of Jubara still experience the violence triangle by nature of being 
Palestinian living under occupation. 
As a result of cultural violence, the Israeli authorities are not concerned about the 
harms the checkpoint system exacts on Palestinians because they deem them as the 
reason for the checkpoint. Israel blames the Palestinian for needing an enhanced violence 
triangle due to the fact that the indigenous Palestinian is not willing to accept the ongoing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Interview with Mohammed. Jubara, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.  
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violence of the occupation. Rather than focusing on the violence that the occupation 
inflicts, the Israeli state enforces more structural and direct violence in an effort to repress 
the Palestinians into obedience. Not all of the checkpoints are currently staffed, yet they 
can be utilized at a moment’s notice to ensure full control over the population. As PCHR 
reported, 
While many checkpoints are now open for free passage, the infrastructure 
of many checkpoints has been left in place, allowing for their reactivation 
on short notice. In addition to these checkpoints, which are intermittently 
manned, 15 permanently manned checkpoints remain in place throughout 
the West Bank, in addition to 16 checkpoints, which restrict the movement 
of Palestinians in the centre of Hebron. (2014: 37) 
 
The checkpoints are designed to track and monitor Palestinians. This aids in separating 
Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Israelis within Israel proper from the Palestinians, 
who are viewed as the dangerous element of the occupation through heightened cultural 
violence.   
 
 
Children of Jubara walking freely past the site where the old checkpoint and Wall  
were located. Jubara, August 2013 
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Gates 
Israel does not rely on one form of structural violence to impose restrictions onto 
the Palestinian people; they have integrated several different aspects of structural 
violence throughout the Wall as a means of control. A gate system was positioned 
through the structure of the Wall, primarily to reach confiscated land. Israel utilizes both 
direct and structural violence to maintain the gates. The Israeli military mandate who can 
access the land and when they will be allowed through. The United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United Nations Refugee and 
Works Agency (UNRWA) divided up the gates by category: seam zone, agricultural, 
seasonal, and military gates. The heavily militarized gate system is the only means to 
pass through the Wall. It is used by Israel as a measure to displace the Palestinian people 
from their lands and confiscate them for the Israeli settlements. Detailing each type of 
gate within the system supports my argument that Israel uses the violence triangle to 
maintain the occupation, and control the Palestinian people. 
The first set of gates that will be discussed are within the seam zone areas. These 
locations have specific gates to enter what Israel calls a “closed military zone.” These 
gates, also referred to as “closed area community checkpoints,” separate villages from the 
rest of the West Bank and are not open at night. The gate in Mas’ha is the only entry 
point for the Amer family house. The Amers live between their village and a settlement 
in a seam zone. The one gate near the Wall is the only method for the Amers to enter 
their home. The Israeli military check people who come to visit the Amer family and they 
often prevent people from coming through the gate. The location inside the seam zone is 
considered a closed military zone. For years, the Amers could only gain access into their 
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home if the soldiers were present to open the gate. After several years of international 
exposure, they were given a key to open the gates on their own. Cultural violence 
inhibited the Amer’s claim to receive a key, but the exposure of the Amer case to an 
international community coerced the Israeli military to provide a key, thus intending to 
limit the perception of Israel as violent. 
 
             Mas’ha fence and internal gate, with settlement behind it. Mas’ha          Close-up sign on the fence in front of the Amer house. Mas’ha. December  
      December 2005                          2006 
 
Seam zones gates are positioned in every area in the West Bank, and the structural 
violence of the gate limit Palestinian travel to the other side of the Wall. Hableh gate in 
the north allows entry to the seam zone area, yet due to the soldiers’ unpredictability, 
farmers in the area typically choose to access their lands by way of the Alfe Menashe 
road and checkpoint instead.  As the 2004 PCHR report states,   
IOF have established special iron gates along the Wall to control the 
movement of Palestinian civilians to and from the areas located between 
the Wall and the Green Line. IOF often close these iron gates for long 
periods, denying Palestinian civilians their right to freedom of movement. 
(2005: 26)  
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Israel calculatedly creates barriers for Palestinians attempting to move through the gate 
system in an effort to deter them from travel. The more difficult it is to reach their land, 
the less likely people will continue to try, and then the land gets transferred to Israel. 
 
 
  Maniera Amer opening the gate for her son. Mas’ha 
  August 2005. 
 
 
Another form of gates used within the interconnected structurally violent system 
are the agricultural gates, which are the majority of the gates within the Wall. These gates 
are situated along the path of the Wall for Palestinian farmers usage. Israeli issued 
permits are required to enter through them, and they are only opened a few times a day 
for short periods of time. As reported by the PCHR, 
In January 2007, IOF declared that they would decrease the hours of 
opening of the gate at the entrance of Jayous village, northeast of Qalqilya, 
from 12 to 3 hours daily. According to Palestinian farmers, this short 
period is not enough for them to go to their agricultural lands. (2008: 61) 
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Entering through the gates is at the discretion of the soldiers and farmers are often still 
denied entrance to their lands, even with a valid permit. Mohammed from Qalqilya 
expressed his own plight as a farmer: “My entire land ended up behind the Wall. My 
permit says, ‘a permit to enter and stay in a closed military zone.’”45 The permit lists the 
farmer’s name, ID number, and location of residence. It shows how long it is valid (one 
or two years) and states access times: 5:00 AM to 7:00 PM. The permit also lists the 
exact gate that can be used by the permit holder to access the land. Children under twelve 
years old are the only ones allowed to accompany the permit holder; any older person 
needs their own permit due to the risk of them being a possible terrorist and needing to be 
vetted by the Israel. Mohammed explained, “If I want my children to go with my brother 
to the land they are not allowed to, I have to be with them.”46 Only the children of the 
permit holder are allowed to work the land. Even if land is family-owned, relatives are 
not allowed to take another person's child to assist them with working the land, limiting 
the possibility of harvesting. Permits stipulate:  
1. You are not allowed to enter the area for any purpose other than what is 
clarified on this permit, which is for working the land.  
2. The owner of this permit has to have the permit on him all the time. 
3. If you lose the permit, you have to notify the police. 
4. When the permit expires, you have to return it to them in order to get a new 
one.47 
 
The most noteworthy aspect on the permit is the following statement: “This permit is not 
proof of legal rights, including ownership or residential rights.” This statement 
delegitimizes Palestinian land ownership on the other side of the Wall. Local people think 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Interview with Mohammed Abd el-Raheem. Qalqilya, Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
December 2006.  
46 Ibid  
47 Ibid  
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the permits are Israel’s attempt to appear like the state is not forbidding people from 
going to their lands, or that they are not using structural violence against them. People in 
the villages feel that Israel can say people are living and working on their lands if the 
structural violence is contested by Israeli or international audiences. The Palestinians I 
interviewed refuted this claim; they asserted that at any minute, on any day, Israel could 
declare a closure of the gates and the entire area. The people in the northwest Jerusalem 
villages were told they would receive permits to access their lands, but never received 
them. Marian from Beit Duqu stated, “We lost our source of living; the land is ruined. 
They don’t want to give us permits to work our land.”48 Although Israel officially 
produces permits for farmers to work their land, Mariam disagrees; she has been 
completely cut off from her land through the structural violence of the gates, and the 
permits. 
 
 
Marian Jamil and granddaughter, showing a newspaper photo of her defending her land.  
Beit Duqu, August 2013 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Interview with Marian Jamil. Beit Duqu, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.  
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The restrictions on Palestinians’ ability to access their land through the gates limit 
the extent they are able to work the land, which affects their economic potential. Beit 
Liqia’s farmers also have issues accessing their land on the other side of the Wall. 
Mahmoud Asi, a local of Beit Liqia, described the difficulties of moving through the gate 
system. He asserted, “If they open the gate, I am not allowed to bring any car or any 
animal, so I have to pick the olives, I will only take a little bit.”49 Due to Israeli 
regulations, farmers are forced to be alone on their lands; this limits the amount of 
produce they can harvest. The farmers find it hard to profit from their lands when there 
are numerous regulations restricting who can access the land and how they can harvest 
the land. 
 
 
An Israeli military jeep monitoring the fence. Beit Liqia, August 2013 
 
 
 A less commonly used gate within the structural violence of the Wall are the 
seasonal gates, which are opened at specific times of year. These gates are only open a 
few times a week and allow farmers to reach their lands in the closed military zones on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Interview with Mahmoud Asi. Beit Liqia, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.	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the other side of the Wall. Separate sets of seasonal gates are used during the olive 
harvest season, which runs from October through December. Olives are a Palestinian 
staple. These gates are opened anywhere from ten days up to eight weeks and at the 
discretion of the soldiers. OCHA reported that in 2013 there were 74 agricultural gates 
throughout the West Bank Wall; of these gates, 52 were only opened during the olive 
harvest (2013). Olive harvest season in the fall is an extremely dangerous time to be 
working the lands due to the amount of direct violence the settlers and soldiers impose. 
Palestinians seek outside support to harvest their olives in fear of the direct violence. 
Without cultural violence, direct and structural violence are exposed as harmful, therefore 
they are not acceptable. International identity is not attached to cultural violence, 
therefore when direct violence from settlers or soldiers targets them, violence is revealed. 
Exposing the violence through solidarity support limits the use of it, and protects the 
Palestinian people as they work their lands during the olive harvest.  
The last set of gates used to control the Palestinian people are for Israeli use only, 
Palestinians are restricted from accessing them. Israel constructed specific gates for 
Israeli military access to the Palestinian side of the Wall. Military gates, situated 
throughout the Wall, are used for military incursions and are direct access points into 
villages and towns. In Qalqilya, a military gate is positioned near greenhouses within the 
Wall.  Next to the gate is a military tower to monitor Palestinian movement. Army 
vehicles use the gate to enter Qalqilya to carry out military operations. During the winter 
of 2005, there was a rainstorm and the gate was closed. All the rainwater was forced onto 
the Qalqilya side of the Wall, creating a swamp that drowned the plantations, killing 300 
dunums of crops, two cattle, and chicken farms. Since the Israeli military did not open the 
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gates, the girls’ school, 50 meters from the Wall, was also flooded. The water reached 
one and a half meters high. The Israeli army are the permitted users of these gates, 
specifically for their military purposes. These sets of gates aid Israel in their direct violent 
repression of the Palestinian people. 
Throughout the Wall, Israel has established towers as monitoring implements to 
watch the Palestinian people. In Qalqilya, a tower sits above and within the structure of 
the Wall near the military gate. Soldiers in the tower frequently shout at people near the 
Wall to back away from the area, threatening or using direct violence when people are 
close to the gate. Greenhouses and agricultural lands are located in this area. The soldiers 
inconsistently enforce the rules near the gate and the Wall. At times, farmers are able to 
harvest their lands there, but other times are met with direct violence from the Israeli 
military (OCHA, 2007). The gate system is inconsistent and farmers risk direct violence 
to be able to work their lands with no other opportunities for their livelihood. 
 
 
Green House in front of the Wall. Qalqilya, December 2006. 
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Road Closures 
Structural violence encompasses formulating new implements, but also 
eliminating already established means to limit potential. Palestinian roads within the 
West Bank were closed by Israel as a security concern. These road closures have 
prevented movement, obliging people to move through the limited, permitted routes. 
They restrict Palestinians’ direct access throughout the West Bank, inhibiting their 
quality of life. Road closures in the West Bank are created through two main methods: 
earth mounds and roadblocks. Earth mounds are made of dirt and obstruct access where 
roads once were. Pedestrians are able to walk over the mounds, but cars are blocked from 
entire areas.  People with physical disabilities, the elderly, and pregnant women are 
unable to travel over the earth mounds, increasing the difficulty of their travel in time, 
distance, and exertion. Emergency vehicles and delivery trucks drive to the earth mounds 
to be efficient. These vehicles arrive to one side of the mound and retrieve the person or 
goods, once they travel or are transported over the mound. Roadblocks are also 
positioned in once-bustling streets and restrict vehicular traffic from utilizing the road. 
The roadblocks are cement and typically, several are placed in the road to limit mobility. 
While earth mounds and roadblocks are easily accessible from villages, checkpoints are 
further away. Transportation over earth mounds and roadblocks are quicker, but 
numerous vehicles must be involved to be efficient. 
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Gate in front of Omar house. Al Walaja. August 2013 
 
In several locations, the Wall has closed off roads entirely, prohibiting all access 
to the other side. These road closures separate the villages and towns from the other side, 
forcing Palestinians to travel much further to reach checkpoints. In Qalqilya, the Wall 
blocked the main road in the city, “el Fawakeh (fruits) Street,” named for its high volume 
of fruit stores. People used to sell their products to Israel on that road because of the close 
location to the Green-Line. With the establishment of the Wall, numerous greenhouses 
were destroyed and the road was officially blocked. This main road was an access point 
for the industrial businesses of the city. Once the road was blocked, the business sector 
relying on that access point died. The Wall’s path shut down several roads in Bethlehem, 
which was once a thriving hub. George from Bethlehem explained,  
The entrance of Bethlehem, what’s called checkpoint 300, was a very 
active commercial hub. Even Israeli Jews used to come here to trade, to go 
to the dentist because it's cheaper, to buy from supermarkets because it’s 
cheaper than Israel. Also, we used to go there, there was a discotheque, 
there was restaurants, now it’s like ghost town over there.50  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 
2013.	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This entrance point is on the main street of Hebron Road, which connected Jerusalem to 
Bethlehem. The Wall has blocked the main road; now the only way to access the area is 
to go through the heavily militarized checkpoint. The once-thriving hub is now isolated 
due to the Wall, and the area resembles a ghost town. People residing in both Bethlehem 
and Jerusalem have trouble accessing the area. Clair resides in this area with her family; 
they owned some of the businesses that were frequented by both Israelis and Palestinians. 
During the Second Intifada in 2001, the IDF blocked off the area, which is also located 
close to the biblical site of Rachel’s Tomb. In 2003, they built the Wall and now all of the 
shops are closed. The people who lived and worked in the area were forced to shut down 
their businesses, and the residents moved because people could no longer come there to 
sustain their livelihood. 
 
             
Wall during construction in Bethlehem, cutting the main road into.               Bethlehem shops that closed due to the Wall. Bethlehem. December 2006.     
Jerusalem March 2005.          
 
 
The structural violence of the road closures affects various aspects of life within 
the West Bank, including environmental concerns.  In Biddo village, three roads were 
blocked with the establishment of the Wall, leaving only one access point for entering 
and exiting the villages. This lack of access heavily affected the waste and sewage 
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removal for the entire area. Mohammed from Biddo explained, “Before the Wall, we 
used to send the waste outside, but now there is nowhere to send the waste, so it stays in 
the village and we keep burning it, and this causes disease.”51 Having only one road has 
inhibited residents’ abilities to meet some of their basic needs. They are forced to 
concentrate on the imperative aspects of enduring the occupation, where immediate 
human needs trump long term health concerns. 
 
Bypass and Tunnel Roads 
Structural violence in the West Bank is heightened by the use of cultural violence 
positioning the Palestinian as dangerous, which the Apartheid road system reinforces. 
Labeling the road system Apartheid reinforces the argument that Israel uses the triangle 
of violence to differentiate Israeli settlers over Palestinians, and thus allots rights to the 
former while repressing the latter. Israel’s Apartheid system is based on identity, one of 
supremacy over the other. Israel built the Israeli settlers newly paved highways that run 
from their settlements into Israel proper. Palestinian residents are forced to drive on 
poorly constructed tunnel roads that keep them underground and separate from the 
settlers. The damage the road system causes to the Palestinian people is secondary to the 
convenience it provides to the settler communities.  
Israel’s use of the Apartheid road system in the Occupied Territory began to 
facilitate settlers’ travel from the settlements into Israel proper. Israel calls these bypass 
roads because their intent is to bypass the Palestinian villages situated in the West Bank, 
limiting any exposure to the indigenous Palestinian population. Israel’s use of language is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Interview with Mohamed Mansour. Biddo, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.  
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misleading, and enhances their cultural violence accusations. These roads are for Israeli 
use only; Palestinians are prohibited from using these roads, and if caught direct violence 
is probable. According to the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem, “In February 
2014, there were 65.12 kilometers of roads in the West Bank that Israel had classified for 
the sole, or practically sole use of Israelis, first and foremost of settlers” (2014). If 
Palestinians are caught driving on these roads, there are penalties. As Allison Brown 
explained when discussing movement restrictions in the West Bank, “If a Palestinian is 
caught driving on a settler road, the car may be confiscated and a fine imposed. Only taxi 
drivers with Israeli plates and a special permit are allowed to travel on settler roads” 
(2004: 508). To enforce this form of structural violence, Israel designated separate license 
plates for the two populations. Israelis, both within the West Bank and inside Israel 
proper, have yellow license plates. Israeli settlements are viewed as an extension of the 
state of Israel, so they are issued the same plates as within Israel proper. Palestinians’ 
cars are issued white license plates through the Palestinian Authority. Palestinians in 
Israel and Jerusalem are able to obtain the yellow plates, but Palestinians within the West 
Bank are not. 
The road system shows the structural violence, which imposes travel restrictions 
onto Palestinians while allotting more privileges to Israeli settlers. Palestinians are forced 
to stay on a separate tunnel road system, which they must travel far out of their way to 
reach. These tunnel roads are the only access points to reach the other Bantustans within 
the West Bank. In the north of the West Bank, Israel built tunnels between the city of 
Qalqilya and the southern villages to keep people under ground. To reach the southern 
area of the West Bank, people must travel through the tunnel road. Next to the tunnel 
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road, Israel built a fence to restrict the road from the Palestinian inhabitants in the area. 
The Wall and the roads system work together to keep the Palestinian people isolated from 
the settler communities, and in several cases, also from each other. 
 
 
Tunnel Road on the bottom, bypass road on the top. Qalqilya. December 2006. 
 
 
The road system is not merely for separate travel; the Israeli military use the road 
system to monitor the Palestinian people as a form of structural violence. The physical 
aspects of the tunnel roads allow for Israel to execute direct violence towards the 
travelers at their discretion, without interfering with settler travel. On the Israeli side of 
the Wall, the land is elevated for the bypass road. Soldiers position their army jeeps up 
there to watch the indigenous people below. In Biddo, only one tunnel road is an access 
point for several villages. This tunnel road is easily monitored and often closed by the 
Israeli military. Mohammed Mansour explained how the system works in his area: “The 
tunnels connect ten villages, more than 75,000 people, and sometimes the soldiers want 
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to close the entrance and no one can go through because it is closed.52 The Israeli military 
are able to position an army jeep inside the tunnel and close off the entire area, 
prohibiting all movement. The closure works as a checkpoint and roadblock. This closure 
is structural violence; it affects all aspects of village life. Students are restricted from 
reaching their schools, families are restricted from the city of Ramallah, which is where 
all the hospitals and services are located, and anyone from the village that works in other 
areas is restricted from accessing their employment. The unpredictability of a road 
closure creates anxiety for Palestinian residents attempting to perform daily activities.  
 
 
The tunnel road to Ramallah with the settler bypass road above it. Biddo, August 2013 
 
 
The structural violence of the tunnel roads also isolate individual houses to regulate 
travel underground. Omar from al Walaja explained how the tunnel road was situated in 
front of his house, instead of a gate system, when the Wall was being constructed: 
“Before the tunnel, they were planning to put [in] four gates, with limited hours in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Interview with Mohamed Mansour. Biddo, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.  
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morning and the afternoon.”53 Omar was part of a resistance movement against the Wall, 
and activists highlighted his story. As a result of increased awareness regarding his plight 
to an international audience, instead of the restrictive gate system, a bypass road was built 
directly in from of Omar’s house, which also prevented him from leaving on the most 
direct route. A tunnel road was instead built for Omar to be able to access the rest of his 
village. Both of the roads systems were built on his land, confiscating it and preventing 
him from moving freely. 
 
            
Omar and his son in front of their house near the Israeli bypass road.                 The tunnel road under the Israeli bypass road. Al Walaja Al 
Walaja. August 2013.        August 2013. 
 
 
The establishment of the dual road system allows Israel more control over the 
Palestinian population inside the West Bank, limiting any dissent. As people attempt to 
travel from one fragmented Bantustan to another, Israel is able to track them. The 
restriction of roads cost the Palestinian people time and money, yet is the only way to 
move within the West Bank. PCHR reported that in 2011, “Additionally, at least 200,000 
Palestinians living in 70 villages are forced to use alternative roads that are longer routes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Interview with Omar. Al Walaja, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.	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and thus have to endure additional financial burdens” (2012: 357). Jamal Juma reiterated 
this point when describing the overall goal of the tunnel roads system once it is complete:  
These will be the only passage points for Palestinians needing to travel 
from one area or city to another within the West Bank. While providing a 
facade of maximum contiguity among Palestinian areas to the 
international community after all, the claim goes, these junctions connect 
the Palestinian Bantustans with each other – this project is in fact aimed at 
guaranteeing full Israeli control over the West Bank. (2005: 357)  
 
The fragmentation of the West Bank is regulated through these sporadic access points of 
tunnel roads. Currently some of the bypass roads are accessible to Palestinians, but once 
the tunnel road system is complete, Palestinians’ movement will only be permitted on 
tunnel roads. It is essential to detail the violence triangle, such as the detailed analysis of 
the checkpoints, gates and road system, as a means to develop a theme of Israeli violence 
and reframe of the narrative. 
 
Effects of Restricted Movement 
 Palestinians pay a high price as a result of Israel’s use of the violence triangle. 
Israel’s structural violence of restricting movement affects every aspect of daily life 
inside the West Bank. The limitations on moving freely transform the situation on the 
ground for the indigenous people, limiting their ability to survive. Access to labor is 
stifled, producing higher unemployment rates. People are without income, yet the costs of 
travel are higher due to the longer routes people are forced to take. The scarce access 
points throughout the West Bank force droves of people into the same routes, creating 
traffic, long lines at checkpoints, and taking more time. In addition, the Israeli military 
and settlers utilize direct violence and harass the Palestinian people as they move 
throughout the territory. 
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Furniture unable to travel into the village due to the checkpoint. Deir Ballut.  
2005 
 
Access to Labor 
The various implements of structural violence impede the growth of the 
Palestinian workforce, preventing the economic potential of Palestinian society. The 
physical restrictions and the amount of time it takes to access employment opportunities 
affect the local Palestinian economy. Human Rights Watch documented the inequalities 
within the West Bank, reporting that, “The World Bank noted that movement restrictions 
on Palestinians contributed to a 60 percent decline in per capita GDP from 1999 to 2008” 
(2010: 15). Restricted movement after the Second Intifada forced numerous families into 
poverty, with little access to income. The Wall then sealed in the population, making it 
nearly impossible for workers to access jobs beyond the Wall. 
Structural violence limited employment long before the Wall was built, but the 
Wall exacerbated the issue. Numerous Palestinians inside the West Bank relied on 
laborer positions inside Israel as their source of income prior to the Wall’s construction. 
During the “open-bridges” years of 1967-1987, Palestinians were able to travel with ease 
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across the Green-Line to work. Avram Bornstein explained the open-bridges years 
shortly after Israel began to occupy the West Bank: 
Workers from the Occupied Territories were soon welcomed into the 
Israeli labor market in undesirable, laborious jobs, such as those in 
agriculture and construction. By the mid-1980s, about 120,000 Palestinian 
workers from the Occupied Territories—approximately 80,000 registered 
and 40,000 unregistered—went to work in Israel every day. (2008: 110)  
 
Working inside Israel was an economic route for numerous families that did not own land 
or have an education. The Israeli workforce exploited the Palestinian workers during 
those years. As Palestinians lacked an autonomous economy, they were forced to accept 
the working conditions to survive. 
Characteristics of structural violence flow from one element of violence to 
another, revealing the interconnectedness of the implements to oppress the Palestinian 
people. The structural violence of the permit system was devised in the early 1990s, not 
only making it difficult to reach land, but also creating a barrier for employment inside 
Israel.  As a security concern, the open bridge years were revoked shortly before the Gulf 
War. Cultural violence regarded all Palestinians as potential terrorists, and therefore the 
need to restrict them from accessing Israeli communities was implemented. Leila Farsakh 
described the change for Palestinian laborers: “The permit policy, first introduced in 
1991, made entry of WBGS workers into Israel conditional upon obtaining security 
clearance from the Israeli military establishment and a request for employment from an 
Israeli employer” (2002: 19). Those who were unable to obtain a permit found other ways 
to access employment inside Israel, bypassing the structural violence of the permit, and 
the checkpoints. The restriction on movement, due to the checkpoints, did not deter them 
from finding alternative routes into Israel for work. The post-Oslo years were more 
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difficult for laborers to enter Israel and the Israeli military began heavily tracking 
Palestinian movement through the fragmented West Bank to limit the flow of workers 
into Israel. By 2000, after the Second Intifada, it was nearly impossible to sneak across 
the Green-Line as an unregistered laborer. Because of increased cultural violence, the 
Israeli military kept a heavy presence inside the territory to prohibit travel, and utilized 
direct violence when people were traveling outside of the designated areas. 
 Palestinian areas located near the Green-Line were more dependent on the Israeli 
market for work as a result of the historic ease into Israeli proper.  Beit Liqia is located 
further west towards the Green-Line, and the majority of the villagers worked inside 
Israel. Although these laborers were able to make enough money to sustain their families, 
they encountered racism and discrimination while working inside Israel. Typically, 
Palestinian workers make less than their Israeli colleagues in the same positions. They 
also are given neither vacation time nor health insurance (Doumani, 1989). Palestinian 
studies scholar Beshara Doumani discusses this point when he chronicled a Palestinian 
family in Salfit before the start of the First Intifada. Dumani explained, “Job 
opportunities in Israel, no matter how menial or degrading, represented release from a life 
of extreme poverty for Palestinian villagers-cum-city workers” (1989: 30). The Wall 
disconnected Palestinian laborers from accessing their employment inside Israel, creating 
an economic crisis in these areas. 
Once the Wall was established, the restriction of movement interrupted 
Palestinians’ dependence on the Israeli market. Prior to the Wall, numerous workers that 
did not have Israeli-issued permits were able to walk through the fields to avoid the 
checkpoints and access their jobs inside Israel. It has been nearly impossible for day 
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laborers to continue to access Israel to work since the Wall. Bornstein described how 
workers now manage to work inside Israel: “Workers who once snuck around a 
checkpoint early in the morning and returned at the end of the day now travel long 
distances, stay in Israel for a week or two or more, and live hidden at construction sites 
and factories” (2008: 123). Israeli businesses still exploit Palestinian labor and the 
laborers are forced to endure dangerous and difficult travel to maintain a living. Hassan 
Saleh explained how, “The majority of jobs in question—unskilled construction labour, 
agricultural work, and service jobs such as cleaning, working in restaurants, garbage 
disposal and so on—do not present any real threat to the wage structure of organized 
labour” (1990: 346). The employment that most Palestinians are able to gain inside Israel 
is undesirable; they are viewed as inferior to the Israeli worker. The Palestinian labor 
pool is vulnerable to exploitation due to the lack of opportunity inside the West Bank.  
Working within the structurally violent system, and obtaining an Israeli-issued 
permit does not relieve workers of long, difficult travel. From 1967 to 2003, those who 
had permits could access their work fairly easily. Once the Wall was constructed, 
laborers with permits were obligated to go through specific checkpoints to reach the other 
side of the Green-Line. Mahmoud Asi from Beit Liqia explained this lengthy process of 
moving through the checkpoint: “They wake up very early to be in the line. There is a 
long process at both Qalandia and Macabim [checkpoints].”54 The laborers throughout 
the West Bank are using the same few permitted checkpoints. Mahmoud Asi stated, “The 
people go at 3:00 AM, from Beit Liqia and all villages, and Nablus too, 10,000 workers 
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  Interview with Mahmoud Asi. Beit Liqia, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.  
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are going through the checkpoints.”55 The heavy traffic through the checkpoint creates a 
dangerous situation. He continued to explain that people are very tired, waiting for hours 
in line, and this can bring clashes amongst them as they are in confined conditions. 
PCHR reported that workers with permits are subject to abusive situations when crossing 
through checkpoints into Israel: 
Palestinian workers who work inside Israel are subject to humiliating 
measures at border crossings between the West Bank and Israel although 
they have valid official permits. They have to obtain special magnetic 
cards, on which their fingerprints are placed, before being able to obtain 
work permits. (2008: 46) 
 
Mahmoud Asi feels the economic impact is one of the biggest effects of the Wall on 
Palestinians who relied on work inside Israel.  
The triangle of violence restricted movement and increased the unemployment 
rate in the West Bank. People who relied on work inside Israel became unemployed, and 
as a byproduct impoverished. In Beit Liqia, the unemployment rate increased greatly 
since the construction of the Wall. Countless people are out of work, as they lack the 
permit to access their old jobs. PCHR reported, “As a consequence of the total closure 
imposed on the OPT, unemployment has mounted to 40% and the level of poverty has 
increased to 73%” (2008: 46). Mahmoud Asi explained that because people relied on the 
work inside Israel, they did not focus on their education or trades, and so now they are 
suffering economically. His own son is now driving a taxi in Ramallah because he can no 
longer work inside Israel as a laborer. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Interview with Mahmoud Asi. Beit Liqia, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
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Young men selling bread at the checkpoint. Qalandia, July 2013 
 
Structural violence has affected all sectors of the Palestinian economy through the 
restriction of movement. Professionals inside the West Bank are also prohibited from 
accessing their employment. As PCHR reported, 
The most significant problem highlighted in the report is the suffering of 
teachers who have to cross to the other side of the wall to reach 
communities where there are no schools. These teachers are subjected to 
humiliation by Israeli forces on a daily basis. On most days, they are 
denied access under a variety of pretexts. Teachers attempting to pass 
through the checkpoint in the annexation wall near the entrance of Barta’a 
village in Jenin are regularly denied permission to cross. Teachers are 
regularly delayed at checkpoint gates for hours before being denied access 
to the village, during which time they are subjected to profane language 
and body searches, especially on female teachers. (2013: 20) 
 
Teachers are inclined to move beyond the Wall, as schools are often separated from 
villages. Restriction of movement inhibits the growth of Palestinian students, which 
ultimately affects the future of the economy. Various professionals are restricted from 
accessing their employment due to the numerous checkpoints, road closures, long lines, 
and the daily harassment from the soldiers. They are prevented from reaching their jobs, 
which exacerbates the gross poverty rate. 
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Time and Money 
Structural violence is invisible, and the cost of the occupation onto the Palestinian 
people is rarely acknowledged as a form of violence. The structurally violent implements 
that restrict Palestinian travel cost them time and money. The checkpoints, gates, blocked 
roads, and tunnel roads have increased the amount of time it takes to move through the 
West Bank. Lost time is one of the most costly aspect of the restricted movement. People 
wait in long lines to access areas they once were able to reach quickly. Palestinians are 
forced to wait in long lines to move through each checkpoint, and on most routes they 
encounter several. The Israeli military detain people for as long as they want under the 
guise of security. This affects the rest of the people waiting and creates an unpredictable 
situation for all Palestinian travelers. If people attempt to access the West Bank via an 
earth mound, they must get rides to the obstructed road, disembark from the vehicle they 
are traveling in, and walk to another vehicle on the other side of the mound. This takes 
more time and money to reach each destination. The road system forces people to drive 
out of their way to access permitted routes. 
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Palestinian taxis waiting in traffic near the Wall. Qalandia 2007 
 
The structural violence of time is lost when people move through the gate system 
to reach their lands. For example, the Amers still own a small parcel of land near the 
village of Kufr Qasam on the other side of the Wall, where they were originally from. 
The land, which should take a few minutes to reach, now takes thirty minutes to an hour 
to get to, due to the multiple barriers between the Amer house and the land. After getting 
through the first gate constructed outside their front door, there is another one separating 
them from their crops; this creates more difficult and longer travel. Hani shared,  
The problem in getting to the land is how much time it takes to get there 
and the way that we have to use in order to reach it. Many times they give 
us hard time on the way. We are behind a wall and the land is behind 
another wall. We have to go through a gate in the Wall, sometimes it’s 
opened and sometimes it is closed, sometimes they keep us there for ten 
minutes at the gate and other times for thee hours, and even when we get 
there they follow us and ask for our IDs, and ask us why are we there, and 
what we are doing there.56 
 
The Israeli military utilize the structural violence implements to enforce more forms of 
direct violence. Detaining and harassing people are methods used by Israel to deter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Interview with Hani Amer. Mas’ha, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.	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people from accessing their lands. The numerous obstacles and the amount of time it 
takes to travel have inhibited people from moving throughout the territory. 
The structural violence implements, such as the permit system, are designed to 
take more time away from Palestinians. Obtaining a travel permit entails numerous steps 
in navigating the bureaucratic system, taking a lot of time. This system is strategic to 
deter the people from attempting to obtain the necessary documents to move beyond the 
Wall. Israeli journalist Amira Hass refers to this as the “theft of time.” She stated,  
Time was wasted filling out forms and obtaining supporting documents, 
standing in line in PA offices that acted as conduits for the Israelis, 
making desperate phone calls ten times a day to check whether the permit 
had arrived, casting around for people who might know someone with 
some pull with the Israelis, and so on. (2002: 10)  
 
The various forms of structural violence have aided Israel in their attempt to create a 
submissive Palestinian population. Daily obstacles require travel planning and 
strategizing. The risks of travel are more than most Palestinian people can endure. The 
longer routes, long lines, extra costs, and potential for harassment reinforce a distressed 
society. However, those who do travel resist the occupation’s objectives by not 
surrendering to the violence. 
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Boy watching as the Israeli military patrol his neighborhood.  
Abu Dis 2004 
 
Harassment 
Israel employs the violence triangle by way of direct violence to ensure the 
Palestinian population inside the West Bank is obedient to the structurally violent 
implements. Both Israeli soldiers and Israeli settlers employ the direct violence of 
harassment. The aim is to control the Palestinian population. Israeli settlers physically 
abuse Palestinians in attacks referred to as “price tags.” The origin of this term stems 
from an incident in 2008. The head of the settler struggle was quoted in the Ha’aretz 
newspaper as saying that there will be a high price to pay after the Israeli police 
dismantle their outpost inside the West Bank. The settler movement views the Palestinian 
people through the lens of cultural violence, demonizing and dehumanizing them due to 
their cultural identity, and positioning them as inferior in comparison to Israeli cultural 
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values. Because of this view of the Palestinian as subordinate to them, settlers target 
Palestinians with direct violence. The statement in the popular Israeli newspaper 
informed the larger settler movement that these “price tag” attacks would be seen as a 
form of good citizenship (B'Tselem, 2011). An example is the situation of the Amer 
family. They have been experiencing daily harassment from the settlers living in El Qana 
settlement near their house. Hani said that the settlers threw stones at the house and broke 
all the glass on the solar heating system on multiple occasions. Besides throwing stones 
at the house, the settlers, who ranged in age from twelve years old to the mid-twenties, 
exposed themselves to the Amer family as a way to coerce them to move. Settlers’ “price 
tag” attacks are common in villages that are located close to settlements. These acts are 
used to coerce the indigenous population to relocate or stay away from settler areas, 
although settlements are built on Palestinian land. Settlers do not experience 
repercussions for these attacks because Israel frames anti-Palestinian violence as self-
defense due to positioning the Palestinian identity as a form of violence. It is clear to 
Hani that the Israeli military and the settlers are working to expel him and his family by 
any means possible. 
Cultural violence exists outside of mere settler perspectives of Palestinians. The 
Israeli military also view Palestinians as inferior, subordinate, and a rightful target of 
direct violence. Although international law, under the IV Geneva Convention (ICRC 
1958: 21) mandates that the Israeli army protect the people they are occupying, they tend 
to ignore the settler attacks on Palestinians. “In some cases, rather than restricting violent 
settlers, Israeli security forces impose restrictions on the Palestinians” (B’Tselem, 2011). 
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The Israeli army also participates in the harassment of Palestinians. Hani highlighted the 
Israeli military harassment he has faced while living in his home, 
We also face problems from the soldiers. They started coming at night, 
when the children are sleeping around nine or ten o’clock at night. They 
surround the house as if they are going to a military base with their guns 
pointed at the house, and us, and ask us to leave the house. Around thirty 
soldiers make us go outside, whether it is cold or rainy they don’t care 
they make us leave. Then they go inside the house, God only knows what 
they are doing there. They claim that they are looking for something, what 
they are looking for we don’t know, there is nothing to be searching for in 
the house. It happened many times already, and we understood that the 
purpose of it is not searching the house but terrorizing us and to force us to 
leave the house, and to exhaust us, and the children psychologically. Aside 
from this, every time we bring something home, they search through it, 
what we bring in or out of the house, they investigate everything.”57 
 
The Amers have experienced extreme forms of direct and structural violence from both 
the Israeli military and settlers, for refusing to leave their home to the settlement. This 
harassment extends to people who visit the Amer family. At times, soldiers have come 
into the house to force visitors to leave. In the summer of 2004, a group from the U.S. 
called Break the Silence Mural Project came to Mas’ha to paint a mural on the Wall. The 
aim was to disguise the ugliness of the Wall, which separated the Amer house from the 
rest of the community. In August of 2005, the group returned to continue painting on the 
Wall with the Amer children. When people were painting on the Wall, the soldiers came 
to the area and forced everyone to leave, stating it was a closed military zone. Hani’s 
house is located between the Wall and the settlement, which positions it into a seam zone. 
The Israeli military first asked Hani to make everyone leave, but when he refused to tell 
his guests to leave, the Israeli military removed the group. The Israeli authorities utilize 
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direct violence as a byproduct of the underlying cultural violence, which defines the 
occupation. 
 
 
Break The Silence Mural Project. Mas’ha, August 2005. 
 
The Israeli military uses harassment as a method of direct violence to control 
Palestinians who do not comply with structural violence. The Israeli authorities visited 
Omar in Al Walaja on numerous occasions and harassed him to get him to sell his land 
and house for the site of the Wall. The Israeli authorities showed him a map depicting 
where his house would be on the Israeli side of the Wall, separate from his village. Omar 
saw this as another threat and attempt to get him to sell his land for the site of the Wall. 
Omar was not willing to sell his house, no matter how much intimidation he experienced. 
In 2010, the Israeli authorities threatened to take away his work permit if he did not sell 
his land. Omar was still unwilling to budge, and in the end he kept his land and work 
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permit, though he is trapped near the Wall and Apartheid road. Harassment is used in this 
way to pressure Palestinians to conform to structural violence. As the cases of Hani and 
Omar illustrate, resisting structural violence results in direct violence. Direct violence is 
often used to oppress the indigenous people as a mode of control. Inside the Occupied 
Territory, resistance is viewed as any behavior that does not conform to the structural 
violence of the occupation. 
 
 
Young boy near the Wall. Mas’ha 2005 
 
Dissolving the Border 
Israel has used the Wall for their political aspirations, placing the Wall deep 
inside the West Bank, disregarding the 1967 borders, and expanding the Israel’s 
territorial claims. The violence triangle has been successful in unilaterally dissolving the 
borders and confiscating more Palestinian land. Integrated forms of violence 
(checkpoints, gates, tunnel roads, and the Wall) trap the Palestinian people inside 
Bantustans within the West Bank. The Wall creates the impression of a new border; thus 
establishes the illusion of entering a different country when moving from the Palestinian 
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side, to both the Israeli settlements and inside Israel. Gabriela Becker describes this as a 
way for Israeli politicians to evade the need for official border recognition stating,  
The policy of "final borders" through the construction of the apartheid 
wall, without the need to make declarations since the wall and the Israeli 
occupation's infrastructure (settlements, bypasses and 
checkpoints/terminals) serve the goals of stifling, controlling, confiscating 
and eradicating. (2006: 1239)  
 
These structurally violent implements were designed to dissolve the Green-Line borders 
outside of negotiations. The new “borders” ultimately track and control all Palestinian 
movement throughout the territory and limit the prospects of a Palestinian state. The new 
borders’ purpose is to concentrate highly-populated Palestinian areas into smaller 
enclaves and separate them from Israeli settlements. Israel has successfully disappeared 
the borders inside the West Bank without negotiating with the Palestinian Authority or 
international mediators. The new borders expand beyond the Green-Line, essentially 
erasing the 1949 Armistice Line, and including Israeli settlements. The state of Israel has 
ultimately expanded their borders as a result of the disappearing Green-Line. This move 
by Israel minimizes the land for a future Palestinian state. For Jamil Dakwar, “The result 
is that Israel’s borders are being demarcated on the basis of a unilateral land grab and the 
contours of illegal settlements rather than in accordance with Security Council 
resolutions, in particular Resolution 242” (2007: 67). Israel did not withdraw from the 
Occupied Territories in 1967; they actually maintained a heavier presence inside the West 
Bank through direct and structural violence, utilizing the triangle of violence to steal 
Palestinian lands and expand their colonial state.  
 The unilateral division of territory through the establishment of the Wall is not 
only used to dissolve borders with Israel; it has separated Palestinians from other villages 
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within the West Bank and disconnected a unified Palestinian entity. Jubara village was 
separated from the rest of the West Bank to erase the border. Mohammed, a resident of 
Jubara, shared, “It is near the Israeli border [Green-Line]; they consider it their land.”58 
The idea was to move the boundary closer into the West Bank. Jubara’s population is 
small: only 300-400 people reside there. The people of the village believed that the Israeli 
authorities assumed that closing off their village from the West Bank would prompt them 
to relocate and allow the land to be reclassified as belonging to Israel. Mohammed stated, 
“They [Israel] want during these ten-years that these people will leave this village and 
they will take the land.”59 The people of Jubara feel that they were being put in a difficult 
living situation so they would leave their village. This would enable Israel to annex their 
land and prove the violence triangle successful, this however was not the case. 
The location of the Wall creates a new boundary between the Palestinian villages 
and Israeli settlements, weaving around and inside villages and isolating them. This path 
separates houses and positions them near the so-called “border”. This occurred in 
Mas’ha, as was discussed in the Amer family case, and in the village of Biddo as well. In 
Biddo village, a family’s house was also in the way of the Wall. When the homeowner 
was unwilling to move, Israel’s solution was to literally build the Wall around her house. 
The settlement was expanded on the other side. The family in the house is completely 
surrounded by the Wall and a gate was installed as their only access point to enter into 
the home. The gate positions them into a tiny seam zone, where the new “border” is in 
their backyard. 
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  Interview with Mohammed. Jubara, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.  
59 Ibid.	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Palestinian house surrounded by the fence, and an Israeli settlement 
on all sides. Biddo, August 2013 
 
 
The unilateral dissolving of the Green-Line officially minimizes the West Bank 
territory and extends the colony of the Israeli state, creating long-lasting political 
implications for the Palestinians. George Rishmawi, an activist in Bethlehem and Beit 
Sahour, explained that in Bethlehem, the Wall affects people in the same ways as the 
other villages in the West Bank, but unlike the villages, unless a person’s land is taken, 
people do not see the Wall. George stated, “As an average Palestinian, in your daily life 
in Bethlehem, you don’t see, physically, the Wall very much, in the line of sight, except 
for those who live close by.”60 Although the Wall is not visible, George highlighted that 
the effects are the same in Bethlehem as they are in the other villages. The Wall 
psychology affects all people residing inside the West Bank. As George explained, “On a 
psychological level we started to feel that this is the border of Palestine. This one of the 
main goals of the Wall that Israel has set, to make a mindset that this is the border, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 
2013.  
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Israelis and Palestinians.”61 According to George, Israel wants the Palestinian people to 
feel that the other side of the Wall is a foreign land, one that does not belong to them, and 
one they cannot reach without permission by Israel to access the structural violence 
implements. George continued to describe the effects of the barrier in the Bethlehem 
area. “Because of the Wall now, and the settlements, Beit Sahour has borders with 
Jerusalem. This never happened, Beit Sahour is a small town, then you have Bethlehem, 
then there is this Talpiyot area, and then you have Jerusalem.”62 The Wall seals in 
Bethlehem, isolating it and becoming the unilateral “border” between Jerusalem and 
Bethlehem. Becker explained how these “final borders” are determined by Israel: “We 
see that the Palestinian ‘majority’ resides in the area within the ‘final borders,’ which is 
overwhelmingly demarcated by the apartheid wall” (2006: 1238). Bethlehem is populated 
with Palestinians, whereas West Jerusalem, located a few minutes away from Bethlehem, 
is populated with Israelis. The Wall created a barrier between them, isolating the majority 
of Palestinians inside the Wall. According to George, people are finding the conditions 
living behind the Wall too difficult due to the various restrictions and separation, and are 
thus leaving the Palestinian side to move abroad, when possible. This evacuation aids 
Israel, limiting the number of Palestinians residing on the land while populating it with 
more Israelis. The demographic decrease of Palestinian inhabitants supports Israel’s 
claim over the land. 
Israel utilizes various structural violence implements to redefine their new 
“border”. Israel has begun renaming checkpoints “border crossings” to create an illusion 
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  Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 
2013. 
62 Ibid.	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of entering a new country when moving from the Bantustans and through the Wall. 
PCHR reported that, 
 In the last week of 2005, IOF declared the transformation of Qalandya 
checkpoint, south of Ramallah, into a border crossing between Jerusalem 
and Ramallah. IOF are currently establishing a similar border crossing at 
Za'tara checkpoint, south of Nablus in the northern West Bank. The 
operation of these two crossings will divide the West Bank into 3 separate 
zones and add additional restrictions on the movement of Palestinian 
civilians. (2006: 41) 
 
Transforming checkpoints into “border crossings” is extremely dangerous for the future 
of the Palestinian people. Israel’s unilateral move to dissolve the border of the Green-
Line not only has political implications, it also restricts all movement beyond the Wall 
and further isolates the Palestinian people from each other. 
 
Hizma Checkpoint, the “border crossing” into Jerusalem. June 2013 
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Conclusion 
The use of the violence triangle to restrict movement creates a fragmented 
Palestinian society. Israel utilizes the violence triangle to repress the Palestinian people, 
restricting their movement to gain more control over them and access to their lands. The 
structural violence implements are only of consequence when direct violence is used to 
enforce them and cultural violence is exploited in an attempt to excuse them, as has been 
proven throughout this chapter. The violence of the Wall has long-lasting affects for the 
Palestinian people, and inhibits a future Palestinian state. Muhin, speaking on behalf of 
the National Committee to Access the Damage of the Wall, has been clear that the 
purpose of the Wall is to separate and control the Palestinian people. He stated,  
It was established to create cantons for the Palestinians. Separated from 
each other and controlled by Israelis when they want to open and close it 
whenever they want. It is to show the Palestinians that their rights can be 
given, or taken, by the Israelis.63  
 
The checkpoints, gates, and tunnel roads work in collaboration with the Wall to imprison 
the Palestinian people. These implements cost time and money to move through. They 
expose the Palestinian people to more direct violence from the Israeli military and the 
settlers. Palestinians are subjected to control by way of these access points, not sure if 
they will be able to move through them each day. Jamal Juma from the Stop the Wall 
Campaign reiterated this point when he stated, “The only future envisaged for the 
Palestinian people is a life to be lived in ghettos and Bantustans, under permanent Israeli 
control, domination, and humiliation” (2005: 357). The aim of the Wall is ultimately to 
control the Palestinian people through the various structurally violent implements.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.  
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Through this integrated network, Israel is able to maintain control of the West 
Bank and all of the people residing within it. Israel has forced the Palestinian population 
into unlivable conditions with the hopes of Palestinian relinquishment of the land to 
Israel. Muhin described the emotional toll that people experience when they choose not to 
leave: “The other effect of the Wall is the emotional and psychological that isolate people 
from each other, and affect their spirits. We cannot separate the Wall issue from the 
whole Zionist project in how it was established and how it’s looking for the future.”64 
Muhin adamantly expressed that, “The future of the Palestinians will be related to the 
occupation all the time.”65 Israel’s use of the violence triangle successfully dissolved the 
Green-Line in an attempt to establish a new border, preventing the possibility of a 
Palestinian state. This unilateral move imposed a Palestinian dependency on the 
colonizing state and further exploited the indigenous people. 
Israel has employed the violence triangle, through the establishment of the Wall, 
throughout the West Bank to dominate the Palestinian people. Structural violence 
implements are used throughout the structure, enforced by direct violence, ultimately to 
collectively imprison the Palestinian people. Cultural violence frames Israel’s narrative 
that Palestinians are violent, and this enables the process of violence within the West 
Bank. The Wall created an illusion of securing Israelis by inhibiting Palestinian violence 
through a false culturally violent narrative. For mainstream Israelis, all Palestinians are 
guilty by way of their cultural identity; therefore they must be caged as a form of 
protection, or security. My detailed analysis of Israel’s triangle of violence, through the 
structurally violent apparatus within the West Bank, invalidates this assumption, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013. 
65 Ibid.	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revealing the cause of the violence to be Israel. Israel restricts Palestinian movement for 
their own colonial interest, and thus the narrative should be reframed from ‘Palestinian as 
the aggressor’ to one of ‘Palestinian as the victim to Israeli violence’.  
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Chapter 5 
The Jerusalem Envelope 
 
The Wall in the Jerusalem area, known as the Jerusalem Envelope, is the most 
dangerous current political strategy used by the state of Israel to sustain the triangle of 
violence. The Wall is a tool Israel uses to depopulate the city of its Palestinian residents 
and to annex more land. The path of the Wall weaves around Palestinian towns, pushing 
entire communities into the side of the Wall that borders the West Bank. Palestinian 
Jerusalemites, living in the suburban areas, are forced to make the difficult decision of 
staying in their homes and losing their Jerusalem residency, or relocating to expensive, 
smaller residences inside Jerusalem to maintain access into the city. Israel uses structural 
violence in the Jerusalem Envelope to relocate Palestinians from the city, altering the 
city’s demographics. In contrast, the Wall annexes Israeli settlements in Jerusalem and in 
the West Bank into the city. Israel uses cultural violence to preface Palestinian 
Jerusalemites as violent, allocating rights to Israelis over Palestinians through structural 
violence, and creating inequality throughout the city. The Wall enables military, border 
patrol, and police to enforce numerous forms of structural and direct violence against 
Palestinian residents. The violence triangle in the Jerusalem Envelope aims to limit the 
Palestinian population residing in the city, and to increase the number of Israelis and 
Israeli settlers. By deterritorializing Palestinians, Israel works to prevent East Jerusalem 
from becoming the capital of a future Palestinian state. This aids Israel in maintaining full 
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control over the holy city. This chapter specifies the violence triangle within the context 
of the Jerusalem Envelope to argue Israel’s use of the violence for political purposes. The 
Wall in the Jerusalem Envelope has long-lasting political implications, displacing the 
indigenous Palestinian people while expanding control for Israel’s ongoing colonial aims. 
By identifying the violence triangle in the case of the Jerusalem Envelope, the narrative is 
transformed, and Israel is unmasked as the perpetrator of the violence. 
The Wall implements the triangle of violence to transform the demographics of 
the city, eliminating Palestinian claims. Although Jerusalem is a shared city, resident 
Palestinians are subject to numerous forms of structural violence, while Israelis living 
there are not subject to structural violence and benefit from the inequalities of the system. 
The structural violence imposed onto Palestinian residents has existed since Israel began 
to occupy the city. One way that inequality manifests is through residential segregation. 
Palestinians reside in East Jerusalem, whilst Israelis mainly live in West Jerusalem. Post 
1967, Israel began building settlements inside Palestinian areas of Jerusalem, populating 
East Jerusalem with Israeli residents. According to B’Tselem, in 2012 there were 300,150 
Palestinians living in the Jerusalem municipality, and 815,310 Israeli Jews, which also 
accounts for the settler population inside East Jerusalem (2015). Palestinians are already 
a minority within the city; the settler population inside East Jerusalem is compounding 
this issue. Israel established restrictions for Palestinian residents with building laws and 
the ID system that lists identity and residency. Israelis living in Jerusalem are recognized 
as citizens of Israel, but Palestinians there are given a resident status. Numerous 
Palestinian Jerusalemites moved to the suburbs to afford larger residences and still 
maintained a close proximity to the city, without consequence. The Wall has strategically 
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pushed the suburban Palestinian communities into the West Bank, rescinding their rights 
inside the city. 
 
 
Girls from Al Ram walking towards Jerusalem before the Wall was finished. Al Ram,  
  November 2006 
 
 
This chapter explores how Israel uses the Wall and the violence triangle to 
transform the demographics of Jerusalem and maintain more control over the holy city. 
Examining the Wall’s route, I argue that the Wall’s path strategically pushed the densely 
populated Palestinian areas into the West Bank side of Jerusalem. Several structural 
violence implements, such as the ID system, checkpoints, medical disparities, and the E1 
plan demonstrate how Israel utilizes the violence triangle to control the Palestinian 
people. Stories from two Palestinian suburban areas, Abu Dis and Al Ram, illustrate how 
the Wall has gravely affected the local communities. Palestinians view the Wall around 
the Jerusalem Envelope as the most dangerous aspect of the ongoing occupation. The 
Wall, supported through the violence triangle, works to limit the possibility of a 
Palestinian state and dislocates the indigenous people from the holy city of Jerusalem. 
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Structural violence mechanisms are employed by Israel as process to transfer 
Jerusalem’s Palestinian residents into the West Bank. Checkpoints are the only access 
points through the Wall and into Jerusalem for Palestinian residents. The checkpoint 
system limits West Bank and Gaza residents from accessing Jerusalem entirely. In 2004, 
when the Wall was still under construction around Jerusalem, the Palestinian Center of 
Human Rights reported: 
 
IOF have continued to restrict access to occupied East Jerusalem for 
residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As a result, Palestinians 
have been denied access to advanced medical care only provided by 
hospitals in East Jerusalem, to family, education, to workplaces and to 
religious sites in the city. The construction of the Wall around East 
Jerusalem will establish a permanent barrier for Palestinians seeking to 
enter occupied East Jerusalem. (2005: 9) 
 
As a major city, Jerusalem provides various services not found in other areas. 
Palestinians residing in the Occupied Territories find themselves in fatal situations when 
they face restricted access to the advanced medical care in this city. These restrictions are 
not only aimed at West Bank and Gaza residents; the purpose of the Wall is to isolate all 
Palestinians from the city. To do this, Israel tracks people as they pass through 
checkpoints located throughout the Wall. Jerusalemites residing in the West Bank 
suburbs risk losing their Jerusalem IDs when moving through the checkpoints. The 
constant travel into Jerusalem is tracked, and they must prove their Jerusalem residency 
to keep their IDs. If they are caught residing outside of the city limits, their Jerusalem IDs 
are revoked, and they face more restrictions on access into the city. The Wall in the 
Jerusalem Envelope prevents Palestinians from prospering and intrudes on their lives as 
individuals and as a community. This violence is not exacted onto Israeli residents; they 
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benefit from the Wall. Israeli settlers residing in West Bank settlements outside 
Jerusalem are considered city residents through the reinvigorated E1 plan. The violence 
triangle displaces the Palestinian population out of Jerusalem and into the West Bank, 
while including Israeli settlers and maintaining full Israeli control over the city.  
 
 
The Wall winding around Abu Dis. Abu Dis December 200 
 
Structural Identification  
Structural violence exists when one group’s potential is limited from their overall 
ability, prioritizing another groups who in turn benefits from that exploitation. Israel’s 
establishment of an ID system enables the differing rights allotted to Israelis versus 
Palestinians. Israel used the ID system to separate people and prioritize Israelis over 
Palestinians in the West Bank, including Jerusalem. This system allocated rights and 
privileges by Israeli or Palestinian identity. Structural violence started in the Occupied 
Territories, including the Jerusalem area, once Israel began to occupy the West Bank, but 
the ID system was established soon after state formation. In 1949, all Jewish people 
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entering the lands were given citizenship and a blue ID card. This system is still in place. 
As Tawil-Souri notes:   
All Jews born or residing in Palestine prior to the establishment of the 
state of Israel or arriving from elsewhere were given Israeli citizenship 
and national ID cards in 1949. This is still the case. Today, all Jewish-
Israeli citizens hold blue ID cards whether they live in Tel Aviv, 
Jerusalem, a settlement, or an outpost in the West Bank. (2011: 71) 
 
Prior to Israel’s occupation, all Palestinians inside the West Bank and inside Jerusalem 
were given Jordanian passports. In 1967, immediately after Israel began occupying the 
West Bank, they implemented an ID system to differentiate between Palestinians residing 
in the West Bank and in Jerusalem. Palestinians residing in the West Bank were issued 
orange ID cards, unless they were flagged as a risk to Israel, in which case they were 
issued a green ID card. In 1994, post Oslo, once the PLO returned to the Occupied 
Territories, the newly formed Palestinian Authority (PA) provided green IDs to all 
residents of the West Bank. In 1967, Israel issued Palestinians from East Jerusalem a blue 
ID card. Although they are considered Jerusalemites, and their blue ID card recognizes 
their residency in the city, they are not citizens of Israel. As Craig Larkin explains:  
Since Israel’s de jure annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Palestinian 
inhabitants of the city have been conferred “permanent residency” status 
but not citizenship. Instead they are provided with Jerusalem ID cards that 
entitle them to live, travel, and work in Israel and receive social services 
and health insurance benefits. (2014: 139)  
 
The blue ID comes with some social privileges and the freedom of movement. In 
contrast, the West Bank ID prohibits travel into Jerusalem without an Israeli-issued 
permit, which imposes a structurally violent process to obtain. As Israeli journalist Amira 
Hass points out, this separation of West Banker movement into Jerusalem after the 1967 
occupation only became stricter for people holding green IDs:  
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Ever since that time, the Palestinian cultural, religious, institutional, 
economic, and commercial capital has been encircled, with ever-
expanding bureaucratic measures and regulations forbidding or “thinning” 
Palestinian entry into the city. At first, only men under forty needed 
permits, then women as well, and finally everybody of all ages required 
them. (2002:8) 
 
The permit system prohibits travel from the West Bank into Israel proper and into East 
Jerusalem. Before the establishment of the Wall, West Bank ID holders could access the 
holy city either with the Israeli issued permit or through alternative routes where the 
Israeli military was not stationed. 
 
 
Palestinian man pleading with an Israeli soldier to let him into  
Jerusalem to pray for Ramadan. Qalandia, July 2013 
 
Prior to the occupation, an Israeli ID system did not exist for West Bank and 
Jerusalem residents, allowing Palestinians to live together as a unified people. Families 
from Jerusalem built houses in the surrounding suburban areas. Post 1967, Jerusalemites 
with blue IDs continued to live in these surrounding suburbs, which provided larger 
living spaces and allowed residents close access to the city and its services. According to 
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “East Jerusalem 
Palestinians could and did move to these areas in large numbers, without requiring exit 
permits and compromising their permanent resident status” (2011: 22). During the “open 
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bridges” years between 1967 and 1987, Palestinian Jerusalemites traveled freely between 
the suburbs and Jerusalem. They were also issued entry and exit travel documents known 
as the laissez-passer, which permitted travel over the bridge into Jordan and to Ben 
Gurion airport in Tel Aviv. Travel for Palestinians with blue permanent residency cards 
was relatively easy, until 1988, when the Israeli High Court issued a law that required all 
Jerusalemites to have a central residence inside the city. Under this new law, their IDs 
could be confiscated if they were unable to prove that they lived within the city limits. 
The law applied to both Jerusalemites living inside the West Bank suburbs as well as 
those who had moved abroad. It required Jerusalemites to periodically return to update 
their IDs. The Jerusalem ID is used to ensure this transfer, and during the summer of 
2013, another change was made. The blue ID now displays the word muqim, meaning 
“resident,” whereas before, it stated muwattan, which means “living.” This linguistic 
change specified that Jerusalemites must have a place to live inside the city to maintain 
their legal status, or else lose residency inside the city of Jerusalem. This change works to 
displace Palestinian Jerusalemites that choose to stay in their homes on the other side of 
the Wall. Jewish Israelis are not subject to this ID system; as their blue ID provides them 
with citizenship, they may live inside the West Bank or abroad without having to 
relinquish their ID. 
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Palestinian American showing his US passport, and his current visa  
to pass through the checkpoint. Qalandia. July, 2013 
 
Structural violence increased after the First Intifada and 1988, due to heightened 
cultural violence fears from within Israel. Travel regulation became stricter for all 
Palestinians attempting to move either within the West Bank or into Jerusalem. From 
1988 to 2003, Palestinians who held green West Bank IDs and Jerusalemites holding blue 
IDs were permitted to access the city via checkpoints. West Bankers were required to 
provide an Israeli-issued permit to access the holy city, but if they did not have a permit, 
there were numerous ways to enter the city around a checkpoint. In 2003, construction 
began on the Wall around Jerusalem, and by 2004, several areas had been sealed off. This 
restricted the access of all West Bankers whom Israel had not issued a difficult-to-obtain 
permit. Jerusalemites continued to live in their homes in the surrounding suburbs of Abu 
Dis and Al Ram, passing through the checkpoints situated in strategic locations 
throughout the Wall to access the city.  
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Women checking for soldiers before passing into Jerusalem             Girls from Abu Dis being checked for blue IDs before being allowed to enter Jerusalem.  
Abu Dis. October 2004                      Abu Dis. October. 2004. 
 
Suburban Isolation - Abu Dis 
The intent of the Wall in the Jerusalem Envelope is to push Palestinians in the 
vicinity deep into the West Bank. The Wall’s structurally violent implements isolate the 
suburb of Abu Dis from Jerusalem, regulating their travel into the city. The construction 
of the Wall around Abu Dis began in 2003, and today the entire area is sealed off from 
Jerusalem. Checkpoints are the only way into the city. The Wall was built within the 
town of Abu Dis, splitting a street and pushing the majority of the town into the West 
Bank’s side of the Wall. Ibrahim and his brother built houses next to each other in Abu 
Dis in 1967. In late 2003, the construction of the Wall began directly in front of their 
houses. The Israeli authorities informed Ibrahim that part of his house and balcony would 
be appropriated for the path of the Wall. He was also informed that one of their family 
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houses was going to be taken to the other side of the Wall, which would cut off all access 
to it. Ibrahim shared that he argued with the Israel army, saying that they could not take 
his house and land for the Wall. Due to his complaints, the construction stopped between 
his house and an abandoned hotel at the top of the hill for four months, but continued in 
other areas of Abu Dis. Ibrahim explained, “The cement was on the ground for four 
months. They stopped here but they continued to work on the Wall.”66 As Ibrahim waited 
to hear the decision around his home, the construction around Abu Dis continued to seal 
the suburb in. Although the construction eventually began again in front of Ibrahim’s 
house, he resisted and was able to save his balcony. As the Wall is now mere feet away 
from his home, it blocks his view. Ibrahim and his brother remember the views of 
Jerusalem from their homes, which are impossible to see through the 26-foot concrete 
barrier that is currently isolating them from it. 
 
        
     Wall construction in front of Ibrahim’s house. Abu Dis.                       Ibrahim on his porch nearly 10 years after the Wall has been constructed. Abu Dis 
 January 2004.                      August 2013 
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  Interview with Ibrahim. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.	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Structural violence from the Wall in the Jerusalem Envelope also annexed the 
surrounding areas, along with Abu Dis, into the West Bank side of the Wall. The Abu Dis 
area contains several small towns, including the historically religious town of Bethany. In 
2003, the Wall around Abu Dis was being built, sealing Bethany in. The establishment of 
the Wall around this town, which relies on tourism, has made it difficult for religious 
tourists to visit. Noura, a local from Bethany, shared how the Wall has impacted her 
community in numerous ways. “The Wall has affected many things, both spiritually and 
in reality.”67 The Wall cuts off all access to Bethany, interrupting spiritual tours in the 
area. The completion of the Wall around Abu Dis forced residents to travel further 
distances to Ramallah city to access services they once utilized in Jerusalem. The people 
throughout the area are cut off from previously accessible schools and work in Jerusalem. 
 
Suburban Isolation - Al Ram 
Palestinian areas surrounded Jerusalem as part of suburban sprawl; the Wall’s 
violence affected them all. The Wall isolated Palestinian neighborhoods from Abu Dis to 
the east, to Al Ram in the north, two of the biggest suburbs around the Jerusalem 
Envelope. The Wall’s construction started in Al Ram in 2004, which was over a year 
after it started in the Abu Dis area. During the first year of construction, it enclosed the 
city, sealing it off in several locations. During the construction, a single checkpoint (“Al 
Ram checkpoint”) was the only entry point for residents to access Jerusalem. This 
checkpoint and the Wall were situated on a major traffic route known as highway 60. 
This highway, historically the main road from Ramallah to Jerusalem extended south. In 
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  Interview with Noura. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.	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2004, when the Wall was finished, the gates in the Wall that allowed residents access to 
Jerusalem were shut, and the Al Ram checkpoint was dismantled. Fadwa, a resident of Al 
Ram, explained that when the Wall was under construction, the Israeli authorities told the 
residents of the town that two gates would be created for an accessible and direct route 
into Jerusalem through the Wall. Fadwa explained: “Accessibility to cross to Jerusalem 
from the gates, but it never happened. It had never happened. We are in 2013 now and 
nothing happened. The one in the southern gate, facing Dahiyat el Bareed, it didn’t open, 
not once.”68 A children’s nursery called Farah Nursery was located near the south gate of 
the Wall. Parents faced extreme difficulties retrieving their children from the nursery 
once the Wall was completed. At times, soldiers had to assist in transporting children 
through the Wall, which was traumatic for both the children and their parents. The Wall 
sealed off all access to the Jerusalem side of the Wall for the families in the area, creating 
a difficult situation. 
 
 
A house in Al Ram next to the completed Wall. Al Ram July 2013 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Interview with Fadwa Khader. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.  
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The structural violence of the Wall disconnected Palestinian families from 
schools, limiting the educational opportunities for Palestinian children residing in Al 
Ram. Mariam, a resident of Al Ram who has lived there for over twenty years, 
proclaimed: 
When I heard about the Wall, I said, “I want to move to Jerusalem,” but 
they told me, “No, you will be on the other side of the Wall, the Jerusalem 
side.” But I was surprised that the Wall came just right in front of my 
house, surrounded my house.69  
 
People waited to see if their homes were to be positioned on the Jerusalem side of the 
Wall, but the majority of Al Ram was pushed into the West Bank. Anticipating the 
imminent barrier, the neighbors took the issue of the Wall to the Israeli High Court. 
Mariam highlighted the way the families in her area responded: “All the neighbors went 
to the court, and we put so much money because we said that this Wall is affecting us, 
affecting our daily life, it’s affecting our life, but we lost it.”70 Although some West Bank 
cases succeeded in rerouting the Wall, this case did not. Numerous families were left with 
the decision to stay in their homes in Al Ram, or to relocate to Jerusalem city. Mariam’s 
family stayed, due to financial reasons; moving to Jerusalem meant renting a costly 
apartment there. Mariam explained, “We have Jerusalem IDs and wherever we look it’s 
the Wall, and it’s making so many problems for us because we feel suffocated.”71 Having 
IDs grants Mariam and her family an element of privilege, but the necessary continual 
travel through the Wall poses persistent risks.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Interview with Mariam. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.	  	  
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid.	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The Wall in Al Ram separating the town, before it was completed. Al Ram. 
August 2005 
 
Route of the Wall Around Jerusalem 
The path of the Wall around Jerusalem, a form of structural violence, enables 
Israel to dominate the city by pushing Palestinian areas into the West Bank. The violence 
triangle aids Israel in unilaterally annexing Jerusalem land and transforming the 
demographic makeup of the holy city. The Wall inside the West Bank and around 
Jerusalem is not built on the 1949 armistice line (Green-Line), thus dissolving the border. 
The Wall throughout the Occupied Territory restricts movement and steals Palestinian 
land for the expansion of the Israeli state, and this is continuous around the Jerusalem 
Envelope. In 2005, after much of the Wall was erected in the Jerusalem area, the 
Palestinian Center of Human Rights reported, “The Wall currently under construction in 
the West Bank reflects the largest single manifestation of Israel’s ongoing policy of 
annexation of Palestinian lands” (6). The Wall around Jerusalem is dangerous because it 
prevents the Palestinian people from accessing the contested city, leaving Israel with sole 
rights over it.  
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The violence triangle, through the establishment of the Wall, eliminates the need 
for negotiations around the contested city, and grants Israel total control. Jerusalem is the 
envisioned capital for both Israelis and Palestinians, making it a controversial issue 
during negotiations. As a way to maintain control over the city, Israel began 
implementing the violence triangle in 1967, when the occupation of the West Bank 
began. Settlements were developed inside East Jerusalem and Israelis began to occupy 
the city in entirety. According to the UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs: 
Since 1967, the Government of Israel has constructed settlements within 
the extended municipal boundary of East Jerusalem and in the wider 
metropolitan area beyond, despite the prohibition, under international law, 
of the transfer of civilians to occupied territory. (2011: 10)  
 
The settlement expansion continues to grow inside Jerusalem and its surrounding areas. 
The Wall is the most recent form of structural violence in Jerusalem (since 2003) and has 
aided in securing the settlements inside the city of Jerusalem. The route of the Wall has 
dissolved the borders, eliminating the need for future talks by unilaterally annexing the 
East Jerusalem into Israel.  
Structural and direct violence are both exposed visually around the Jerusalem 
Envelope, weaving around Palestinian homes and annexing Palestinian lands in an urban 
setting. The Wall literally moves in between houses to push Palestinian neighborhoods 
into the West Bank. Muhin, from the Palestinian National Committee to Access the 
Damage of the Wall, described the physical nature of the Wall around Jerusalem: “It is 
like a snake between houses, dividing buildings. We don’t need more of an explanation to 
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tell the people; a picture is enough.”72 The settlement growth and the Wall displace the 
local Palestinian population and restrict access to the city. For Peter Lagerquists, “Over 
90 percent of the post-1967 Palestinian Jerusalem district will be swallowed by the fence 
and absorbed into Israel, representing some 40 percent of the urban population of the 
West Bank” (2004: 15). The path of the Wall directly affects two major Palestinian 
suburbs of Jerusalem. Abu Dis and Al Ram have been completely isolated from the city. 
The construction started in Abu Dis in 2003 and in Al Ram in 2004. By 2005, both cities 
were completely sealed into the West Bank and away from Jerusalem by the Wall. 
Palestinians that relocated or remained inside Jerusalem city found themselves living in 
extremely high priced, small dwellings to maintain their ID cards, while all other 
Palestinians were isolated behind the Wall. 
 
 
       The Wall encircling Abu Dis and separating it from Jerusalem. Abu Dis October 2004 
 
 
The economy is directly affected through Israel’s use of the Wall, structurally 
disadvantaging the Palestinian people, especially in the suburban areas. Residents from 	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  Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.	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the Palestinian suburbs are isolated from employment opportunities they once accessed 
before the establishment of the Wall. In Al Ram, countless Jerusalemites reside in the 
town, as it is closer to Jerusalem. In Abu Dis, the majority of the city residents hold West 
Bank IDs. Khalid Abu Hillil, a local from Abu Dis, worked for the Palestinian General 
Federation of Trade Unions and was a member of the executive committee. He was also 
the chairman of the Hotel Restaurants and Tourist Services workers’ general union in 
Abu Dis. Khalid observed that since Oslo, the closures and checkpoints in the West Bank 
and Gaza worsened workers’ situations.73 Wall construction, which began in 2003, 
limited all access into Jerusalem for workers. After the Wall, only 10% of the Abu Dis 
residents were allowed to continue working inside Israel, due to the green IDs they 
carried. Khalid shared, “Jerusalem is important for all workers who used to work in Al 
Quds [Jerusalem] and inside the Green-Line.”74 A checkpoint was stationed outside of 
Abu Dis to check all people as they passed into Jerusalem, to ensure that no green ID-
holders entered. Khalid recalled, “10,000 people worked in East Jerusalem; 850 from this 
teachers.”75 After the Wall, only Jerusalem ID-holders were able to access work, which 
led to high unemployment inside the suburban towns. This issue of accessing Jerusalem 
based on ID was also relevant inside Al Ram. For Fadwa, a local from Al Ram:   
Specialist from Al Ram, or the West Bank, and holding West Bank IDs: 
they can’t [continue to travel into Jerusalem]. For education information, 
or scientific information, for the Jerusalem students [travel is difficult]. So 
also Jerusalem is lacking specialists.76  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Interview with Khalid Abu Hillil. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 
2006.  
74 Ibid.	  	  75	  Ibid.  
76 Interview with Fadwa Khader. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013. 
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West Banker ID-holders are restricted from accessing Jerusalem. The limited travel has 
heavily affected access to employment for all professionals attempting to reach their 
work inside Jerusalem. 
 The Wall’s violence also affected business and trade within the towns near 
Jerusalem as a result of the travel restrictions Israel imposed. Most Abu Dis inhabitants 
generated income in the business sector, but the Wall caused business to dwindle there. 
The Wall made the situation in this area much worse than any time since 1967, according 
to Khalid. By 2006, more than 70% of the people in Abu Dis were unemployed because it 
became a closed area. Khalid described, “10,000 families in the area, and more than 70% 
under the poverty line because of the Wall.”77 Women now provide for their families, due 
to the financial hardships caused by the Wall. Before the Wall went up, 90% of the 
people in the Abu Dis area were dependent on Israel for work, which leaves those with 
green IDs unemployed and with few prospects for work. 
 
 
Young Boy getting money from an unknown person  on the Jerusalem side of the Wall.  
Abu Dis. December 2005. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Interview with Khalid Abu Hillil. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 
2006.	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In addition to the structural violence of restricted access to and from Jerusalem, 
the Wall also separated local West Bank trade from the suburban areas of Jerusalem. 
Before the Wall, a drive between Al Ram and the villages of Beir Nabala, Aljib, Biddo, 
Qatana, Beit Duqu, and Beit Iqsa took five minutes. Fadwa from Al Ram explained:  
We used to buy from our own local markets vegetables and fruits, very 
healthy fruits and vegetables, because it’s an agricultural area. But after 
the establishment of the Wall you could rarely see one of them because it 
became very costly to pay for transportation crossing the western villages, 
to Ramallah, and coming back to Al Ram.78  
 
Before the Wall, trade flourished between the town of Al Ram and the village farmers in 
the northwest area. Trade halted when farmers encountered multiple barriers in attempts 
to reach Al Ram.  
Structural violence affected commercial exchange between the suburban 
Jerusalem areas with the local farmers within the West Bank. Produce and services were 
traded between Al Ram and its surrounding villages. Western village inhabitants 
regularly visited clinics and businesses in Al Ram. However, the Wall sealed off direct 
access. It was constructed on the main highway 60, separating the town into two. When 
asked why Israel would put the Wall in the major business hub of Al Ram, Fadwa 
replied, “If you look geographically, you will find out that the most population of this 
location in Al Ram is located on the eastern side of the Wall; what was left from the 
western side was very few buildings.”79  She observed that splitting Al Ram in this way 
strategically isolated Palestinians in the West Bank and limited the number residing 
inside Jerusalem: “Annatta became out, Abu Dis and Azariya, Bethany became isolated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Interview with Fadwa Khader. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.  
79 Ibid.  
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too, so those are the highest populations in the suburbs of Jerusalem.”80 Now, there is 
only one route to the western villages from Al Ram: through Ramallah city. This has 
ultimately stopped direct trade, creating an economic crisis. Al Ram suffered when the 
Wall was built in the business hub and travel from the highly populated western villages 
decreased. Numerous businesses closed. Villagers were forced to sell their produce in 
Ramallah, where they faced intense competition from all the other agricultural villages 
also affected by the Wall. This decreased their profits. 
 
 
The Wall in Al Ram before it was completed, splitting the town into two. Al Ram 
August 2005 
 
 
The structural violence from the Wall’s establishment separated families holding 
differing Israeli issued ID’s as a way to depopulate Jerusalem of Palestinians. According 
to Khalid, by 2006, there were 2,500 broken families in the Abu Dis area, including his. 
Broken families are marriage partners who hold differing IDs. In these situations, the 
Jerusalemite must make a tough decision: keep the blue ID and not live with a spouse, or 
give it up and lose access to social services and Jerusalem.  Khalid is a West Banker with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Interview with Fadwa Khader. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.	  
	   242	  
a green ID, and his wife holds a blue Jerusalemite ID. Because of this, she can travel 
from the West Bank into Jerusalem through checkpoints. However, all of her travel is 
tracked to force her to give up her blue ID and become a West Banker with restricted 
access. 
Israel uses various structural violence tactics to coerce Palestinian Jerusalemites 
to leave Jerusalem and move deeper into the West Bank. This coercion is a component of 
Israel’s strategic plan to transport the population outside of Jerusalem into the West 
Bank. Health insurance is one thing that pushes families into the West Bank. Khalid’s 
wife’s health insurance was cut because she is married to a West Banker. Mariam lives in 
Al Ram, yet holds a blue ID. She lost her health insurance in Jerusalem because her 
family does not have a residence inside the city. However, her family is not financially 
able to get a residence inside Jerusalem. Mariam explained, “The other option is for me 
to live in Jerusalem and pay one year in advance [for insurance], because you need one 
year to approve for them, and pay lots of money, and then take your medical 
insurance.”81 Most families must leave their homes in the suburbs and move into 
Jerusalem to keep their blue Jerusalem IDs. Yet not all families are financially able to 
make the move. Families that can afford it do make the move to Jerusalem; they want to 
avoid the risk of losing the blue ID and its privileges. Fadwa from Al Ram explained, 
“Many of the Palestinians who hold the blue ID left their assets, their buildings, their flats 
and they moved to Jerusalem. They live in very small apartments, some of them in one 
bedroom for around seven persons, imagine this, one bedroom for seven persons.”82 The 
homes these families own in the suburbs provide them with larger spaces, but they are 	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  Interview with Mariam. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.	  	  82	  Interview with Fadwa Khader. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.	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forced to leave them empty to keep their Jerusalem status. Mariam cannot pay for the 
move and has lived in her house for over two decades, raising each of her children there; 
therefore, it is difficult for her to leave. If a family with a blue ID is caught not residing in 
Jerusalem, Israel will confiscate their ID. Mariam and her family limit the number of 
times they pass through checkpoints, for fear of having their blue IDs revoked. As time 
passes, she and her husband will need to finally decide where to live permanently, as one 
cannot live inside the Wall and still be considered a Jerusalemite.  
 
A family from Bethany passing around the Wall to get to the  
  Jerusalem side. Abu Dis August 2005 
 
 
Tracking Movement 
Tracking movement is vital for Israel to transfer the Palestinian population from 
the city of Jerusalem into the West Bank, and several structurally violent checkpoints are 
positioned around the city as central component to achieve this. Families with blue IDs 
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residing in the suburbs still must pass through militarized checkpoints to access the city. 
As children have been psychologically affected by the continual militarization of the 
checkpoints, families opt to limit their travel beyond the Wall. Fadwa described the 
exposure numerous children have experienced when attempting to reach Jerusalem 
through a checkpoint from the West Bank side of the Wall:  
Imagine that you have your own kids, and big soldiers and security 
persons highly equipped with weapons are coming to you in the vehicle 
window or the bus. The children don’t understand what is going on; their 
faces are horrible, terrifying them and so on.”83  
 
The Wall has forced Palestinian Jerusalemites to make the extremely difficult decision of 
whether to stay inside suburban towns and limit travel through the checkpoint, or to 
relocate to Jerusalem to avoid accessing the military checkpoint’s violence. 
As the process of the Wall developed, Israel decreased the access points into the 
city of Jerusalem, forcing all Palestinians traveling from the West Bank to use the few 
checkpoints that remained. Before the Wall, there were several entrance points into 
Jerusalem from the West Bank. Once the Wall was completed, only two checkpoints led 
to Jerusalem city. Israel began tracking IDs as people passed through the checkpoints to 
discern those staying inside the Wall so they could confiscate Jerusalem IDs. Tracking 
Jerusalem IDs at checkpoints enabled Israel to claim that the ID-holder lacked the proper 
residence status inside Jerusalem to maintain their status.  
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  Interview with Fadwa Khader. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.	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Qalandia checkpoint in 2004 
 
The cost to Palestinians traveling into the city of Jerusalem is high in both the 
stakes, and the financial burdens. Traveling through the checkpoints is extremely 
difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. The drive from Abu Dis to Jerusalem, which 
was once ten minutes, now takes over an hour. To reach Jerusalem from Abu Dis, one 
must travel north, deeper into the West Bank, around a settlement, and then south, 
through Hizma checkpoint.  Noura, a Bethany local, once took her children to Jerusalem 
for school. Now, they are forced to do all their daily activities behind the Wall, as they 
cannot enter Jerusalem. Noura explained, “The purpose was to separate all areas and it 
worked. I feel bad about it because it affects everything.”84 The majority of residents 
inside the suburbs utilized numerous services offered inside Jerusalem. Their IDs and the 
checkpoints that are connected to the concrete Wall imprison them inside the West Bank, 
isolated from the city. 
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The Wall in Al Ram, Qalandia checkpoint is on the other side. Al Ram. July 2013 
 
 
Time is another excessive cost to those traveling from the West Bank side of the 
Wall into Jerusalem. Structural violence around the city forces Palestinian Jerusalemites 
to travel longer distances to reach the city from these various suburbs. Al Ram, which is 
six miles away from Jerusalem, is centrally located between Jerusalem and the city of 
Ramallah. It used to also take ten minutes to drive to Jerusalem, but now it takes over an 
hour with the checkpoints. Qalandia checkpoint is the main entry point in the area from 
Al Ram. Residents with permits and proper IDs must travel north, in the direction of 
Ramallah, to pass through the checkpoint. Once through Qalandia checkpoint, they travel 
south, on the other side of the Wall from Al Ram.  
Israel established two main checkpoints for Palestinians to access Jerusalem as a 
way to monitor all movement into the city. Israel built another checkpoint for inhabitants 
of Al Ram and Abu Dis. Hizma checkpoint is northeast of Al Ram. Residents must first 
travel east, then south, to bypass Newe Ya’akov settlement, which the Wall secures into 
Jerusalem. Both Qalandia and Hizma are heavily crowded on a regular basis, as 
numerous people must travel through them. If one of these checkpoints is shut down, it 
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creates a travel nightmare for the entire area. Ramallah is only five miles into the West 
Bank from Al Ram, yet it could take an hour to access the city with the high traffic 
around Qalandia checkpoint. Marian explained the difficulties while traveling around the 
Wall: “When we need to go to Jerusalem, we have to go through Qalandia, which is even 
more trouble for us.”85 A trip that once took ten minutes for Mariam and her family, now 
takes at least an hour. For example, it took Mariam’s children one minute to walk to 
school before the Wall was built. It has literally cut the family off from the other side, 
restricting access to the services and the school. The children had to travel through 
Qalandia checkpoint each morning, which meant traveling north to access the checkpoint, 
and then back south to the other side of the Wall. This could take up to two hours at that 
time of day due to the high volume of people accessing the checkpoint. Although the 
children preferred this school, Mariam decided to take them out and have them study 
inside Al Ram to avoid the checkpoint and the travel time.  
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  Interview with Mariam. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.	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  Boy on his way home from school watching the Wall    Students walking back from school on the Jerusalem side of the Wall before it was  
  being constructed. Al Ram, August 2005                         sealed. Al Ram, December 2006 
 
 
The structural violence of the Wall is compounded in the Jerusalem Envelope; 
Palestinian families in the area are finding it more difficult to remain resilient in the face 
of such extreme violence. Structural violence aims to move Palestinians from East 
Jerusalem deeper into the West Bank. The Wall’s path and checkpoints have created a 
nightmare for travelers along the routes into Jerusalem. Those attempting to enter 
Jerusalem and those traveling into the West Bank have endured various structurally 
violent barriers, which cost them time and money and make them vulnerable to losing 
their residency status. Jerusalemites risk losing their IDs by staying in the suburbs, but 
countless have relocated into the city, living more difficult lives to maintain their 
residency status and the privileges that come with it. As the services in Jerusalem are 
higher quality than those in the West Bank, families find that although financial costs are 
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higher and homes are smaller in Jerusalem, their medical needs outweigh these 
drawbacks. 
 
 
Men denied entry into Jerusalem pray for Ramadan at the checkpoint. Qalandia, July 2013 
 
Medical Disparities 
Structural violence creates inequalities between Israeli and Palestinian 
populations in the Jerusalem Envelope, including medical care, causing Palestinian 
fatalities due to restricted access. The suburbs of Jerusalem relied on the medical 
facilities inside Jerusalem; they were the closest in distance and provided the best care. 
The Wall cut the entire suburban population off from Jerusalem area hospitals, and in 
several cases, this caused fatalities. Dr. Abdulla Abu Hilal, who has resided in and 
practiced medicine in Abu Dis for several years, described the medical situation changes: 
Before the wall, even in 1992, it was very easy for anyone to go to the 
hospital. In 1993 [Oslo], they started to give people permits to go to 
Jerusalem and they put one checkpoint in Ras al Amud. People managed 
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to find other ways to go to Jerusalem. When they finished building the 
Wall, it became impossible to reach Jerusalem.86  
 
Before the Wall, the only medical facility in Abu Dis was a small clinic. Because Abu 
Dis was so close to Jerusalem, there was no need to build an alternative medical facility, 
such as a hospital or medical center. According to Dr. Hilal, a specific process was 
developed to enable people to access the hospitals in Jerusalem after the Wall was built. 
First, they needed to apply for a medical permit, which required completing a several 
bureaucratic processes within the Palestinian government’s District Coordination Office 
(DCO). The request would next go to the Israeli authorities, who would check to see if 
the applicant is on an Israeli list barring them from entering Jerusalem. There are two 
types of permits: one for emergency cases and one for what is known as “elective” cases.  
Dr. Hilal explained how doctors work within this system to provide medical care: 
For elective cases, we send a paper to the hospital and the hospital sends 
us a special form. The patient takes this special form to the Palestinian 
side. The Palestinian Authority takes all these papers/forms to the Israeli 
side, and the Israeli side checks if he is allowed to get a permit or not. If 
he is they give this person the permit.87  
 
It usually takes about four days to complete the process of obtaining a permit for an 
elective case. Chronic illness cases, like cancer, use the same process as an elective case. 
Some people have been denied access to the only cancer center in the country inside 
Jerusalem because they lacked an Israeli-issued permit. This permit system is a form of 
structural violence that limits the potential of Palestinian life, and in several instances, 
results in death. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Interview with Dr. Abdulla Abu-Hilal. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 
2013.  
87 Ibid.  
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Palestinians physicians in Abu Dis attempted to alleviate the structural violent 
effects of Israel’s occupation by establishing a facility to counter the shortage of medical 
services. As way to limit the fatalities, in 2010, the people inside Abu Dis built a small 
emergency department in the existing medical clinic to provide needed services. 
Residents from the entire area, including surrounding villages and Bedouin camps utilize 
the center and rely on it for emergency situations. A different permit process is used for 
emergencies. The layers of bureaucracy required in this process make it very stressful. 
Dr. Hilal described how an emergency case is typically handled: 
If they need an urgent referral to the hospital, we call the hospital [in 
Jerusalem]. We give the hospital the name of the patient. The hospital 
calls the Israeli side, the Israeli side checks to see if he [patient] is allowed 
to get a permit or not. If he is allowed to get the permit the Israeli side 
calls the hospital again. The hospital calls us and tells us that it’s ok. Then 
we call the ambulance, and the ambulance comes from Jerusalem and 
takes the patient and goes through Zion checkpoint. At Zion checkpoint 
they check his name, and look everywhere inside the ambulance, and then 
he goes to the hospital.88  
 
This process can take two hours if everything goes quickly. As things do not usually go 
quickly, women have given birth or died while waiting for approval to get to a hospital 
inside Jerusalem. People do not utilize the hospital in Ramallah because it is always full; 
it is the main hospital for the various towns and villages inside the West Bank. It is also 
very far from Abu Dis; it can take well over an hour to travel to Ramallah, while the city 
of Jerusalem is only twenty minutes away. Israelis are not subject to this form of 
structural violence; they may travel and utilize all services inside Jerusalem. This 
imbalance of rights is a clear form of structural violence. Palestinian communities living 
inside Jerusalem city are able to utilize both Israeli and Palestinian health care systems, if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Interview with Dr. Abdulla Abu-Hilal. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 
2013.	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they have the adequate insurance, which is difficult to obtain in come cases. Palestinians 
residing in the suburbs, on the other side of the Wall, are unable to access necessary 
medical care due to various structural violence restrictions. 
 
Transforming Demographics Through the E1 Plan 
The violence triangle’s main aim is to limit Palestinians’ claims to Jerusalem by 
transferring the local Palestinian population out of the city and into the West Bank while 
simultaneously including Israeli settlements. The Wall has successfully isolated 
Palestinians from each other, limiting their travel into Jerusalem, and tracking those who 
have Jerusalem privileges in an effort to revoke them. These measures are all part of a 
larger strategy to control Jerusalem. Craig Larkin describes this shift of populations: 
Beginning work in 2002, Israelis have constructed in six phases a wall 
now extending over 142 kilometers in length. Its serpentine route envelops 
the West Bank Israeli settlements of Giv’at and Pisgat Ze’ev, Ma’ale 
Adumim, Gilo, and Gush Etzion (referred to as “the Jerusalem Envelope”) 
while simultaneously severing the Palestinian neighborhoods of Bayt 
Hanina, al-Ram, al-'Izariyya, and Abu Dis from East Jerusalem. (2014: 
138)  
 
The Wall is Israel’s strategy to control the city and ultimately change the demographics – 
a long-standing plan. 
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The structural violence of transfer was a concept long before the Wall’s 
establishment; the Wall enabled this plan to come into fruition. In 1990, Israel devised 
the E1 plan. The Wall reactivated it. This plan was a play off the Drobles plan. According 
to Hassan Saleh: 
The Drobles Plan articulated the settlement strategy of the Likud and Gush 
Emunim. The settlement policy was defined by Drobles on the basis that 
settlements should not be isolated, but should be collected in blocks or 
belts, which could serve as security points as well as a reliable barrier 
against any threat from the Arab eastern front. (1990: 339)  
 
These settlement blocs were viewed as part of Israel and strategic in colonizing more 
Palestinian land while also controlling the Palestinian population. Settlements inside 
Jerusalem were also used to gain more control over the city. Ibrahim Matar highlights the 
purpose of the settlements inside Jerusalem:  
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The residential fortresses that form a ring around the Palestinian 
population of Jerusalem have clearly been strategically placed: to prevent 
the physical expansion of the Palestinian population of Jerusalem; and to 
create a psychological feeling among the Palestinians of living in a ghetto, 
in order to demoralize the Palestinians and encourage them to emigrate 
and consequently facilitate Israeli control of the city. (1981: 94)   
 
This plan aimed to construct new Israeli settlements inside of Jerusalem and connect 
them to existing Israeli settlements inside the Occupied Territories. OCHA reported that, 
“Over one third of the area within the extended boundary of East Jerusalem has been 
expropriated for the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements” (2011: 10). The 
E1 plan also includes the Israeli settlements near Bethlehem. Dr. Hilal described the E1 
plan:  
E1 project is project where Israeli government plans to connect all 
settlements with each other, Ma’ale Adumim with Jerusalem, Khaddar 1 
and Khaddar 2 with Bethlehem settlements. So this will destroy the two 
states solution. They will cut the road from north and east, it will be a 
barrier, north of Palestine and south of Palestine.89  
 
The E1 plan will eventually create an uninterrupted, built-up area between the Ma’ale 
Adumim settlement, the settlements surrounding Bethlehem, and those inside Jerusalem 
(OCHA, 2013). The intention is to connect the settlement blocs inside the West Bank 
with those inside the city of Jerusalem. This would officially transform the demographic 
situation, ensuring that there are more Israeli residents within the Jerusalem district, while 
expelling the indigenous Palestinians into the West Bank. Muhin, from the PLO, 
described the Wall in Jerusalem as a strategic plan in regards to the question of 
Jerusalem: “They established the Wall and planned it in order to exclude where the 
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  Interview with Dr. Abdulla Abu-Hilal. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 
2013.  
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majority of the Palestinians live, and also include the [Israeli] settlement area.”90 
Connecting Israeli settlements creates a large Israeli suburban area sprawling out from 
Jerusalem city. The Wall around Jerusalem secures the E1 plan and pushes Palestinians 
into the West Bank. This move strategically enables Israel to maintain control over the 
city and to continue to displace Palestinians. The E1 plan aids Israel’s in transforming the 
demographics and limiting Palestinian claims to the holy city as their future capital. 
 
 
Young boy riding his bike near the constructed Wall. Abu Dis January 2005 
 
Conclusion 
The Wall enables Israel to use the violence triangle to transform the demographics 
of the city, supporting their political objective of Jerusalem as an Israeli city, and not 
shared. Israel has planned the path of the Wall to push the densely populated Palestinian 
areas into the West Bank, while simultaneously including Israeli settlements through the 
E1 plan. The Wall’s route dips deep into the Green-Line and renders it obsolete. Israel 
uses structural violence implements to transfer and limit the Palestinian population. One 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.	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implement, the ID system, divides the larger Palestinian population into smaller 
categories, allocating different rights to groups based on residence. Jerusalem ID-holders 
now must move from the suburbs into the city or risk losing their ID and the privileges 
that come with it.  Israel checks Palestinians’ residence as they travel through 
checkpoints in the Wall, as well as within the city proper, threatening to confiscate IDs. 
The Jerusalem Envelope is viewed as the most strategic and dangerous location of the 
Wall because of its effects, the E1 plan, and the threatened displacement. The case of the 
Jerusalem Envelope reveals Israel’s use of the violence triangle for explicit political 
ambitions. The detailed analysis of the Wall around Jerusalem highlights the root of the 
violence, and reframes the narrative, positing Israel not as the victim, but as the offender.   
 
 
Family waiting at Qalandia checkpoint lines. July, 2013	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The objective of the violence triangle is to control the Occupied Territories, but 
Palestinians resist the various forms of violence as they continue to live within Israel’s 
violent system.  As Craig Larkin explains, “For Palestinian Jerusalemites, resistance 
focused on navigating shrinking urban spaces distorted by concrete barriers and 
checkpoints, breaching holes in the wall, and performing the tasks of daily life within the 
city” (2014: 141). In the West Bank, including Jerusalem, Palestinians resist the Wall’s 
violence on a daily basis through the resilience of remaining in the Occupied Territories 
under such duress. Palestinians stay on their lands, and in their houses, finding alternative 
routes and ways of existing under Israel’s violent occupation, not allowing forced 
displacement as a form of resistance. 
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Part 3 
Resistance to the Wall’s Violence  
 
 
This dissertation has traced how Israel has exacted extreme violence via the 
violence triangle onto the Palestinian people to maintain its occupation. However, this 
analysis does not fully describe life in the Occupied Territory of the West Bank. The 
Palestinian people have demonstrated their determination to exist as a liberated 
population and have continued to resist Israeli violence as a means to that end. Countless 
times in Palestinian history, the indigenous Palestinian people have utilized various 
methods of resistance with the aim of working toward self-determination. Some of the 
resistance tactics have brought them closer to their goal, while other tactics have pushed 
them further back from achieving their dreams. As Israel’s use of the violence triangle 
continues to grow, so does the need for enhanced resistance tactics on the part of the 
Palestinian people.  
Part 3 of this dissertation explores methods of Palestinian resistance against the 
violence triangle of the Apartheid Wall. Chapter 6 examines the Palestinian popular, 
nonviolent, civil resistance movement that began as a direct response to the various forms 
of violence enacted by virtue of the Wall. Briefly summarizing the history of Palestinian 
resistance over the past several decades contextualizes the resistance to the Apartheid 
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Wall, which took place from 2002-2013. A detailed analysis of first-hand testimonials 
from numerous Palestinian people who actively resisted the Wall exposes the various 
facets of the ongoing movement. Local popular committees and solidarity activists used 
media and nonviolent tactics in the resistance. These first hand accounts illustrate how 
Palestinian nonviolent resistance functioned in the face of extreme Israeli violence. The 
resistance movement against the Wall disrupts the typical framing of Palestinians as 
aggressors and Israelis as victims by showing Israeli violence against Palestinian victims. 
Thus, Part 3 of this dissertation charts Palestinians’ nonviolent resistance strategies 
against the multiple forms of violence employed by Israel to squash Palestinian dissent. 
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Chapter 6 
Resistance Against the Wall 
2002-2013 
 
Israel’s establishment of the Apartheid Wall utilized the triangle of violence to 
oppress the indigenous Palestinian people and steal their lands. For the Palestinian 
people, the act of uprooting their trees and imprisoning them into their towns and villages 
was the catalyst for another phase of Palestinian resistance. The popular struggle against 
the Wall initiated as a response to the Wall’s violence. Palestinian activists used 
nonviolent tactics against Israel’s military in the hopes to stop the Wall and save their 
lands. Unarmed tactics enabled Israel’s violence triangle to shine through, and reframed 
the narrative from "Palestinian as terrorist perpetrating the violence", to one of 
"Palestinian as victim of Israeli violence." Reframing the narrative is essential for 
ongoing Palestinian resistance to be effective; it weakens Israel’s cultural violence 
campaign, which ultimately creates an imbalance in the violence triangle.   
Israel uses the violence triangle as a means of repressing the indigenous people, 
and the violence of the Wall is an extension of that violence. The identification of the 
violence triangle through the establishment of the Wall proves that Israel is the source of 
the violence. In addition to Israel’s use of violence, the Palestinian response to the 
violence aids in shifting the mainstream narrative. In the face of extreme violence 
Palestinian activists have remained nonviolent in their dissent against the Wall. This 
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chapter will examine the ongoing, unarmed popular resistance movement against the 
newest form of structural violence: Israel’s Apartheid Wall.  I will first contextualize the 
Palestinian resistance movement against the Wall in light of the First and Second 
Intifadas. Next, I will overview the historical development of Palestinian resistance to the 
Wall. This chapter will focus on particular villages that played a key role in the struggle 
against the Wall; several other villages resisted the Wall than are covered here. I 
conducted numerous first-hand interviews with resisters throughout the West Bank and 
photographed the movement from 2004-2006. The experiences of local participants and 
organizers of the struggle against the Wall illustrate how separate actions together form 
an important part of a larger movement. Residents I interviewed within the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory of the West Bank referred to the Apartheid Wall as the Third Nakba 
(Catastrophe) on several occasions. It was stated that this is due to the Wall posing a 
great threat to the indigenous people’s future on the lands. In this context, locals define 
the popular struggle against the Wall as the Third Intifada (Uprising), as resisters in 
various areas in the West Bank have mobilized to rise up against the Wall. The 
Palestinian civil resistance movement, which began in 2002, interrupted its construction 
and today continues to disrupt Israel’s persistent land grab. The Palestinian popular 
struggle against the Wall is a model of how to use a history of resistance, and develop a 
new movement based on the ever-changing realities of Israel’s triangle of violence. 
 
Histories of Violence and Resistance 
Israel has implemented the triangle of violence as a way to ensure total 
domination over the Palestinian people. Israel, as a settler colonial state, has remained 
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violent towards the indigenous Palestinian population as a way to gain more control over 
the land and resources. The violence triangle assists Israel in systematically colonizing 
the people and the land. However, the ongoing violence has not deterred the Palestinian 
people; their existence relies on their continued struggle to remain on their lands. The 
overall aim of the Palestinian struggle is self-determination. As Taiaiake and Corntassel 
discuss in Being Indigenous: 
The struggle to survive as distinct peoples on foundations constituted in 
their unique heritages, attachments to their homelands, and natural ways of 
life is what is shared by all Indigenous peoples, as well as the fact that 
their existence is in large part lived as determined acts of survival against 
colonizing states’ efforts to eradicate them culturally, politically and 
physically (2005: 597).  
 
In addition to remaining on their lands, indigenous Palestinians resist Israeli colonial rule 
daily by actively utilizing resistance tactics against the Israeli state. Mazen Qumsiyeh 
explored the historical timeline of Palestinian unarmed resistance in his book, Popular 
Resistance in Palestine, noting: “colonizers always use violence because it is the only 
way to remove people from the land, while those being colonized can choose to resist by 
other means” (2011: 8). Palestinian resistance has encompassed armed resistance 
techniques, which are widely known, due to mainstream media interest, and unarmed 
tactics. Armed resistance by the colonized is limited and must be “carried out in 
clandestine operations under constant threat of infiltration and liquidation by the 
colonizers” (Qumsiyeh, 2011: 9). Armed resistance also entails more “logistical support 
(arms etc.), secrecy, killing of armed combatants, difficulty in establishing geographic 
areas for armed control, and much more” (Qumsiyeh, 2011: 9). Armed resistance has 
framed the narrative, positioning the Palestinian people in total as the source of the 
violence. In contrast, unarmed resistance, or popular struggle, as I will call it in this 
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dissertation, is a transparent movement that allows for numerous activists to become 
involved. Although popular struggle does not use arms to resist colonial rule, it is still 
extremely dangerous for those involved. For Qumsiyeh, “popular resistance can in many 
situations be more dangerous than armed resistance (after all, we have only our bodies 
and willingness to suffer). In fact, in many ways, it is reliant on willingness to suffer by 
people” (2011: 9). Mainstream media has not covered unarmed resistance as this does not 
fit into the narrative that is being sold. 
 The Palestinian people have nonviolently resisted Israel’s colonial plan since 
before state formation. Palestinian people living under the Israeli occupation resist 
nonviolently on a daily basis through remaining on the lands. By remaining on their 
ancestral lands, they are subjected to Israel’s triangle of violence through the 
dispossession of their lands, and the restriction of their movement. Besides existing, 
Palestinians have actively resisted the Israeli state, utilizing both armed/violent and 
unarmed/nonviolent tactics. Both the First and Second Intifadas were direct responses to 
Israel’s triangle of violence, but contrasting tactics resulted in different outcomes. 
The First Intifada provided valuable lessons for the resistance against the Wall, 
and the Palestinian activists attempted to emulate the success of the previous movement. 
The First Intifada was a large-scale, Palestinian-led, unarmed struggle against the 
occupation in 1989. In this uprising, the Palestinian people organized a campaign against 
the occupation using nonviolent tactics. As Dudouet explained, “The intifada is not a 
well-recognised case of civil resistance, although it has been quantitatively assessed that 
at least 90% of its methods of insurrection were nonviolent (Sharp 1989), spreading 
across Sharp’s three categories of nonviolent action” (2008: 13). During the First Intifada 
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stone throwing was present from the shabab (boys), which for principled nonviolence 
practitioners is a form of violence. This tactic disregarded the First Intifada as an 
exclusively nonviolent movement. The organization of the First Intifada was an aspect of 
the resistance that supported its success. Different local committees, such as the 
agricultural relief committees, medical relief committees, health work committees, 
cultural work committees, and numerous un-affiliated locals throughout towns and 
villages in the West Bank and Gaza were involved in organizing the resistance. The 
people worked together to resist the occupation using nonviolent methods. The First 
Intifada successfully put pressure on Israel, resulting in the Oslo Accord negotiations, 
which ultimately stopped the struggle’s progression. Oslo brought with it numerous 
setbacks for Palestinian self-determination. Anne Marie Baylouny detailed some of the 
difficulties around negotiating space in the West Bank after the Oslo negotiations, 
“Fundamental to this process is the fragmentation of the Territories, the prevention of all 
forms of opposition, and the continued control of exit points by Israel” (Baylouny, 2009: 
51). Oslo brought forth new implements of control, intensifying the triangle of violence 
the Palestinian people had already experienced. The Israeli reaction to the First Intifada 
aimed to stop the resistance before Palestinians achieved self-determination and to create 
an environment where the same resistance tactics were impossible. 
Palestinian resistance did not stop post First Intifada, even with Israel’s increased 
violence triangle. After several years of increased restrictions, a façade of “negotiations,” 
and failures to attain autonomy, the Palestinian people again began to resist the 
occupation. As the Second Intifada began in 2000 in the (post Oslo) fragmented West 
Bank, it was nearly impossible for protesters to utilize tactics used in the First Intifada. 
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Israel had strategically created cantons, which posed challenges to collective resistance 
actions throughout the Occupied Territory. According to Baylouny:   
The first consequence of Oslo was the inability of previously active 
groups to mobilize and protest. While prohibitions and harsh penalties for 
organizing were present in the first intifada, Oslo added a new element. It 
increased the geographic difficulties of convening meetings, networks, and 
stage protests. (2009: 52)  
 
People were scattered in different areas throughout the West Bank, separated by 
numerous checkpoints. Limited travel made sharing information nearly impossible, 
which made organizing ineffective. Each Palestinian who passed through a checkpoint 
was tracked, and Israel labeled those who were active in the First Intifada “activists,” 
viewing the word as negative through cultural violence. Israel heavily monitored these 
activists as they traveled throughout the West Bank. This separation made it extremely 
difficult for the masses to get involved in a new struggle. For Baylouny, “The limitations 
on mobility imposed by the Oslo accords have contributed to the increasing difficulty of 
collective protest, which, contrary to divide and conquer axioms, worked to increase, not 
decrease, violence” (2009: 40). The lack of organized mass protest left few people 
willing to participate. As a result, the Second Intifada consisted of small, marginalized 
groups that largely utilized armed tactics against the occupation.  
The use of armed resistance against the occupation is not an excuse to use cultural 
violence and frame Palestinians as dangerous terrorists. Armed resistance is legal in 
international law; according to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/3246 (XXIX; 29 November 1974), those living under occupation are legally 
permitted to use arms against their occupying colonial powers. The resolution states that 
the General Assembly “Reaffirms the legitimacy of the peoples' struggle for liberation 
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from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available means, 
including armed struggle” (United Nations General Assembly, 1974). Where 
international law permits armed tactics against colonial domination, it refers specifically 
to military targets, not civilian populations. Several times, armed Palestinian factions 
targeted Israeli-populated cafes and buses and Israelis themselves; this is not permitted 
under international law. The Second Intifada failed due to the use of armed tactics against 
civilian targets, and the lack of popular participation. The few that resisted were quickly 
defeated, and the Second Intifada ended not long after it began. By 2002, the armed 
resistance of the Second Intifada (especially the suicide attacks on civilian populations) 
provided Israel and its allies an excuse to increase the use of cultural violence, and exact 
more violence on the Palestinian people through the Apartheid Wall. 
Israel’s use of the violence triangle through the establishment of the Wall was not 
envisioned as a direct result of the Second Intifada, this had been a political aspiration of 
Israel’s since the 1967 War, and was known as the Allon Plan.Over the years, various 
Israeli politicians used this plan in their campaigns, reiterating: “good fences make good 
neighbors” (2004: 6). In 2000, then Prime Minister Ehud Barak sold the idea of the Wall 
to the Israeli public, making adjustments to previous plans to increase settler support. He 
perpetrated cultural violence, and informed the Israel people that constructing the Wall 
would keep the Palestinian people contained and unable to perform violent attacks, 
creating safety for the Israeli people. Cultural violence was the foundation for the 
structural violence of the Wall, and Israeli politicians used this propaganda to put fear 
into the Israeli people and excuse their intended violence. For Israel, it was a “security 
measure”, but for Palestinians, it was collective punishment and an open-air prison.  
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Israel’s triangle of violence has maintained the occupation, and the Palestinian 
people explored ways to resist. The Wall, as a form of violence, was a resistance 
opportunity for the Palestinian people. Ayed Morrar, a First Intifada organizer in Budrus, 
described the reason the Palestinian people started resisting the Wall: 
The popular resistance does not just belong to the Wall. The Wall was the 
best opportunity for us to put a popular struggle, as a live example, on the 
ground. We didn’t aim, or target just the Wall in our struggling against the 
occupation. We recognize the Wall as part, or as a component from the 
occupation, or as a symbol of the occupation, and we have to resist it for 
that reason.91  
 
People who were directly affected by the Wall instantly began to organize, learning from 
the previous uprisings. They also built new forms of resistance to address the new 
realities on the ground. As civil resistance against the occupation was not new, the 
resisters to the Wall built from what previously worked best: the nonviolent tactics of the 
First Intifada. Several of the local organizers had also participated in the First Intifada 
and saw this popular struggle against the Wall in the spirit of the First Intifada.  
The triangle of violence invoked the struggle against the Wall, which occurred in 
numerous villages throughout the West Bank, and lasted over a decade, continuing today. 
The resistance officially started in April of 2002 in the town of Tulkarm, north of the 
West Bank. The farmers directly affected by the confiscation of their land responded 
immediately. Fayez, a farmer from Tulkarm, described the first reaction the farmers of 
the village had when they learned that their land would be taken for the site of the Wall:  
We started to ask [questions]. I wrote two messages, two letters. One to 
the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC), they had been 
strong to (support) our life (as farmers). The second message, I sent it to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Interview with Ayed Morrar, Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.  
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the Palestinian Authority. I wrote the same question, what happened? 
What’s going on?92  
 
The farmers did not get a response from the Palestinian Authority explaining why the 
Wall was being built on their land. PARC, however, did respond to the farmers. PARC 
was a member of the Palestinian Environmental NGO’s Network (PENGON), a larger 
agricultural network, and they had numerous resources to support the budding movement 
against the Wall. The farmers decided the next immediate step would be to actively resist 
the construction of the Wall. Their primary aim was to stop the construction on their 
lands and save their crops and their livelihood. The farmers started resisting with their 
bodies, and soon, people living in Tulkarm and nearby villages joined them in physically 
obstructing the bulldozers from building the Wall. Shortly after Wall construction began 
in Tulkarm, it also started in the nearby village of Jayyus. As much land north of the 
West Bank was agricultural, the farmers in both areas initiated the resistance to the Wall. 
The residents in Jayyus also started looking for answers. They took their concerns to 
human rights organizations in various places, such as Jordan, Europe, and inside Israel. 
They attempted to get outside support to stop the Wall knowing that the cultural and 
structural violence they experienced as Palestinians would limit them if working alone. 
The people of Jayyus went as far as contacting the Israeli military to ask what was 
happening on their land with the construction. The response was minimal, and after a 
month of watching soldiers seize their land, the people decided that to stop the Wall in 
their villages, they needed to also actively resist its construction with their bodies as their 
only weapons. Organizers in Jayyus began to protest against the Wall. The first protest 
began there during the summer of 2002, a few months after the resistance in Tulkarm. 	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Human rights workers, international activists, and local journalists participated in this 
protest. They aimed to send a message from Jayyus to the Israeli military. Adwan 
Shamasna, a local activist from Jayyus, explained that the people of Jayyus would not 
allow the Wall to continue to destroy their land and imprison their village without a 
fight.93 The people of Jayyus also wanted those living outside the area to see what the 
Wall’s violence was doing to their village, so they invited solidarity activists to join them. 
The first three protests were successful; people marched to the land that was being 
confiscated for the Wall, and then returned to the village. They were able to stop the 
construction. The fourth protest was not the same. The Israeli military behaved violently 
toward the protesters to stop the resistance by using direct violence. This use of direct 
violence mobilized more resisters to join in the struggle. The organizers held meetings to 
discuss nonviolent tactics, which they continued to use to resist the Wall. As the 
construction continued to travel south, the resistance movement followed, with each 
village learning from the Jayyus and Tulkarm experiences. 
The resistance to the Wall was a collaborative and organic venture that attempted 
to include all corners of Palestinian society, unifying Palestinians against Israel’s 
violence triangle. PENGON used their resources and network to address the 
organizational needs. PENGON was comprised of committees that were actively 
involved during the First Intifada. Jamal Juma, the coordinator of the Stop the Wall 
Campaign, which stemmed from PENGON’s involvement in the resistance, shared that 
“the main figures and organizers in this campaign was very active in the First Intifada.”94 
PENGON facilitated the first meeting against the Wall. 150 villagers from the north were 	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  Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007.  
94 Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.	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invited to attend the meeting in the Salfit area to discuss organizing against the Wall. 
Jamal Juma explained the main objectives of the first Salfit meetings: 
Its main aims was for three major things; one to mobilize the communities 
to stand up against the bulldozers, against the destruction of the land, 
against building the Wall. Second is documenting day to day, and every 
single violation that they [Israel] are doing against them [Palestinians]. 
The third important dimension, which is the main one besides the work on 
the ground in the popular resistance, is the international outreach.95  
 
PENGON oversaw all of the organizing in the initial stages of the resistance. The efforts 
later formed a separate organization called the Stop the Wall Campaign, which continues 
to work solely on the Wall’s violence today. This split happened when the movement 
grew beyond the environmental framework of PENGON’s mission into a Palestinian 
national concern. The Stop the Wall campaign relied heavily on village activists to 
document and resist the Wall. Juma described how previous relationships between the 
activists and local committees accelerated the organizing process within the villages 
against the Wall: “We had the connections, and these organizations helped a lot. They 
provide us with all the possibilities; they provide us with volunteers, with places to 
coordinate, and that gives us really the strong starting point.”96 The villagers directly 
affected by the Wall’s construction took the lead in resisting the Wall. Fayez from 
Tulkarm noted that the Israeli army’s reaction to the resistance was to speed up 
construction in the area.97 The Wall was completed in Tulkarm during the summer of 
2003, a little over a year after Israel started construction. After the Wall was constructed 
in Tulkarm, it moved to the areas between Tulkarm and the surrounding villages, and 
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  Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013. 
96 Ibid.  
97 Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.	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then south. The activists from Tulkarm began to travel to neighboring villages to support 
them in organizing efforts. Fayez explained how the farmers worked with other villages 
to resist the Wall. “We [would] go to the other villages to teach them how we started to 
build our [popular] committees here. And we can resist, and how we can have contact to 
be all together.”98 The resistance continued south to the Salfit area, where the Wall’s 
construction had started. 
Israel continued to use the triangle of violence to pave Palestinians lands for the 
site of the Wall, what they did not expect was for the resistance to follow them as they 
moved through the Occupied Territory. In the Salfit area, the resistance to the Wall was 
largely concentrated in the village of Mas’ha. On the 28th of March, 2003, activists 
raised two tents on village lands, marking the beginning of what was known as “Peace 
Tent.” Ra’ad Amer, a local Peace Tent organizer, explained why the people chose to 
struggle for their land: “The idea was initiated by farmers to stay and defend their lands, 
and supported by PARC with tents being supplied, and contacts made to internationals 
and Israelis.”99 The Peace Tent was an act of resistance to the Wall, and the locals invited 
Israeli and international activists to join them in the tent’s activities. This initiative was a 
direct response to a notice given two weeks earlier to the village residents about the Wall. 
Farmers found a confiscation order in their fields informing them that their land would be 
taken for the construction of the Wall. Israeli law allows one week to appeal, yet the 
people of Mas’ha did not trust that the Israeli legal system would work for them, as it had 
not been successful in past cases. The villagers decided to follow the north’s example, 
and they started to resist the Wall.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013. 
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The successful resistance tactics to the Wall violence was essential for the life 
span of the movement, and resistance tactics were shared from village to village. The 
activists from the north shared their knowledge with the villages that came after them 
about how Israel employed the violence triangle, and how the people actively resisted. 
The organizers from Mas’ha learned from those who resisted before them how to build a 
campaign against the Wall. Ra’ad Amer, a local organizer from Mas’ha, explained that 
the people saw only two options: react to the situation, or leave and help their people 
relocate.100 Ra’ad explained that the Peace Tent was popular in attracting solidarity 
visitors: “In the first two months, 6,000 people visited the camp, and over 8,000 within 
five months.”101 The tents were moved into different locations during the months of the 
camp. They first sat in the northern part of the village, and then moved closer into the 
village as a strategy. They wanted to be able to access the wireless Internet, which was 
another way to share information with those outside of Mas’ha village. The tents’ main 
purpose, at that time, was to establish a media center for exhibitions, talks, and 
workshops. Ra’ad stated how he personally benefited from the Peace Tent: “The camp 
was an interesting school to be at; [there were] politics and different forms of 
activism.”102 The tent offered a way for the residents of Mas’ha to engage with Israeli and 
international activists and build a social movement, eliminating the cultural violence that 
was so pervasive within Israeli society. Camp participants organized three main protests. 
The first was to officially establish the camp in the month of March. The second protest, 
on May 3rd, 2003, involved 300 Israelis, 60 Internationals, and 300 Palestinians. This 
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protest was designed as an educational event to talk about the Wall’s dangers, such as 
human rights and environmental issues. The village women’s group, established by the 
camp, held the third protest on the 15th of May, 2003 (Nakba commemoration day). The 
local women organized the last protest at that site, which primarily consisted of speeches. 
On August 5th, 2003, the tent was moved to its third and final site in Mas’ha: the land in 
front of Hani Amer’s house. This area was where the Wall would eventually separate the 
Amer family’s house from the rest of the village. It was a strategic move by the protestors 
to physically take up this space with the tent, as this was where the Wall was going to be 
constructed. Before the move to Amer land, the camp was only used to raise awareness; 
the major focus was on the media. On August 9th, 2003, Israeli military orders forbid 
anyone besides the Amer family to enter the area where the house was located and 
deemed it a closed military zone. The protestors risked arrest by continuing to participate 
in the Peace Tent, and all activities were eventually halted. In October 2003, the Wall 
was finished in front of the Amer home, officially separating the house and family from 
the rest of the village.  
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Resisting the construction of the Wall. Budrus. February 2004. 
 
The Wall continued to travel south, and the next village it arrived to made the 
biggest impact in penetrating the violence triangle through civil resistance techniques. 
Budrus, a small village in the Ramallah district of the West Bank, next faced the Wall’s 
destruction. By the time the Wall arrived in Budrus on November 9th, 2003, 170 km had 
already been constructed in the north of the West Bank. Like others before them, herders 
found notices posted on olive trees informing the people of Budrus that they had two 
weeks to send a complaint to the Israeli court, the body that had approved land 
confiscation. Although the letters stated a two-week deadline, the next day, the bulldozers 
started uprooting the trees for the Wall. As the construction had already begun, the 
villagers decided that going to the structurally violent Israeli court would not prevent the 
land from being completely destroyed before their complaint would be heard. As they 
urgently needed to halt the construction and knowing about the resistance in the northern 
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villages, Budrus villagers decided that demonstrating was their only option to combat the 
Wall. As they viewed the Wall as a problem for Palestinians, the villagers decided it 
needed to be an all-Palestinian resistance. Budrus made the Wall a community concern, 
and as the village was small, nearly every household participated in the resistance. 
Between 100 -150 Budrus villagers took part in the first demonstration. There was no 
media coverage and the protesters did not get much outside support. The villagers 
requested loudspeakers from the Palestinian Authority, but as the villagers reported to 
me, they were denied. No camera was present to document that first action, limiting all 
claims to personal experience. One villager wrote an article about the action and sent it to 
a Palestinian newspaper, but the paper chose not to publish it. The resistance to the Wall 
was not yet newsworthy, including in Palestine, and village struggles were isolated from 
each other. Eleven demonstrations were held in Budrus without any international or 
Israeli solidarity presence. On December 30th 2003, the Israeli military injured 70 
Palestinian villagers of Budrus; cultural violence removed any concern for the Palestinian 
well being. In eight months of resistance, 55 demonstrations had been organized against 
the Wall in Budrus alone, which included solidarity activists. As a response to the 
resistance, Israel decided to move the route of the Wall onto the Green-Line. Budrus’ 
unarmed civil resistance movement had saved more than 90% of their land and olive 
trees. 56 dunums were confiscated out of the 1200 that were in the initial plan. Budrus 
was a high point for the resistance movement, later viewed by outside practitioners as a 
successful model of resistance using nonviolent methods. In the fall of 2004, the 
resistance returned to Budrus, and although the Wall was re-routed, Israel was still 
building it in another area on their land. The people of Budrus did not see the Wall apart 
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from the occupation, and the village maintained their resistance as long as the 
construction continued on their land. 
The violence of the Wall continued to destroy Palestinian land as it moved from 
village to village, eventually arriving in Nil’in, a village neighboring Budrus. Nil’in held 
only two anti-Wall demonstrations in early March of 2004 before Israel stopped the 
construction. Once the first tree was uprooted, the villagers of Nil’in immediately went 
out to demonstrate. No internationals were present at the first demonstration and 
numerous villagers were injured as a result of direct violence being indiscriminately used. 
Cultural violence excused Israel to not ignore Palestinian harm. Immediately, the 
organizers in Nil’in called Ayed Morrar from Budrus on the telephone. They informed 
him that construction workers had begun cutting down trees. The following Friday, a few 
days later, Nil’in villagers planned another demonstration to pray on the land near the 
newly cut trees on a Friday – a holy day for Muslims. Ayed from Budrus called solidarity 
activists, who went to Nil’in to join the demonstration. Ayed also invited Budrus 
villagers to go to Nil’in and support the people there in the second demonstration. This 
collaborative strategy increased the number of activists present in Nil’in.  Nil’in villagers, 
who were known for their strong First Intifada resistance, understood the destruction 
through the triangle of violence of the Wall, and were committed to resisting it. Jamal 
Juma described the resistance in Nil’in: “Demonstrations in Ni’lin started massive, big, 
and people [there] are angry. Even the [Palestinian] Authority was worried from Ni’lin 
experience.”103 After the second demonstration, the Israeli army left Nil’in village for 
four years because a lot of activists participated. This proved that a high number of 
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  Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.  
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activists made a strong resistance against the Israeli army, and was effective. Mohamed 
Adbelqadar from Nil’in shared the reason he believes that the army stopped working in 
Nil’in: “It was like Intifada; kids, women, men resisting. It was high resistance.”104 Nil’in 
was successful for some time, but on May 17th, 2008, the Israeli military returned. They 
responded heavily with their weapons, shooting an international activist from the U.S., 
Tristan Anderson, in the head. He survived, yet continues to deal with brain damage as a 
result. Due to Tristan’s American nationality, his incident with Israeli direct violence was 
broadcast to a larger audience, whereas Palestinian activists have also been injured and 
are ignored due to the function of cultural violence. Mohamed from Nil’in explained that 
because the resistance was so strong in his village, it was easier for the army to go to 
other areas and leave Nil’in for a later date.105 The Wall was finished in 2010 in Nil’in; it 
took one and a half years to complete there. Mohamed observed that the resistance 
extended the amount of time and money it took Israel to build the Wall in that area, in 
that regard, the resistance in Nil’in was successful. 
Israeli violence persisted, and the resistance withstood the violence triangle, 
keeping a presence at each site where the Wall was being constructed. The resistance 
began to gain momentum during the winter of 2004. Budrus’ success in moving the route, 
and Nil‘in’s success in forcing the Israeli military to stop, motivated other villages. The 
villagers in the northwest Jerusalem area were well-prepared to resist the Wall once it 
arrived in their villages. In February 2004, the construction officially began in Biddo and 
Beit Suriq villages. To keep a constant presence in both locations, solidarity activists split 
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up between the villages. The resistance there was Palestinian-led. Shortly after the 
construction started in Biddo and Beit Suriq, paving of the land for the Wall began in 
other neighboring villages: Beit Duqu and Beit Anan. This simultaneous construction in 
multiple areas at the same time was a tactic Israel used to slow down the movement. It 
hindered activists’ ability to have high resistance numbers at each demonstration. 
 
        
Women stopping the construction of the Wall. Beit Duqu. March 2004.       Gathering at the site of the Wall before the construction. Beit Suriq. March  
          2004.       
 
The realities on the ground forced the local movements to quickly respond to the 
changing violence triangle, therefore the use of solidarity activists differed in each 
village. The Northwest Jerusalem villages had a higher population than Budrus, but they 
relied heavily on solidarity activists’ participation for strong demonstrations. 
Construction simultaneously occurring in multiple locations at the same time made it 
very difficult for the solidarity activists to spread themselves between the five villages. 
Israeli bulldozers kept a constant presence at the site of the Wall, working from the early 
morning hours until 7:00 or 8:00 pm. It was illegal to move into the area where the 
bulldozers worked, called the “red line.” Israel enhanced direct and structural violence to 
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inhibit the resistance movement to gain momentum or power. Activists who tried to move 
close to the bulldozers were shot at with rubber bullets and tear gas. During the 
construction in Biddo, Israel set up a checkpoint outside of the village to restrict 
solidarity activists from entering the area as a means for structural violence implement to 
deter the activism. The army used this checkpoint to regulate when and if people from the 
village passed through to the other areas in the West Bank.  
Structural violence was penetrated through the court systems, and the Biddo area 
was able to suspend the construction for several months while attempting to use the legal 
route. The civil resistance in the Biddo area lasted for three months in the beginning, 
from February 2004 to April 2004. It eventually ended during a court case this group of 
villages brought forth. They took the case of the Wall to the Israeli High Court. After 
several months in the legal system, the court decided to reroute the Wall. The Wall was 
moved away from one farmer’s land, and positioned on another’s farmer’s land a little 
farther out. The villagers did not believe that the legal system was the only solution, but 
they wanted to stop the construction and attempted every route that was possible. 
Mansour Mansour, a local organizer from Biddo, explained: “If I want to complain, who 
do I complain to? I’m complaining against whom, against another soldier?”106 As the 
court system is another arm of the occupation, both using structural violence to maintain 
the occupation, the people in Biddo feared that the Israeli legal system would not 
prioritize their interests. Israel framed the Wall as necessary for security through cultural 
violence, not taking into account how it would affect the Palestinian population inside the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Interview with Mansour Mansour. Biddo, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
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West Bank. The people inhabiting the northwest Jerusalem villages felt that their civil 
resistance coupled with the legal resistance would allow them more time to save their 
lands. The construction did stop for several months and the Wall was eventually re-
routed. The construction continued in Biddo for the new site during the summer of 2004, 
and there was little resistance. The local people were unable to resist daily because they 
needed to get back to work and they no longer had the energy to withstand the violence 
the Israeli army exacted upon the demonstrators. After the Hague court decision in July 
2004, the people all across the West Bank hoped that the international community would 
stop the destruction of Palestinian land for the Wall, and allow the people to re-enter their 
lands on the other side, but this did not happen.  
 
 
The uprooting of a tree for the site of the Wall.  
Biddo. April 2004. 
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Israeli violence, through the construction of the Wall, altered as a reaction to the 
resistance, creating low points and high points of activity within the movement’s life 
span, essentially ebbing and flowing. In December 2005, a high point of the resistance 
materialized in Bil’in village. Nasir, a member of the local popular committee in Bil’in, 
explained the situation in his village: “Bil’in is separated into two parts: the eastern, 
where people live, and the western (the agricultural land), which are stolen by the Wall. 
Where the settlement is built.”107 Markers were put up in Bil’in to show the where the 
construction would occur, and one bulldozer started building the Wall. The people of 
Bil’in went to speak with the Israeli army on the land. They marched as a large group to 
express their condemnation of the Wall on their land. Due to this confrontation, the work 
stopped for two months, until February 2005, when the army returned with more 
bulldozers to continue construction. The village began demonstrating almost every day 
for roughly six weeks; they then slowed down the momentum to only demonstrate on 
Sundays and Fridays. Like the villages before them, when construction began there was a 
sense of urgency, but that momentum stopped, as people were exhausted, burnt out, and 
physically and emotionally affected by the construction of the Wall. Bil’in continued 
resisting the Wall, but only on Fridays. They also took the case of the Wall to the Israeli 
High Court to legally resist. During the court proceedings between 2005 and 2007, the 
construction stopped, but the villagers continued to protest every Friday. In 2007, the 
court declared that the route of the Wall was not merely for security concerns. This 
outcome surprisingly combatted some of Israel’s own cultural violence through the 
security myth, and the Wall was re-routed as mandated by the court. The portion of the 
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Wall in Bil’in that was rerouted started construction in February 2010. In Bil’in, the 
resistance continues today. Each Friday, new solidarity activists and local villagers 
demonstrate against the occupation using the same tactics that were used against the 
Wall’s construction. 
 
 
Protestors in Bil’in being pushed by the Israeli military. Bil’in  August 2005. 
 
 
Small successes against the Wall did not deter Israel from using the violence 
triangle as they continued construction. Moving south, passing Jerusalem and connecting 
to the Bethlehem area, the Wall continued to damage Palestinian lands. The villagers of 
Al Walaja, situated between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, started resisting once the 
construction began. Omar was one of the main organizers in Al Walaja village. His house 
was in the path of the Wall and would be separated from the village. The people of Al 
Walaja resisted the Wall for nearly three years, using the same techniques that were 
utilized the in previous villages. The last demonstration in the village was in January 
2013. Omar had an infant son when the resistance started, and due to the close proximity 
of his house to the Wall’s path, his baby son could not leave their house until the 
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construction was finished. Israel often enacted direct violence by throwing stunt grenades 
and tear gas. Omar explained how his youngest son only started playing in their yard in 
February 2013, when he was already four years old. This was after the construction had 
officially ended. His house was eventually isolated from the rest of the village and 
situated next to the Israeli bypass road, with a tunnel road for his family’s use.  
 
 
Palestinian protester during a demonstration against the Wall. Beit Ula. November 2004. 
 
Israel’s use of the violence triangle through the Wall continued past Hebron to the 
southernmost point of the West Bank, destroying lands and imprisoning Palestinian 
communities in its path. As the Wall moved south, the resistance followed to show that 
the Palestinian people did not accept Israel’s violence. Techniques used in the First 
Intifada, such as mass protests and information sharing, enabled Palestinian resistance to 
the Wall to be more effective. The affected villages communicated with each other and 
unified against the construction of the Wall. The new geographical barriers post Oslo 
made it difficult for Palestinian activists to travel easily to other areas, but with the 
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support of international and Israeli activists who had the privilege to travel within the 
West Bank, undeterred by the structural violence implements, there was always a 
presence on the land that was under construction. The villagers from all areas knew the 
Wall was going to be built, but the resistance would not let it be built without a fight.  
 
Organizing Strategies 
 Resistance to the Wall was well organized, and the methods the 
Palestinians activists used in combatting the Wall supported the small successes of the 
movement, namely reframing the narrative by combatting cultural violence. 
Understanding how Israel used the violence triangle with the establishment of the Wall 
enabled the local activists communities to use techniques learned from the First Intifada, 
and include new forms of resistance to effectively respond to the realities on the ground. 
Highlighting four main organizing strategies; popular committees, solidarity activism, 
alternative media, and nonviolent tactics, I express how the reframing of the narrative 
was accomplished through the popular struggle against the Wall. 
 Successful resistance tactics were borrowed from the First Intifada, which proved 
useful in reframing the mainstream narrative. An organizational aspect of the First 
Intifada that supported movement’s success was the establishment of local popular 
committees throughout the Occupied Territories. Local Popular Committees against the 
Wall were also established, starting in the northern villages early in the movement. There 
was a need for an organizing body in the resistance. According to Beshara Doumani:  
Harnessing the tremendous political energy of Palestinian communities 
and their supporters worldwide requires the establishment of a 
representative entity that can clearly articulate what the Palestinians want 
and why, and can define the parameters for strategic action. (2007: 62).  
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Popular committees were not a new concept that began with the resistance to the Wall. 
They formed during the First Intifada as a technique for organized resistance. For 
Dudouet: 
Sectorial popular committees were set up in each community to address 
the daily needs of the population: medical relief, food distribution, strike 
forces, agriculture, trade, public safety, education, information, solidarity 
with families of martyrs and prisoners. (2008: 14) 
  
Learning from the First Intifada, organizers formed popular committees against the Wall 
in a similar manner. Referencing First Intifada’s organizing methods, Joe Stork observed 
that, “The most organized villages seemed to be those where at least two and often all 
four of the major organizations have a presence in just about every case going back 
several years before the uprising” (1988: 7). The resistance to the Wall took this form, 
strategically including various village bodies in the popular committees. According to 
Jamal Juma, by late 2002, there were already 54 popular committees against the Wall in 
the West Bank. 
 
 
Sign made by the Anti-Apartheid Wall Committee in North West Jerusalem.  
Beit Suriq. February 2004. 
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Popular committees functioned both hierarchically and horizontally, placing those 
within the popular committee in control of the protests against the violence triangle, yet 
still along side the villagers in confronting Israeli violence. Palestinians involved in the 
popular committees became the demonstration leaders. They organized actions and were 
the point people for the solidarity activists and the media. Juma described how people 
were invited to join the local popular committees against the Wall: 
In the village we [would] call everybody to come. We asked the activists 
to have a call in the mosque. The local councils joined, organizations in 
the village, political activists from all parties. Even that time Hamas was, 
not as Hamas, not political parties as their political parties.108  
 
Members of specific political parties, such as Hamas, Fatah, or PFLP, joined the popular 
committees, regardless of their political affiliations. Each member joined as an individual 
Palestinian affected by the Wall. The issue of the Wall was seen as a national concern, 
and it was important to have a sense of national unity against the Wall.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.  
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                         A member of the popular committee addressing the                        A popular committee member organizing the demonstration. Beit Awa. February. 
     demonstration in Beit Awa. February, 2005.      2005 
 
 
The resistance to the Wall encompassed First Intifada tactics, yet they also varied 
methods due to the changes on the ground through the violence triangle. The popular 
committees played different roles than in the First Intifada. They focused on the 
resistance to the Wall and on those that came to support their villages. The members of 
the local popular committees organized the demonstrations and documented the struggle 
against the Wall on their land. They also coordinated with and received the solidarity 
activists and the media and communicated with the lawyers regarding court cases against 
the Wall. They were the leading political element of the resistance to the Wall. 
Membership into the local popular committees was voluntary. It was grassroots-based 
and only Palestinians could participate. Anyone from the village that wanted to join the 
local committee was welcome, although it mainly consisted of men. The committees 
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were made up of municipality members, people from different political parties, and 
members from youth clubs and schools. Each local popular committee worked for their 
village’s needs. This committee work was unpaid, and several times, activists requested 
but did not receive financial support from the Palestinian Authority. Stop the Wall 
campaign (or PENGON in early years) provided some materials for banners, flags, and 
other important items. Budrus had a very effective popular committee; the villagers 
established it in early 2003, before Wall construction began. This prepared them to resist 
construction. Other popular committees formed as a direct response to the Wall’s 
construction. The way the popular committees organized and when they began resisting 
depended on where the village was located in the path of the Wall. 
 
 
Ayed Morrar, from the Popular Committee in Budrus,  
addressing the demonstration. Budrus. February 2004. 
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Popular committees functioned to strategically combat the violence of the Wall, 
and to do this they sought outside assistance in the struggle against the Wall. Once they 
formed, committee members contacted international and Israeli activists to join them in 
solidarity against the Wall. The solidarity activists and villagers aimed to fill the 
demonstrations with masses of people. The resistance was stronger when more people 
participated in the movement. According to Baylouny:  
Through numbers, protesters compensate for their lack of resources. This 
amassing does several things. First, it can compensate for lack of 
resources. Second, it gives the group publicity, and third, it promotes 
solidarity among the group, convincing them that they are indeed part of a 
cause with large numbers of committed members. (2009: 46)  
 
Resisting became an important part of village life, but popular committee members knew 
that organizing the demonstrations would become dangerous. Participating in the 
resistance against the Wall was dangerous for all participants, and each demonstration put 
people in the path of Israeli violence. The organizers of the actions personally paid a high 
price as leaders in the movement. For example, Abdulla Abu Rahmeh of Bil’in was 
convicted in an Israeli court for his role in organizing the resistance in his village. As 
Ha’aretz reported,  “An Israeli military court convicted on Tuesday a prominent 
Palestinian activist for incitement and organizing illegal demonstrations against Israel's 
separation fence in the West Bank” (2010). Abu Rahmeh spent sixteen months in an 
Israeli prison for his role in the unarmed resistance movement. Palestinian popular 
committee members took this risk. They knew that if they did not organize against the 
Wall, it would be built on their lands, imprisoning their communities. Resisting the Wall 
was a way to intervene in Israel’s colonial project. Indigenous Palestinians could resist 
their occupiers, interrupting this new move of the occupation. The unified, anti-Wall 
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struggle worked toward self-determination and an end to the occupation. The popular 
committees were leading the struggle within their villages, and the internationals and 
Israeli activists came into the West Bank in support and solidarity. 
 Solidarity activism was a major part of the resistance against the Wall, and 
identity privilege was used as another tactic against Israeli violence. From Jayyus and 
continuing today, activists from abroad and from inside Israel have been welcomed into 
the villages to support the resistance movement in solidarity. George Rishmawi, an 
activist from the Bethlehem area and one of the founding members of ISM (International 
Solidarity Movement) has worked with international solidarity activists since the Second 
Intifada. During that time, solidarity activists supported Palestinians by escorting 
ambulances to their intended destinations. On numerous occasions, the Israeli military 
refused ambulances access or targeted them, and the presence of solidarity activists 
enabled the ambulances to provide emergency services. The lack of cultural violence 
towards internationals supported the Palestinians in the midst of Israeli violence. As a 
result of this, solidarity activists also kept a constant physical presence where there was 
increased Israeli violence towards Palestinian communities, which was intended to 
minimize harm. In essence, solidarity activists used their privileged identities to help 
Palestinians obtain their rights. Harm to internationals or Israelis would have garnered 
media attention, but harm to Palestinians would not have due to cultural violence. 
Rishmawi describes this phenomenon as “using the racism of the system against 
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itself.”109 This use of solidarity activism exposes Israel’s blatant cultural violence of 
prioritizing international bodies over Palestinians’. 
 
 
International and Israeli solidarity activists stopping a bulldozer with a Palestinian farmer.  
Budrus. September 2004. 
 
 
The notion of solidarity flourished with the establishment of the Wall, activists 
were eager to support the ongoing anti-Wall movement Solidarity activists came to 
support Palestine in late 2000 and continued to work there once the Wall’s construction 
began. In 2002, Jayyus was the first village to invite solidarity activists to join them in 
their struggle. Adwan Shamasna, a local organizer from Jayyus, shared why his village 
invited solidarity activists to join them: 
The reason for that was that we figured that it would be hard to face the 
Israelis [army] just by ourselves. To face the military forces without any 
kind of protection, without anyone that can protect us. After all, people 
coming from Europe, the States, or Israel, have the privilege to do things 
we can’t do. Like talking to the soldiers and going and standing in front of 
a bulldozer.”110  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 
2013.  110	  Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007.	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It was clear to Shamasna that Palestinians would not be safe from Israeli violence if they 
were to protest alone. Villages incurred increased violence when they resisted the Wall. 
Mica Pollack describes this use of privilege: “The movement capitalizes upon the 
racialized privileges attendant to internationals’ predominant physical appearance as 
people of European, rather than Palestinian, descent” (2008: 231). Solidarity activists 
from the US, Europe, and Israel were racialized differently than the dark skinned 
Palestinians. The majority of the protesters coming in to support the Palestinians in their 
struggle were also Jewish, which is another form of privilege many solidarity activists 
held. Israeli soldiers treated these activists differently from the local Palestinians, and 
clearly showed their racist nature.   
 
 
International solidarity activist getting arrested. Bil’in. August 2005 
 
 
Israel’s use of the violence triangle was so severe and heavily embedded into the 
system to maintain the occupation, that international and Israeli presence was not enough 
to stop the violence. With that said, the presence of solidarity activists at the 
demonstrations did not prevent Israeli military violence, but it did decrease. The Jayyusi 
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people began to communicate more with the international community, which meant that 
the English speakers from the village were in contact with solidarity activists. In 2002, 
when the Wall’s construction began, ISM activists were situated in various regions of the 
West Bank. Shamasna explains the collaboration between the internationals and the 
locals inside the village: “At that time, we were all cooperating and building ideas on 
how to resist the Wall, because we were hoping that we could be able to stop the 
Wall.”111 
 
      
     Israeli activists being separated by the IDF. Budrus. December 2004.                          An Israeli activist being beaten by the IDF before arrest September 2004. 
 
 
As a result of the lack of cultural violence towards solidarity activists, they were 
able to use their privilege to perform resistance techniques that would not be permitted 
for Palestinians due to cultural violence labeling them terrorists. Solidarity activists 
started working in the north with the villages resisting the Wall, and as the Wall traveled 
south, they joined other villages. The Mas’ha Peace Tent was a turning point for the 
collaboration. At this, point numerous Israeli activists were traveling into the West Bank 	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  Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007.	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in solidarity with the Palestinian villagers. The tent held several activities in the village. 
In the eight months of the tent’s existence, the solidarity activists coming from abroad 
and from Israel became very close with the local Palestinian activists that participated in 
the initiative. On December 26th, 2003, Israeli activists organized a direct action, the last 
action for the Peace Tent. This action did not include internationals or Palestinians. Their 
Israeli privilege enabled them to perform this action. They returned to Mas’ha to cut the 
area of the fence near Hani Amer’s house. This act was a direct response to the fence 
isolating the Amer house from the village. They successfully cut the fence and the army 
reacted, opening fire with live ammunition. One of the Israeli activists was shot in the 
leg. This violent response from the Israeli army towards the Israeli protesters became 
news inside Israel, and the group was given the name Anarchists Against the Wall. If 
Palestinians had cut the fence, it would have been more dangerous and would not have 
garnered this type of media attention. The Israeli activists used their privilege to gain 
media attention around the issue. The Anarchists Against the Wall continued to support 
the Palestinian-led resistance movement as it moved through various villages over the 
next several years. 
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Women’s demonstration in Biddo with solidarity activists. Biddo. May 2004. 
 
 
The Wall and the resistance continued south, and as new solidarity activists 
traveled into the West Bank they located the movement to join the struggle. After the 
Peace Tent, international and Israeli activists were committed to struggling with the local 
Palestinian villages against the Wall. Budrus, a village that followed in the resistance 
after Mas’ha, invited all the solidarity activists to join their local struggle against the 
Wall. Ayed Morrar from Budrus explained:  
The Palestinian people must rise up to resist the Wall, but we appreciate 
anyone who wants to support us through our struggle. We appreciate the 
Israeli and International solidarity, and we have a good relationship with 
them, but this is our problem and this the Palestinian people must rise 
up.112  
 
Budrus held several demonstrations without the support of solidarity activists. Once 
support came, the village’s cause became more widely known. Morrar expressed how the 
village felt about the solidarity activists coming to Budrus to participate in the 
demonstrations: “We need the Israelis to be with us, and many of them are against 
Zionism and the occupation. We aren’t against Jews or Israelis, we are just against the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Interview with Ayed Morrar, Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. January 2007.  
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occupation, and I think that the majority of the Palestinian and Israeli people want 
peace.”113 The connection between the Israeli activists and the local Palestinian villages 
did not exist on this level before the resistance to the Wall. When Palestinians 
encountered Israelis, they were usually the Israeli military or the settler population. The 
resistance to the Wall brought left-wing Israelis into the West Bank in struggle against 
their own government’s agenda.  
 Cultural violence was noticeable when Palestinians attempted to resist the Wall 
without the support of solidarity activists. When they ventured out to nonviolently resist 
the Wall, Palestinians saw the use of extensive force through direct violence. For 
example, in 2005, four men from Deir Ballut village walked with their livestock towards 
the site where the Wall was to be built on their land. The Israeli “Wall security” opened 
live fire on the group, injuring them all. Although Israel injured these Palestinians with 
impunity, were international or Israeli activists there, media would have been interested, 
which is not desirable for Israel’s public relations. Palestinian life is viewed as inferior to 
Israel, and resisting the Wall without support, or visual proof of the violence, creates a 
dangerous situation for Palestinians facing the violence triangle. 
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  Interview with Ayed Morrar, Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. January 2007.	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Women crying on the bloody land where their relatives  
were shot. Deir Ballut. April 2005 
 
 
Proving Israel’s violence towards the Palestinian people is vital for the 
movement’s success. Alternative media coverage was an essential tool for activists on the 
ground to use to share information with their communities abroad and within Israel. 
Sharing the realities of Israeli violence helped gain support for the Palestinian cause as it 
reframed the narrative. At the height of the resistance between 2003 and 2005, the 
movement aimed to use civil disobedience to save land. In the movement’s early stages, 
mainstream media were not present at the demonstrations against the Wall. Local 
villagers and solidarity activists documented the struggle via still and video cameras. My 
visual ethnography initialized during the beginning of the resistance to the Wall. I 
followed the movement from village to village, and captured the struggle to show Israeli 
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violence, and Palestinian unarmed resistance, to a larger audience in the hopes to build 
the movement. 
 
Solidarity activists filming a soldier. Kharbatha. 2005 
 
Using alternative media supported the reframing of the narrative by visually 
exposing Israel’s violence triangle. It was important for solidarity activists to use their 
privilege of mobility to share the struggle against the Wall to newer audiences. Still and 
video cameras were used to capture the violent Israeli land grab and the unarmed, civil 
resistance. Jamal Juma explained that documenting the resistance was essential because 
there was so much bloodshed from the Israeli violence, which would otherwise not be 
seen outside of the villages that were resisting.114 The direct actions within the villages 
were very dangerous. Although the protesters were using nonviolent methods, the Israeli 
army was very violent towards them. Israel maintained direct violence as a means to 
deter people from resisting. Documenting the struggle with a camera was the only way to 
record the extreme Israeli violence, and in some occasions having a camera in front of a 
soldier limited the use of direct violence. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.  
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Solidarity activists filming a protest against the Wall. Budrus. February 2004. 
 
 
The mainstream narrative was difficult to transform in the early years, the 
regional crisis of the Iraq War coincided with the establishment of the Wall, limiting 
access to media outlets, which were already not interested in an unarmed Palestinian 
struggle. Although the locals resisting the Wall anticipated that the media would be less 
interested in their cause than the Iraq invasion, they still wanted to find a way to get their 
story out. Ra’ad Amer from Mas’ha explained the reasoning behind the 2003 Peace Tent, 
and the desire for media attention: “The main aim was to raise our voices to the media 
because we knew we weren’t going to stop the construction.”115 Internationals, Israelis 
and Palestinians spent time in the tent, even sleeping there, to keep a constant presence in 
the absence of media attention. After ten days, the Israeli media reported the story of the 
Peace Tent on Channel 2, a popular Israeli television station. As this was the first time a 
coalition against the Wall involved Israelis, it was newsworthy. A listserv was created as 
a way for the Peace Tent participants to communicate with each other online. Media was 
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  Interview with Raad Amer. Mas’ha, Occupied Palestinian Territory. June 2007.	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essential to get information out to the public, but it was the activists that shared the 
information with media outlets; media sources did not come to them.  
Local media inside Palestine were also slow to cover the resistance movement due 
to other aspects of Israel’s ongoing violence triangle, which they were focused on. This 
made it very difficult for local villagers because other areas inside the West Bank were 
unaware of the struggle, limiting local support. Iltezam, a local from Budrus, felt 
disconnected from other Palestinian people and neighboring villages in the West Bank 
because they were not aware of the ongoing resistance. Iltezam shared, “In Budrus all 
your life started to become about the Wall, and the protests, and you go to Ramallah, 
people have no idea.”116 In Budrus, Arab media outlets came to cover the story in the 
beginning, but with time, the village became isolated in their cause against the Wall. If 
media had covered the movement it could have increased Palestinian participation, and 
not forced the local communities to resist Israeli violence alone.  
 
 
Ayed Morrar being interviewed by Arab journalists. Budrus. February 2004. 
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Reframing the narrative took time, but the momentum of the resistance movement 
throughout the years attracted media to the struggle, supporting the shift in the narrative. 
With time and the movement’s growth, outlets started to report on the resistance. The fact 
that it never ended, only moved from location, and so many solidarity activists were 
involved, enticed media’s interest. Bil’in village used the media attention to share their 
story when they started resisting in 2005. By this time, people were aware of the ongoing 
struggle due to the numerous activists that had participated against the Wall. Bil’in was 
able to use the common knowledge of the ongoing resistance movement to push their 
local cause forward. Abdulla Abu Rahma from the Bil’in Popular Committee described 
how initially, they used the same tactics as the villages before them, marching to the land 
with the slogans, trying to stop the bulldozers. “We found after one month, two months, 
it’s the same. No media, no more people with us.”117 This is when the village of Bil’in 
transformed their strategy to keep the solidarity activists and the media involved in their 
demonstrations. Bil’in relied heavily on Israeli and international participation within their 
struggle as a way to keep media attention, and to establish a safer environment to resist. 
Abu Rahma described why it was important to change their resistance strategy: 
We are thinking about a new strategy to force the people to be with us, to 
encourage the volunteers, or activists, to be with us. To encourage the 
media to come, we know it’s important for the media at that time, and now 
if we protest every day and no media no one hear about your case.118  
 
George Rishmawi from Bethlehem explained how Bil’in village resisted for eight months 
before Al Jazeera covered the movement. The lack of media attention made it difficult for 
information about the ongoing struggle to spread, even within the West Bank. Once the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Interview with Abdulla Abu Rahma. Bil’in, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.  
118 Ibid.	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movement was being televised, people inside the Territories began to recognize the 
importance of the resistance against the occupation’s triangle of violence, but at that time, 
much of the Wall was already constructed. Bil’in aimed to share information outside of 
the West Bank. They wanted to create awareness about the Wall, and they were 
successful. In 2011, the film 5 Broken Cameras was released. A collaborative venture 
between Israeli and Palestinian directors, the film focused on the resistance in Bil’in. It 
was nominated for an Oscar and gained international attention, bringing the struggle 
against the Wall into the international arena. The struggle in Bil’in focused on the media 
as their main method of resistance. Iltezam Morrar explained how the resistance 
transformed over the years: “The aim [of the resistance] became about the internationals 
and the media.”119 She expressed how in Budrus, as well as some of the other earlier 
villages, the resistance consisted of villagers attempting to save their land. Media were 
absent and few cameras were present. It was an organic indigenous struggle over land 
rights against the colonizer. According to Iltezam, now, protests in the current struggling 
villages, such as Bil’in or Nabeh Saleh, consist mostly of leaders, a few villagers, and 
numerous international activists with numerous cameras all documenting. The difference 
between the early resistance movement, in contrast to the struggle now, is that awareness 
of the Wall’s violence was initialized through the villages resisting from 2002-2005 and 
shared with a larger audience. The current villages resisting Israeli violence, in an effort 
to reframe the narrative, are now capitalizing on that attention. 
Palestinian unarmed resistance is a difficult sell to international audiences; it 
transforms the dominant narrative, showcasing Palestinian oppression and Israel as 
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  Interview with Iltezam Morrar. Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.  
	   303	  
aggressor. Activists with cameras do not have the same power as the mainstream media 
because their audiences are limited. George Rishmawi from Bethlehem explained that it 
was difficult to spread the information about the resistance because “We know that you 
don’t see immediate impact of nonviolence.”120 Organizers relied on local faith in the 
movement because the success was not visible, which made it difficult to build the 
movement in the beginning. This lack of visible success also made it difficult for media 
to learn about and become interested in the movement. Jamal Juma experienced this issue 
when he was invited to a nonviolent resistance conference where there were a lot of 
international and local journalists. He asked the journalists to come on a tour to cover the 
Wall and the popular resistance. Several of the international journalists informed him that 
this was not the route they would take in the region. Richard Falk explains this situation:  
The media focus almost exclusively on violence, especially Palestinian 
violence, without taking into account the highly problematic relationship 
that has evolved over the years between the occupying state and the 
occupied people. At issue is the substantive question of the right of a 
people living for decades under such oppressive circumstances to act in 
opposition. (2002: 20)  
 
The media made it clear to Juma that they follow bloodshed and not a nonviolent 
campaign, as a way to profit off of the mainstream narrative. Juma reportedly responded 
to the media while at the conference in a hostile way, saying to them: “So the people have 
to be killed in these demonstration for you to come to cover it?”121 As a local of the West 
Bank, heavily invested in the unarmed resistance, Juma was upset that the Palestinian 
struggle for basic rights was not newsworthy unless the people were murdered while 
resisting.  	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The mainstream narrative had been established for decades, and the media 
reported that narrative, focuseing solely on the ongoing violence between the 
marginalized, armed, Palestinian factions, and the Israeli army’s response to that 
violence. This only reinforced the false narrative of Israel as the victim to Palestinian 
violence. The unarmed movement was outside of typical discourse around these two 
populations, reporting on the unarmed movement would require a shift in understanding 
around Israel’s occupation, which could create an imbalance in the violence triangle. As 
media representations shape Israel’s public image, shifting the narrative could transform 
the situation. As Richard Falk explains: 
The media, especially in the United States, shape public awareness on 
such matters by insidious and consistent deference to prevailing power 
structures, thereby distorting analysis of competing claims and shaping 
public opinion in a manner prejudicial to Palestinian claims. (2002: 20) 
 
As mainstream media outlets were not interested in stories of resistance against the Wall, 
journalists would not financially profit from covering them. Mazen Qumsiyeh described 
this aversion to sharing Palestinian nonviolence with audiences abroad: 
Palestinian nonviolent resistance is not exposed in the West as something 
happening, it’s not even allowed on mainstream media. It’s a taboo 
subject. Because the western media – the mainstream media – is 
dominated by Zionists, editors, and owners, etc. They have a product to 
sell the world. The product is rather simple. Israel is good at defending 
itself, and they are the victims and Palestinians are the aggressors. The 
Arabs are the aggressors, they are the violent terrorists. This is the 
message; it’s a beautiful short message. It sells. There’s the white hats, the 
black hats, the good guys, the bad guys. People connect to it.122 
 
Although mainstream news stories do not reflect the realities on the ground, the 
Palestinian people continue to resist Israeli violence with unarmed means. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Interview with Mazen Qumsiyeh. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.  
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indigenous Palestinian people have hopes that international communities recognize their 
plight, existing under a brutal violence triangle, and condemn Israel for their abuse of 
power.  
 The specific use of nonviolent tactics supported the resistance movement against 
the Wall in both increasing participation within the movement, and combating the 
cultural violence, allowing Israel’s violence triangle to shine through. The popular 
struggle against the Wall did not research nonviolence theory to develop the movement; 
their response against the Wall was organic and practical. Although they did not plan to 
take lesson from theoretical approaches of resistance, their techniques did lay within the 
framework of pragmatic nonviolence, where nonviolence is used as a plan, not as an 
ideology, as in principled nonviolence.  There are numerous methods of pragmatic 
nonviolence. I discuss eight specific forms of nonviolent resistance used in the resistance 
against the Wall to highlight the use of pragmatic nonviolence tactics against Israel’s 
violence triangle. I will examine protests and persuasion, nonviolent intervention, and 
political non-cooperation to analyze the popular struggle against the Wall and its ability 
to penetrate the violence triangle. 
The first approach of pragmatic nonviolence I discuss is protests and persuasion, 
which involve various acts of resistance against Israeli violence. Activists resisting the 
Wall used formal statements, symbolic public acts, processions, withdrawal and 
renunciation at each demonstration from the northern villages to the Hebron area to make 
visual declarations against the occupation. These acts of resistance combat cultural 
violence, emphasizing the Palestinian identity as a form of resistance. Israel’s cultural 
violence campaign emphasizes Palestinian identity as inferior to Israelis. Using protests 
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and persuasion Palestinian activists transform this thought through resistance techniques, 
highlighting several cultural attributes and sustaining them throughout each 
demonstration. 
Palestinians are expected to be obedient to the Israeli military, cultural violence 
positions them as subordinate, and voicing any dissent could lead to direct violence. By 
using formal statements, Palestinian activists regain control from the soldier and preserve 
their dignity. Activists used formal statements at each demonstration before or during the 
action on the construction site to inform the Israeli military of the local condemnation 
about the Wall. Public speeches were made to connect the demonstrators to the action. 
Typically, a local leader from the Popular Committee Against the Wall made a speech. 
Adwan from Jayyus shared how formal statements were made in his village: “We used to 
go and tell the Israelis [soldiers] that we refuse and reject what they are doing in our land. 
The soldiers would ask us what we wanted them to do, and our answer would be that we 
want them to leave our land and let us live on our land.”123 The soldiers often replied that 
they were only following orders and could not challenge the government’s Wall project. 
Although formal statements did not interrupt the Wall’s construction, they motivated the 
activists and communicated the reason for the resistance, where in other spaces of Israel’s 
violence triangle this could result in death. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007.  
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Political flags were used in Budrus as symbolic acts.                       Various flags were used in the demonstrations as a sign of unity.  
Budrus. February 2004.                                   Budrus. September. 2004.  
  
Cultural violence resistance through symbols is extremely important in combating 
the violence triangle. Symbolic public acts, such as flags, portraits of those martyred, 
prayer, and worship, were commonly used at each demonstration against the Wall as a 
means to show Israel that these cultural attributes of Palestinian identity are not violent, 
thus reframing the narrative. This was a form of cultural resistance against cultural 
violence. The Palestinian flag, which was illegal to fly before the Oslo period, was 
always present at each demonstration. The Palestinian flag represented the movement’s 
aim for self-determination. In addition to the Palestinian flag, banners and other flags 
with political colors were present. Political flags in Hamas green, PFLP red, and Fatah 
yellow demonstrated Palestinian unity against the Wall. In addition to flags, villagers 
held portraits of relatives imprisoned in Israel or killed by Israeli violence. Visual 
displays of the martyred connected memories of them with the ongoing movement.  
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Men praying on the land that is going to be seized for the Apartheid Wall.                         Men praying on the land. Beit Ula. November 2004. 
Beit Ula. November 2004.     
 
Israel uses the Muslim religion as a form of cultural violence, the resistance 
against the Wall incorporated religion as a component of the movement to expose the 
nonviolent nature of Islam, thus reframing the narrative. Activists used prayer and 
worship, another type of symbolic public act, at numerous demonstrations and each 
Friday throughout the Occupied Territory. As the majority of Palestinians are Muslim, 
demonstrations were often held on Fridays, a holy day in Islam. During the Friday 
demonstrations, the Muslim participants prayed on the land where the Wall was being 
built, instead of in the Mosque. This type of action was symbolic, as it connected the 
religious faith of many of the participants to the land that Israel was seizing. Im Ilabed, 
from Deir Ballut, who used prayer to resist the Wall in her village, shared that she left her 
house for a demonstration with her body cleaned. She had showered thinking she would 
die that afternoon, knowing that the Israeli army had shot her relatives days before. While 
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marching to the site where four local men had been shot, she was separated from the rest 
of the demonstrators; the Israeli soldiers had prevented them from continuing to the site 
using direct violence. Im Ilabed shared that, as she was alone at that point, she felt like 
she was in the hands of God. She continued towards the land, kneeled to the ground, and 
prayed while crying. In that moment, she thought she was going to be killed, as numerous 
soldiers were surrounding her. As the prayer finished, she got up without harm. She 
peacefully left the area and went back to her village, knowing she had culturally resisted 
in the face of the Israeli army for her people, her family, and her home. 
 
 
Im IlAbed praying on the land. Deir Ballut. April 2005. 
 
 
The next two forms of protests and persuasion combat both cultural violence, and 
structural violence, as a means to resist the violence triangle Activists used processions as 
forms of protest and persuasion to physically gain access to the land where the Wall was 
being constructed. The local popular committees organized the marches to the land, in 
which locals and solidarity activists participated. Marches started at the local mosque in 
the village or near the Baladiyeh (municipality building). After issuing a formal 
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statement, the participants marched with their flags and banners toward the land under 
construction. While marching, they chanted protest slogans and sang nationalist songs as 
a form of cultural resistance. Protests’ durations ranged. If it was safe enough to remain 
on the land without encountering extreme Israeli direct violence, the people stayed and 
chanted. The leader of the protest, a popular committee member, would determine when 
the march would turn back to the village. Marching to the lands attempted to pass the red 
line, and reach the area where the bulldozers were uprooting the trees. This act placed the 
activists in the path of Israeli direct violence, which made resisting the Wall dangerous, 
even if unarmed. 
Israel utilized structural violence as a way to repress the Palestinian people, and 
maintain control over them. Withdrawal and renunciation in the form of walkouts is 
another method of protest and persuasion that activists used to resist structural violence. 
During the resistance to the Wall, Israel put Palestinians on curfew. With the 
participation of Israeli and international solidarity activists Palestinians under curfew 
disobeyed orders and left their homes, in defiance of the curfew, to resist the Wall. As the 
Israeli army was often violent towards Palestinians defying their orders due to cultural 
violence, solidarity activists’ collaboration facilitated this resistance. 
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A march to the land. Beit Awa. February 2005. 
 
As a means to combat the structural violence of the occupation, Palestinian 
activists incorporated various forms of nonviolent intervention to force the Israeli army to 
stop constructing the Wall. This included physical intervention, nonviolent occupation, 
and alternative communication systems tactics. These methods were employed 
simultaneously with protests and persuasion techniques at each demonstration to 
encompass various forms of resistance against the violence triangle of the Wall.  
Physical interventions, such as sit-ins, non-violent interjection, and nonviolent 
obstruction, were important methods in the movement to oppose the construction of the 
Wall. Activists sat and/or stood in front of the bulldozers to stop them from working. In 
some cases, protesters lay in front of working bulldozers as a form of nonviolent 
obstruction, risking their lives. Protestors also set up a blockade to prevent Israeli army 
jeeps from entering the village.  They placed large rocks and burning tires strategically to 
physically restrict the Israeli army from raiding the village and arresting protestors. By 
obstructing Israeli activity from occurring, activists prolonged the time it took Israel to 
build the Wall. 
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Demonstrator blocking a bulldozer. Beit Awa. February 2005. 
 
 
Another form of nonviolent intervention that increased the time it took Israel to 
build the Wall was nonviolent occupation. The Peace Tent started in Mas’ha and 
continued in Deir Ballut, and later, a structure was built in Bil’in. Peace Tents were a way 
to reclaim the stolen land and keep a constant presence through a counter-occupation. 
Nonviolent occupation was a successful method; it created space for solidarity activists to 
play another role in the resistance. For example, activists staying at the Peace Tent in 
Mas’ha, which was positioned in front of Hani Amer’s house, organized a direct action as 
a form of physical intervention. The first direct action there, on August 4th, 2003, aimed 
to stop the bulldozers from constructing the Wall. Of the 50 people there, 40 were 
international solidarity activists. One August 5th, at 5:00 AM, hundreds of Israeli soldiers 
and police arrested the 43 people at the tent. Three of them were Palestinian. One of the 
arrested Palestinian men stayed in jail for three days and two of the arrested internationals 
were deported. The next day, the protesters tried again to stop the bulldozers, and again, 
the Israeli army arrested them. 26 of these protesters were Israeli activists, and all were 
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released from jail that evening. The only Palestinians present in the tent were Hani Amer 
and Ra’ad, and they were not arrested. The Israeli army confiscated the tents and declared 
the area a “closed military zone.” The use of nonviolent occupation forced the Israeli 
military to work harder to utilize more resources while constructing the Wall. 
Sharing information was vital for the movements aim in reframing the narrative, 
and was used as a nonviolent tactic due to the lack of media attention in the early years. 
Alternative communication is another form of nonviolent intervention, and was 
extremely useful in sharing the realities of the grassroots movement. The photographers 
and filmmakers that joined the struggle visually shared the events on the ground with a 
larger audience. Information was also shared via the web. Activists started personal 
websites, created online list serves, and used technology to spread information about the 
resistance against the Wall. This form of nonviolent resistance aided with exposing 
Israeli violence, which was essential to build the movement. 
The last form of pragmatic nonviolent that was used in the resistance against the 
Wall was political noncooperation. Activists practiced civil disobedience to protest the 
Wall, which proved to be the most dangerous form of resistance and resulted in Israeli 
direct violence. This form of resistance was the most prominent in Budrus, where, in 
November of 2003, 13 year-old Iltezam Morrar jumped into a bulldozer to stop it from 
working. The people of Bil’in were also known for their creative acts of civil 
disobedience. During one action there, local activists and solidarity activists chained 
themselves to olive trees as a form of resistance. They went very early in the morning, 
before the soldiers arrived, to protect the bulldozers. Abu Rahmeh, from Bil’in, explained 
why this action was so important: “If you uprooted the olives trees you kill us, you 
	   314	  
destroy our life.”124 This symbolic civil disobedience action received a lot of media 
attention and shared this action with a larger audience. The Arab media outlets Al Jazeera 
and Al Arabia made numerous calls to local leaders to cover the story. Activists realized 
that the way to inform those outside of the West Bank about the struggle against the Wall 
was to be creative with their civil disobedience.  
These numerous nonviolent tactics supported the Palestinian people to include 
more activists into their grassroots struggle, gain media attention to share their struggle 
with a wider audience, and expose Israeli violence. Demonstrators used these similar 
tactics to protest the Wall throughout the Occupied Territory. Using the same techniques 
helped activists organize effectively to build a strong movement. According to Gene 
Sharp, “To have the best chance of success, the nonviolent actionists must stick with their 
chosen technique” (2005: 110).  Activists used pragmatic nonviolence methods for 
various reasons. First, they created space for outside people to join the movement and 
they minimized the amount of violence the protestors experienced. Although the tactics 
were nonviolent, direct violence from the Israeli army was always present at the 
demonstrations against the Wall. As Mazen Qumsiyeh observed, “the term ‘nonviolence’ 
obscures the violent nature of the occupation/colonization that is intrinsic to their 
function.”125 As the triangle of violence facilitates every aspect of the occupation, 
violence is always present under occupation. Demonstrators who utilized unarmed tactics 
did not assume that the Israeli military would stop using violent methods. Pragmatic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Interview with Abdulla Abu Rahma. Bil’in, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.  
125 Interview with Mazen Qumsiyeh. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 
2013.	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nonviolence practitioners strategically chose to not use violence, understanding it would 
be forced upon them from their opponent.  
 
Israel’s Increased Violence Against the Resistance 
Israel implemented the violence triangle to maintain the occupation, and increased 
direct and structural violence against activists resisting the Wall in an effort to deter them 
from progressing their movement. Participating in unarmed resistance exposed activists 
to higher levels of direct, structural, and cultural violence. Palestinian civil resistors were 
aware of the risks involved in resisting the occupation, but they continued to resist, as 
they needed to transform their futures by challenging the violence triangle. All 
Palestinians who resisted the occupation were targeted by the Israeli military, whether 
they utilized unarmed or armed resistance methods. As Anne Marie Baylouny explained, 
“Advocates and organizers of non-violent activities end up in jail alongside those 
engaging in violence, even members of organizations uniting Israeli Jews and 
Palestinians” (2009: 55). Although Palestinians who utilized nonviolent resistance tactics 
were targeted as “threats” to the Israeli state, the direct and structural violence they 
experienced was less severe than that their armed resistance counterparts faced, and 
cultural violence was unable to function in the same manner. 
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Palestinian protestor being carried away by the Israeli military. Beit Ula. November 2004 
 
 
The triangle of violence is used as a way to maintain control over the occupied 
population, dissent limits Israeli control, therefore Israel uses excessive direct and 
structural violence in an effort to gain back the lost control. Civil resistance against the 
Wall and the occupation are ways the indigenous Palestinian people could participate in 
realities on the ground. As Israel does not wish for the Palestinian people to have a stake 
in their own outcomes, it employs more violence against the activists in an attempt to 
squash the movement. In the face of the violence, the popular struggle against the Wall 
has flourished, moving through the West Bank from village to village. Israel has utilized 
various methods of direct and structural violence to combat the unarmed resistance 
movement. Soldiers have put entire villages under curfew, arrested numerous Palestinians 
without charge, and used various dispersal techniques to suppress the resistance. I will 
discuss components of the direct, structural and cultural violence Israel uses against the 
resistance to the Wall, highlighting their perceived threat of Palestinian self-
determination through unarmed means. 
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Mohammed Khatib from Bil’in showing injuries. Bil’in  Israeli soldiers attempting to disperse the crowd from close range. Beit Awa, 
April 2005.      February 2005. 
 
Structural violence, an important aspect of the ongoing occupation, is a central 
force in Israel’s effort to control the Palestinian population by isolating them. As a way to 
control Palestinians resisting the Wall, Israel implemented structural violence by way of a 
mandated curfew. This allowed the Israeli military to continue the construction of the 
Wall without the people’s intervention. Curfew legally imprisons communities inside 
their homes. If Palestinians break curfew, they risk arrest. Tulkarm was the first village 
where curfew was enforced during the resistance to the Wall. Residents did not fully 
understand the Wall’s effects in the first weeks, as they were forced to remain in their 
homes. When they were able to leave their homes after two weeks under curfew, they 
witnessed Israel’s massive land destruction for the site of the Apartheid Wall. Jayyus was 
also put on curfew. Thousands of people living there were imprisoned in their homes, due 
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to their resistance to the Wall. In response to the curfew in Jayyus, the popular committee 
organized an action to defy the curfew order as a form of resistance. Jayyus residents 
waited for solidarity activists to join them before risking breaking curfew to ensure their 
safety. Cultural violence influenced which actions locals performed alone, and which 
ones they relied on solidarity activists for. The day the village broke curfew, 50 
internationals were with them. Although the army had threatened physical harm against 
anyone who broke curfew, the people did it anyway to resist the Wall. Six locals from 
Jayyus were arrested for defying curfew. Israel continued to threaten other villages with 
curfew, but they too strategically invited solidarity activists to join them in this action. 
Every act of resistance by a Palestinian was a great risk, as when they were arrested, they 
were not treated the same way that international or Israeli activists were as a result of 
cultural violence, and the assumption by Israel that they were terrorists. 
 
	   319	  
 
Palestinian protestor getting arrested during a demonstration 
against the Wall. Beit Ula. November 2004. 
  
Structural violence met direct violence throughout the West Bank, and Palestinian 
Wall-resistors were targeted by the Israeli army and arrested as a way to deter them from 
participating in civil resistance. In the early years of the resistance movement, when 
Palestinians were arrested, they were usually released from jail after a few days. As the 
struggle developed, demonstrations became more dangerous for Palestinian participants. 
The Israeli army targeted activists, especially organizers, who often spent years pleading 
their case in Israel’s courts. As Israel intended to end the movement, soldiers arrested 
numerous Palestinians protesting the Wall to discourage other activists from 
participating. Since Palestinian participants were utilizing unarmed means, there were 
few offenses to charge them with, and they were placed in jail under administrative 
detention. Administrative detention allows for Palestinians to be held in Israeli prisons 
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without charge or judicial process for up to six months at a time as a form of structural 
violence. The Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem described this: 
Administrative detention is detention without charge or trial that is 
authorized by administrative order rather than by judicial decree. Under 
international law, it is allowed under certain circumstances. However, 
because of the serious injury to due-process rights inherent in this measure 
and the obvious danger of its abuse, international law has placed rigid 
restrictions on its application. (2014) 
 
All activists participating at the demonstration risked arrest, but due to cultural violence, 
their sentencing varied. Palestinians were placed under administrative detention with the 
possibility of extension after the six-month period ended. International activists, if 
arrested, were deported from the country and prevented from returning. Israeli activists, 
due to their identity privilege, were fined. The fear of arrest led several Palestinian 
activists to hide. Between 2006 and 2007, the Israeli military often sought out young boys 
in Budrus to charge them with stone throwing. Fearing repercussions, boys slept away 
from their homes, as the Israeli army typically collected the boys in the middle of the 
night. Once, the army came to arrest a boy who was at home after a demonstration. The 
women of the village resisted this arrest and took on the heavily armed Israeli military to 
save the child. 
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A woman from Budrus getting beaten by an Israeli soldier  
for attempting to save a young boy from arrest. Budrus.  
September 2004. 
 
 
Active participants in the movement experienced higher doses of Israeli direct and 
structural violence as a result of their organizing. Specifically, popular committee 
members were targeted for organizing demonstrations against the Wall. Abdulla Abu 
Rahmeh, from Bil’in, who was well known as an organizer, was arrested several times 
while nonviolently resisting the Wall, and in December 2009, the Israeli court sentenced 
him to two years in prison for his activism. He was charged with stone throwing, 
incitement, and organizing illegal protests. He spent a year in prison for his role in the 
demonstrations against the Wall. This case emphasizes the function of the legal system as 
an extension of the occupation with structural violence maintaining it. Mohammed of 
Nil’in was also targeted for his role in organizing in his village. The Israeli army arrested 
him at a demonstration. Mohammed understands Hebrew and heard soldiers discussing 
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how they targeted him. In his first arrest, he was held for six hours. When they arrested 
him, they covered his eyes and handcuffed him while they detained him. He was fined 
3000NIS to be released each time, even if he was not charged with a crime. Israel also 
targeted Omar of Al Walaja for his role in organizing. The Israeli authorities threatened 
to take away his permit, his only access to his work in Jerusalem, hoping that exerting 
more structural violence would deter him from resisting the Wall. Omar replied by 
referencing the Torah. He countered that God offered bread. He asked the man arresting 
him, “Who gives the bread?” The man replied, “God does.” Omar then stated, “Ok, God 
will give me the bread, take your permit.” The Israeli authority representative told Omar, 
“No, someone will come take it from you.”126 Organizing demonstrations was very 
dangerous for the leaders of the movement in their villages, they risked increased direct 
and structural violence, but they took the chance in an attempt to stop the Wall. 
 
 
   A local from Bil’in getting arrested from undercover Israeli police. Bil’in. April 2005 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Interview with Omar. Al Walaja, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.	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In an effort to stop the movement, the Israeli military and the Israeli Border Patrol 
enforced collaborative structural and direct violence in an attempt to control the 
resistance. It was not unusual for the Israeli authorities to plant undercover agents in the 
protests as an excuse to impose direct violence. These Israeli agents were darker in skin 
color to mimic Palestinians and wore street clothes in disguise. This type of action is a 
form of cultural violence, impersonating the other in a negative way, and then excusing 
the use of direct violence as a result. The under cover agents threw stones at the Israeli 
army as a provocation and to enlist the shabab (young boys) to also throw stones. The 
Israeli army used stone throwing to legitimize using direct, violent force against the 
demonstrators. Aiming to disperse the crowds near the construction site, they used 
several forms of direct violence. The Israeli army did not attack protestors during three 
demonstrations in Jayyus, but did during the fourth, shooting tear gas, rubber bullets, and 
stunt grenades at the demonstrators. The protesters retreated back to the village, knowing 
that future demonstrations would become more dangerous for all those involved. 
Protesters experienced direct violence at each demonstration against the Wall. According 
to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights: 
In 2010, Israeli forces continued to use excessive force against peaceful 
demonstrations organized by Palestinian civilians to protest settlement 
activities and the construction of the annexation wall in the West Bank. 
Peaceful protests have been organized weekly in the villages of Bil’ein, 
Ne’lin and Nabi Saleh near Ramallah, al-Ma’sara village near Bethlehem 
and Beit Ummar town near Hebron. (2011: 42) 
 
The rubber-coated bullets and tear gas were dangerous, and those participating in 
demonstrations were aware of the extreme risks of participation.  
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Man suffering from tear-gas inhalation. Beit Awa. February 2005. Protestor being rushed out of a demo on a stretcher   
after getting injured during a demonstration. Biddo. 
April 2004. 
 
 
The Wall is a form of structural violence, and Israel utilized direct violence in an 
attempt to halt the resistance movement, causing numerous injuries for participants. In 
April of 2005, four young, Palestinian men from Deir Ballut village went to their land to 
stop the bulldozers from uprooting their trees, just as they typically did in bigger 
demonstrations with solidarity activists. They were a small group, and the Israeli Wall 
security responded extremely violently, shooting these young men with live ammunition 
as a form of crowd dispersal. The men bled from their wounds and after hearing the shots 
from the village, their family members ran to the scene and took them away to safety. 
Then, the nearby settlement police came to take statements from other villagers. One of 
the boys who was shot in his torso was taken to Ramallah and eventually recovered. 
Samer, another victim, who was shot in the leg, rode on a donkey with his brother to the 
neighboring village of Biddya. He had to ride a donkey for transportation because he 
lacked a permit to exit the checkpoint in the front of the village. Another victim was shot 
from his shoulder through his back. The last man was shot through his back to his groin, 
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which caused him permanent disabilities. These four boys survived, but not all 
Palestinians resisting the Wall are as lucky. As Ayed shared, in the early years of the 
resistance, “400 inhabitants from Budrus had been injured by rubber bullets, two were 
injured by live bullets, and one killed in Budrus.”127 Unarmed protestors in the northwest 
Jerusalem villages sustained 600-800 injuries. Injury is extremely common for resistance 
participants. Israel’s soldiers fire tear gas, stunt grenades, and bullets at the crowds to 
disperse the civil resistance activities near the Wall. As injuries are expected, 
demonstration organizers prepare by inviting Palestinian Red Crescent medics, who 
provide on-site care.  
 
   
Israeli soldier aiming at stone-throwing protesters. Beit Liqia. March 2004. 
 
 
Unarmed resistance against the structural violence of the Wall was very 
dangerous; Israel increased the direct violence to such a degree that fatalities were likely. 
According to Jamal Juma, “About 26 martyrs have been killed on the Wall since 2002. 
Most of them are young and have been shot, killed either by live bullets or tear gas cans, 	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  Interview with Ayed Morrar, Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. January 2007.	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and some of them shot with tear gas.”128 The first killing near the Wall happened in 2003 
in Jenin. In 2004, four boys were killed in Biddo and Beit Duqu while nonviolently 
resisting the Wall. On February 26th, two days after the first demonstration in Biddo, the 
Israeli forces killed three young men: two from Biddo and one from the neighboring 
village of Beit Duqu. On the sixth day of resistance in Biddo, the fourth person was 
killed, and one month after the struggle against the Wall began, another local from the 
village was murdered. In the first month of anti-Wall resistance in the northwest 
Jerusalem area, five young men were killed. In 2008, five boys were killed in Nil’in 
within six months. Some youth who were killed were not resisting but were “collateral 
damage.” Ahmed Mousa was ten years old when the Israeli military killed him on July 
29, 2008. Within six months, Yousef Amira, who was 17, was also killed. Two other 
boys, Mohammed and Arafat Huwaja, were killed near the main road near the settlement. 
In June, 2009, Akin Sroua was killed in Nil’in. Two residents of Bil’in and one resident 
of Nabeh Saleh were also killed while nonviolently resisting the Wall. Israel uses 
indiscriminate violence against Palestinian activists resisting the Wall, still attempting to 
position them under the negative perspective of cultural violence. Due to the increased 
numbers of activists coming into the West Bank in support of the resistance, and the 
exposure to the violence triangle, this attempt proves futile in regards to the unarmed 
resistance movement. 
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Israeli soldier aiming at a women’s demonstration. Biddo.  
May 2005 
 
 
Direct violence from Israel does not only target those who actively engage in the 
struggle against the Wall; it has also caused fatalities for Palestinians in their villages and 
homes, under attack by the Israeli army, and unable able to escape. The Israeli army 
killed two boys from Beit Liqia who were with their sheep near Wall construction. 
Another ten year-old boy from Nil’in was killed while sitting under a tree after a 
demonstration. A 70 year-old man and a 36 year-old woman from Bil’in died from tear 
gas poisoning that engulfed their village. According to the Palestinian Center for Human 
Rights: 
Ms. Jawaher Ibrahim Ahmed Abu Rahma, 35, suffered from extreme 
difficulties in breathing and fainted. She was evacuated to the Palestine 
Medical Compound in Ramallah. At approximately 09:30 on Saturday, 01 
January 2011, she was pronounced dead. (2012: 31) 
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At the time of this writing, the most recent death was a young boy who was killed in 
Budrus in 2013 near the site of the Wall. Israel has punished neither the Israeli army nor 
the Wall security for killing Palestinians near the Wall. Instead, Israel justifies the use of 
force against the activists, claiming that they threw stones and retribution was necessary. 
Although Israel claims this, often no stones were thrown, yet Israel still uses direct 
violence against the demonstrators. The rubber bullets and tear gas that the Israeli army 
uses in response to the stones have killed numerous Palestinian activists. The excuse of 
stone throwing is not a valid argument for murdering Palestinians, but the Israeli lens 
frames the stone as a weapon, attempting to justify the shooting of the stone throwers.  
 
             
Boy jumping back from tear gas canister. Biddo.         Tear gas canister falling into the yards of homes. Bil’in March 2005. 
April 2004.               
 
 
 
Palestinian Authority’s Role in the Resistance 
The Israeli violence triangle is so influential that the entity designated to govern 
the Palestinian people, the PA, is powerless to reduce it. The international community’s 
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silence around Israeli violence has allowed the violence triangle to intensify over time. 
The PA has a limited leadership role, and Israel does not permit it to oppose Israel’s 
aggression. Lacking the support of an autonomous political entity, the Palestinian people 
cannot effectively attain a conventional political resolution. According to Beshara 
Doumani:  
The central dynamic or iron law of the conflict over Palestine, since it 
began in the late nineteenth century, has been the adamant refusal by the 
most powerful forces in this conflict-the Zionist movement (later the 
Israeli government) and its key supporters (first Great Britain, later the 
United States) either to recognize or to make room for the existence of 
Palestinians as a political community. This non-recognition has made it 
possible for the twin engines of the conflict-territorial appropriation and 
demographic displacement of Palestinians from their ancestral land to 
continue operating largely unabated, as they have for over a century. 
(2007: 50).  
 
Although Israel accepted the PA’s role as a governing body over the Palestinian people, 
the Palestinian cause for self-determination was left to the people. 
Israel has strategically used the PA to control Palestinian resistance, and 
unbeknownst to the PA, increased the violence triangle. To suppress the First Intifada’s 
resistance, Israel negotiated with the exiled Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
during the 1993 Oslo Accords, and as a result, the PA established itself in the Occupied 
Territories. Although the PA was tasked with representing the Palestinian people, there 
are strict limitations on what it can do and they are forced to work within the guidelines 
of the Israeli government and its allies, such as the United States. If the PA deviates from 
the political frameworks that Israel demands of them, the entire Palestinian population is 
collaterally punished. Functioning under Israeli control, the PA is unable to work for the 
Palestinian people’s best interests, restricting its power as an independent representative. 
According to Amira Hass, an Israeli journalist:  
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With time, what had originally been an ad hoc military-bureaucratic 
measure crystallized into a fully conscious Israeli strategy with a clear 
political goal: separation between the two peoples with an appearance of 
political separation, but with only one government—Israel—having any 
effective power to shape the destinies of both. (2002: 18)  
 
Neither Israel nor its supporters have recognized the Palestinian people or their governing 
representatives as viable partners in a resolution to the “conflict.” Israel maintains control 
over the PA, maintaining control over the land. This lack of PA power has encouraged 
the Palestinian people to participate actively as political actors, and Intifadas (uprisings) 
have proven more effective than official political negotiations. The Palestinian people 
have thus been their own representatives, actively resisting Israeli violence and fighting 
for self-determination. 
Israel controls the PA to maintain control of the ongoing occupation, threatening 
economic resources if the PA does not perform a security role in the West Bank. If the 
PA moves too far outside their appointed role, Israel imposes collective consequences 
onto the entirety of Palestinians inhabiting the Occupied Territories. The PA also aims to 
maintain the limited control they do have over the people. However, the PA was largely 
absent in the struggle against the Wall. As was stated to me from locals in Tulkarm, they 
wrote to the PA at the beginning of the Wall’s construction but received no reply. Ayed 
from Budrus stated that in January, 2004, Budrus activists travelled to Ramallah to 
request three things of the PA: an official position recognizing the Wall as a national 
enemy and taking a political stand against it; visible solidarity, such as Palestinian 
politicians’ attendance at village marches to demonstrate their support of the people; and 
assistance with a project to help the people resist the Wall.129 As Budrus residents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Interview with Ayed Morrar, Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. January 2007. 
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reported to me, the people there received no help from the PA and continued to resist the 
Wall with the help of PENGON. From 2002 to 2005, the local popular committees 
organized independently, maintaining control over how they organized demonstrations. 
During the time people were protesting in Budrus, the PA offered money, but with 
conditions attached. Ayed Morrar of Budrus rejected the money, as he saw money 
becoming the movement’s focus and splintering grassroots efforts and the spirit of 
resistance. According to Ayed: “You want to kill a revolution, drown it with money.” 
Countless activists claimed that the PA had its own agenda and did not want the 
movement to disrupt ongoing official political negotiations with Israel. Several activists 
thought that the PA also wanted to maintain power over the people, which this money 
could provide. In 2005, the PA gave money to the movement, allowing it to regulate the 
popular struggle. Jamal shared that the PA finally putting the Wall on its agenda affected 
the already thriving movement. “The Authority woke up in 2005, where they start to 
make us problems. They wanted to form their committees because they feel this is a 
movement that can go out of control.”130 Jamal opposed the PA’s involvement for various 
reasons: 
First, we have to have our space because our ceiling is much bigger and 
wider then the PA, which is limited to the Israeli. The second thing is that 
we don’t want the influence, to be on the committees, to use them by 
remote control for their purposes, and to control it.131   
 
The PA suppresses demonstrations in Area A, the area in PA limited control. As 70% of 
the West Bank population lives in Area A, the PA in this way aimed to keep resistance 
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  Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.  
131 Ibid.	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outside of these areas to ensure the Palestinian people did not rise up in opposition of 
their governing body. 
 
Prisoner demonstration inside Ramallah, in Area A. July 2013 
 
The PA found an opportunity to include themselves in the movement, and their 
involvement created changes in its structure of the organizing, which limited the effects 
the movement had on the violence triangle. In 2005, the Stop the Wall campaign started 
to form district committees, in an attempt to avoid fragmenting the already split popular 
movement. At that time, the Wall had been already been completed in numerous villages, 
and as the resistance was in a slow period, it focused on Bil’in. The district committees 
sent representatives to Stop the Wall meetings to discuss the situation around the Wall 
and the next steps for the struggle. As Jamal noted, “We have ten committees in the West 
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Bank that we are in direct connections, and they have their own plans.”132 Salam Fayyad, 
a PA representative, was the primary politician to focus on the Wall. Jamal shared, 
“Salam Fayyad called for a meeting, for us the whole activists, two times in 2007, and his 
whole proposal was to open bank accounts for each committee, and to give them 6000 
NIS a month.”133 Stop the Wall adamantly opposed this plan. In Jamal’s opinion, money 
would take the focus away from the grassroots work and would eventually corrupt the 
movement. Both Ayed and Jamal forecasted destruction the PA money would bring to the 
grassroots movement. However, Salam Fayyad succeeded, and now the popular 
committee members are paid employees. As a result, the movement focuses on some 
villages more than others, which has created inequality within the movement and its 
ability to combat the violence triangle in multiple locations. With that said, those who are 
being paid by the PA are in need of the support, and they continue to struggle daily on 
their lands against Israel’s occupation. 
The resistance to the Wall changed over the years due to the transforming 
violence triangle, and the involvement of the PA was merely one aspect of that change.  
The PA has effectively splintered the movement from where it once was, to how it 
function today. This change in dynamic has limited the movement’s power against Israel, 
and it is used as a public relations vehicle. Bil’in is a well-known village in the anti-Wall 
resistance, largely due to their creative means of resistance and the media attention they 
received. Although the Wall is completed in their area, Bil’in villagers continue to 
demonstrate against the Wall. In Bil’in, local popular committee members are now paid 
employees and members of the new Popular Struggle Coordination Committee. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.  
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committee is a formal entity and an official NGO registered with the PA. Bil’in became a 
PA focus because they worked on joint struggle – Israelis and Palestinians working 
together – which fit within an acceptable conventional model for their political gains of 
showing how Israelis also want to end the occupation. I was informed from several 
activists that the PA wanted to show this joint struggle activity off to both Israel and the 
international community for their own political agenda.  
The Popular Struggle Coordination Committee now controls the movement, and 
the organic, reactionary approach is no longer present due to the Wall already being 
established. The villages involved only demonstrate on Fridays, and largely as a media 
campaign, not an anti-construction campaign as the Wall has been completed in most 
areas. A number of the original activists are on the payroll, but they are few compared to 
the vast numbers who participated in the entire movement. For Dudouet:  
Since its inception, the Palestinian Authority has proceeded to build 
centralised, bureaucratic, and often ruthless mechanisms that have fostered 
dependence and crushed most grassroots initiatives, resulting in a 
“demobilisation” of the population and its deepening alienation from 
political action. (2008: 20) 
 
By the time the resistance arrived in Nabeh Saleh in 2008, the Popular Struggle 
Coordination Committee was running every aspect of the resistance, taking a governance 
approach. With that said, the activists in Nabeh Saleh continually face a highly 
militarized army when they go to their lands to resist to occupation. Palestinian activists 
from the early years of the movement feel that the PA’s involvement killed the spirit of 
the movement. For Ayed Morrar, it was not the PA’s role to lead the people in this 
movement. Ayed shared, “If you are looking for struggle, don’t look for money, or don’t 
look for the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian Authority they are our life manager, not 
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our struggle leaders.”134 As evident from the interviews, in the early years the PA had 
expressed little interest in supporting the villagers in the struggle against the Wall, when 
support was most needed. As the movement gained media attention and focused on a 
joint model, the PA became involved for what is most likely for political reasons, and not 
to stop the Wall nor to secure self-determination through unarmed resistance. 
 
 
Elderly man from Beit Awa during a demonstration. Beit Awa February 2004 
 
Conclusion 
Israel meets all resistance against the occupation, whether armed or unarmed, 
with the Israeli triangle of violence. All Palestinian resistance is viewed as a threat to the 
Israeli state; therefore Israel frames those who resist as terrorists through cultural 
violence. Israel views resistance acts as threatening attempts to destabilize the colonial 
plans. For Beshara Doumani, “The Palestinians discovered that the closer they came to 
finding their own voice, the more they were perceived as a destabilizing force” (2007: 
53). Israel aims to conquer the land and control the indigenous Palestinian population by 
any means possible, and the use of the violence triangle is essential to this plan. Israel 	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considers Palestinians to be embodying a political identity through their mere existence, 
and does not permit their resistance. Frantz Fanon explains this fact in Wretched of the 
Earth: “The colonized, underdeveloped man today is a political creature in the most 
global sense of the term” (1963: 40). Palestinian resistance is political action not 
permitted by Israel, and unarmed resistance is the biggest threat due to its ability to 
weaken cultural violence and transform the narrative. 
Activists used nonviolent tactics in the popular struggle against the Wall to 
include more participation and combat cultural violence. More Palestinian people and 
solidarity activists joined the movement, and fewer injuries or killings were likely in 
unarmed struggles, in contrast to armed resistance. The tactics inspired solidarity activists 
to join in the struggle, increasing the numbers of those resisting the Wall. The tactics also 
created a more sustainable movement than those used in armed resistance. For Dudouet, 
“It is argued that the results achieved through NVR are likely to be more permanent and 
satisfactory than those achieved through violence” (2008: 18). Armed struggle enhances 
Israel’s use of cultural violence, enabling direct and structural violence to continue. The 
use of unarmed means against the occupation lasted for over ten years and continues 
today, reducing the power of cultural violence and creating an imbalance in the violence 
triangle.	  
The civil resistance movement against the Wall has maintained a presence, 
spanning the West Bank and gaining notoriety within activist communities over the 
years, increasing the movement’s strength. Although the movement has actively engaged 
in unarmed resistance, over the past ten years, it has not been able to obtain large-scale 
international attention or sway mainstream opinions away from the false narrative Israel 
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has exported. Nevertheless, the movement, scholars, and global activists have brought 
attention to the cause. Although the struggle against the Wall did not stop its construction 
or settlement expansion, it did successfully combat Israeli cultural violence through 
nonviolent means and by sharing information outside of affected areas. The mass 
participation in the popular struggle over the past ten years exposes Israel’s triangle of 
violence and shapes the movement’s next steps.	  
 
 
Women’s demonstration. Mas’ha. April 2004 
 
Israel imposes more direct and structural violence onto the Palestinian people as a 
result of the resistance to the Wall.  A shift away from grassroots, on-the-ground tactics 
was essential for the continuation of Palestinian popular resistance. The struggle against 
the Wall successfully resisted Israel’s cultural violence with unarmed methods, ultimately 
exposing Israel’s violence triangle to international and Israeli communities. This shifted 
the narrative from "Palestinian as terrorist perpetrating the violence" to "Palestinian as 
victim of Israeli violence." The shift in narrative aided the next unarmed struggle against 
Israel’s colonial violence: the decentralized, Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) 
campaign. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In this dissertation, I have analyzed the violence triangle in the extreme 
contemporary situation of the Apartheid Wall. By focusing on the Wall, I highlighted the 
various ways in which Israel uses the violence triangle in their efforts to maintain the 
occupation. The detail in which I analyzed the Wall throughout this dissertation supports 
the claim that Israel built the Wall for two distinct political reasons, and not for security. 
First, the construction of the Wall erases the Green-Line, rendering it obsolete, which has 
in turn allowed Israel to seize more Palestinian lands for the expansion of Israeli 
settlements, thus limiting the prospects of a future Palestinian state.  Second, the Wall 
limits collective action against the violence triangle by separating the indigenous people 
from each other in an attempt to control them and deter dissent. These political 
implications emphasize the need to resist the triangle of violence. For grassroots civil 
resistance to effectively resist Israeli violence, all aspects - structural, direct, and cultural 
- of the violence triangle must be addressed. In particular, a grassroots effort to initially 
combat cultural violence will facilitate a shift in the mainstream narrative, positioning 
Israel as the aggressor and the Palestinians as the victims to Israeli violence. Reframing 
the narrative will shift the power of Israel’s cultural violence. This shift will build the 
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civil resistance movement by engaging with a larger audience, thus enhancing the 
effectiveness of the movement against the violence triangle. 
Although Israel has attempted to use the violence triangle for their political 
aspirations of colonizing more Palestinian land through the establishment of the Wall, all 
the while prefacing the Wall as a security measure, my dissertation provides ample 
evidence to successfully combat these claims and expose Israeli violence. The 
construction of the Wall exposed an international activist community to the violence of 
the Israeli state. This created an opening for grassroots movements to combat the 
dominant discourses circulated by the Israeli state. In other words, grassroots movements 
can transform these dominant narratives, a form of cultural violence in themselves, by 
transforming the narrative from "Palestinian as terrorist perpetrating the violence", to one 
of "Palestinian as victim of Israeli violence." My dissertation provides a comprehensive 
study of the intertwined forms of Israeli violence enacted by the Wall, and it will be an 
invaluable resource for ongoing nonviolent Palestinian resistance movements. Nonviolent 
resistance, in order to be effective, requires mass participation. By combating the cultural 
violence of Israeli state narratives, grassroots movements can expand their base of 
support, thus enhancing the larger nonviolent resistance campaign for Palestinian self-
determination. 
  This dissertation makes several distinct interventions into the fields of peace 
studies and Palestine studies. I bridge the gap between activism and academia, which is a 
valuable resource for activists/scholars, making this dissertation a model on how to use 
participatory research methods within social movements and communicate this 
knowledge through academic disciplines. The use of such detailed first-hand accounts to 
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analyze the Wall provides a comprehensive study outside of human rights reporting. 
Palestine as a case study is not a new concept in academia, yet through the numerous 
testimonials; this dissertation brought the voice of the Palestinian people affected by the 
Wall into conversation with each other from a grassroots approach. These robust 
narratives support my claim in reframing the narrative. The testimonials expressed 
throughout this dissertation contradict the U.S. mainstream narrative, and expose Israel’s 
violence triangle.  
The use of photography throughout this dissertation has reframed the narrative. 
As Brace-Govan highlights, “Although images are unavoidably subjective, they also open 
up new spaces for discussion, exchange, collaboration and interpretation that are not 
necessarily easily accessible” (2007: 744). The photos represent a visual ethnography, the 
documentary fieldwork extending over a decade. These images visually reveal the initial 
violence of the Apartheid Wall. The nonviolent resistance movement, in opposition to the 
Wall’s construction, and the completed structure throughout Palestinian towns and 
villages are also exposed through these images. Photography, as an alternative means of 
data, is a beneficial technique for exposing violence; the images make it more difficult to 
disregard the realities on the ground. As Olesen notes, “photographs claim an analogical 
relationship with reality” (2013: 6). The images are in direct conversation with the text, 
and position the image within the political realm of the analysis. Using photography and 
testimonial narratives together, the “photograph is potentially transformed from an 
“object” with no associated meaning to a symbol with universalized meaning” (Olesen, 
2013: 6). Incorporating these photos enhanced the argument, and in collaboration with 
the text, exposed the violence triangle in a graphic manner.  
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With such a powerful opponent of cultural violence, the use of a mixed data 
collection assisted in the reframing of the narrative from Palestinian as the aggressor to 
one of victim to Israeli violence. Violence used by the colonizer is not a new concept for 
colonial aspirations, as Frantz Fanon highlights, 
 “It is not enough for the settler to delimit physically, that is to say with 
the help of the army and the police force, the place of the native. As if to 
show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints the 
native as a sort of quintessence of evil. Native society is not simply 
described as a society lacking in values. It is not enough for the colonist to 
affirm that those values have disappeared from, or still better never existed 
in, the colonial world. The native is declared insensible to ethics; he 
represents not only the absence of values, but also the negation of values” 
(Fanon 1963: 32). 
 
In essence, Fanon argues that the colonizer not only uses direct violence to oppress the 
colonized, but the use of cultural violence is also present through the presentation of the 
native in society as not having values. Israel, as the colonizer, has used cultural violence 
against the indigenous Palestinian people as a means to justify their structural and 
cultural violence in their settler-colonial goals. Mixed media supported my argument that 
Israel uses the violence triangle for colonial objectives, and not through their cultural 
violence discourse of security. 
Cultural violence was employed by Israel to such an extreme extent that it also 
penetrated throughout the U.S. society. Mainstream media narratives supported Israel’s 
claims of security, while Israel was continually utilizing the violence triangle against 
Palestinian civilians, as proven throughout this dissertation. Galtung argues that cultural 
violence, through the “culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into 
seeing exploitation and/or repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them 
(particularly -not exploitation) at all” (Galtung, 1990: 295). Palestinian activists, and 
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Palestine solidarity activists, are challenged with the task of resisting cultural violence as 
a means to reframe the narrative and engage a larger audience. If Palestinian or solidarity 
activists were to merely confront direct or structural violence, Israel’s cultural violence 
campaign would increase, positioning the resistance as terrorism, even if nonviolent 
means were utilized. Israel, recognizing the power of the nonviolent movement against 
the Wall, enhanced direct and structural violence on the ground to repress the movement. 
Combating cultural violence, through knowledge production regarding Israeli violence, 
supports the expansion of the anti-occupation movement, thus limiting Israel’s authority 
over the narrative.  
The theoretical framework used to argue the violence of the Wall, and ways to 
combat the violence triangle with unarmed resistance, is beneficial for social movement 
scholars. Galtung’s theory of violence is critical for nonviolent social movements 
attempting to transform extreme violence into peace. The goal of resistance is to 
eliminate the violence triangle in total, yet this eradication of violence is a process. 
Although the violence triangle is enforced differently within each cultural setting, 
initially focusing on cultural resistance will support the reframing of the mainstream 
narrative. The use of nonviolence, or unarmed resistance, as a means of struggle 
strengthens the success of the movement. It is essential to expose the violence, and not 
provide counter violence as the focus. By exposing the violence triangle to activists’ 
communities, cultural violence capabilities are weakened, and larger audiences are 
willing to join the struggle. This model targets the roots of the violence through 
identification of the triangle, thus enhancing resistance techniques and effectiveness. 
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Histories of Palestinian Resistance 
Resisting the violence triangle with nonviolence is not isolated to the anti-Wall 
movement. The Palestinian activists within the struggle against the Wall were products of 
a long history of resistance against the violence triangle. Historically, Palestinians 
resisted occupying forces since the early 1800s. Resistance was not a new practice during 
the Wall’s construction. Qumsiyeh illustrated how Palestinians resisted foreign 
dominance as early as the Ottoman Empire (2011: 36). Palestinians’ struggle for self-
determination continued when Israel colonized their land. However, as their context 
changed over time, Palestinians’ resistance methods also transformed. In contemporary 
struggles, Palestinian protestors utilized various tactics to work toward self-
determination. Certain tactics brought the Palestinian resistors closer to their goals than 
others. The two Intifadas shaped the popular movement against the Wall, posing both 
obstacles and lessons. Those who lived in the path of the Wall learned from previous 
struggles against the occupation, incorporating unarmed tactics that proved successful for 
the First Intifada, and objecting to the armed tactics that failed the Second Intifada. 
Palestinian anti-Wall Activists hoped to use nonviolent coercion to leverage their power, 
as had proven successful in the First Intifada. The Palestinian people transformed some 
realities on the ground by disobeying Israeli structural violence. For Johansen, “These 
types of power can be influenced by changing the level of cooperation” (2007: 149). The 
activists that participated in the resistance to the Wall incorporated various unarmed 
resistance methods to combat the structural violence of the Wall in an all-inclusive 
movement, inviting solidarity activists to participate. This was an important tactical 
decision; Israeli cultural violence was so pervasive that Palestinians struggling alone 
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against the Wall could have turned fatal, as was proven in several cases where solidarity 
activists were not present. The use of unarmed methods in the First Intifada reframed the 
media narrative, and this was a goal for the struggle against the Wall. 
Examining the two Intifadas shows how the use of resistance tactics frames the 
narrative, and how the struggle against the Wall learns from the previous movement. The 
anti-Wall resistance needed to develop tactics to support the reframing of the narrative to 
one of Palestinian as victim to Israeli violence, and build from the previous resistance 
movements, such as both the First and Second Intifada. The First Intifada was a 
successful, grassroots, anti-occupation movement. Due to mass participation, and the use 
of nonviolent tactics, the movement was strong enough to reframe the narrative, coercing 
Israel into the Oslo Accords negotiations, which Israel otherwise would not have 
participated in. Unwilling to relinquish control, Israel used this “peace” agreement as a 
guise to enforce and enhance violence within the Occupied Territories. These 
negotiations enabled Israel to enforce a larger presence in the West Bank and heavily 
monitor Palestinians with a set of structural violence implements. The enhanced violence 
triangle, a result of the Oslo Accords, suffocated those living under occupation. 
Frustrated by the failed attempt at self-determination, the Palestinian people resisted 
Israeli violence another time, yet with different tactics. 
Armed resistance benefits Israel in framing all Palestinian people as “terrorists”, 
collectively employing more cultural violence, and thus overshadowing the ever-present 
violence triangle. As we saw from the Second Intifada, cultural and structural violence 
were increased as a result of armed tactics. The Second Intifada took place in a new 
context, shaped by the Bantustans under Israel’s constant surveillance. Activists of the 
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Second Intifada utilized varying tactics. Although some used unarmed resistance, most 
resisters used armed methods, which shaped the struggle’s outcome, resulting in 
numerous deaths and fewer Palestinians engaged in the movement. This approach was 
not sustainable as an anti-occupation resistance movement. With the ability to enhance 
cultural violence, Israel created the Wall to respond to the Second Intifada. This added 
strength to the violence triangle by introducing a large-scale form of structural violence, 
and further discouraged mass participation against the colonial forces. Once again, the 
landscape shifted, impeding activists’ abilities to organize. Those living outside of the 
areas affected by the Wall were unaware of the dangers it would cause, while Palestinians 
living in areas affected by the Wall were compelled to resist. The communities along the 
path of the Wall were forced to either resist the continual land grab or exist in an 
uninhabitable environment. 
The use of unarmed tactics is essential for movements to be effective in resisting 
cultural violence, especially in the case of Israel’s occupation. Israel’s triangle of 
violence consistently escalated over time, especially during the resistance to the Wall. 
Due to heightened direct and structural violence, the anti-occupation struggle could not 
combat the violence triangle in total. By focusing on cultural violence, the resistance 
movement was able to penetrate the violence triangle and weaken it. Although Israel used 
direct violence against the nonviolent protestors, Israel could not stop the resistance 
movement from penetrating the cultural violence, and weakening it. The use of 
nonviolent pragmatic techniques exposed communities outside of the West Bank to 
Israel’s ongoing violence triangle through information sharing. Those who joined in 
solidarity reported back to their communities about the layers of violence the Palestinian 
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people were experiencing. As a result, more solidarity activists, especially those from the 
Israeli left, attended the demonstrations. As Gene Sharp states, “By combining nonviolent 
discipline with solidarity and persistence in struggle, the nonviolent actionists cause the 
violence of the opponents’ repression to be exposed in the worst possible light” (Sharp, 
2005: 657). Israel was violent towards Palestinians long before solidarity activists were 
on the ground to witness it. The fact that the world became interested after information 
circulated internationally about Israel’s violence exposes the subtle cultural violence 
within leftist communities inside Israel and abroad.  
Through their positions of privilege, solidarity activists spread the news of 
Palestinian civilians subjected to Israeli violence through alternative media outlets. In a 
pragmatic nonviolence framework, this is termed “nonviolent intervention.” For 
Johansen, “These are actions in which some form of direct involvement from someone 
who originally was not part of the conflict takes place” (2007: 149). Palestinians’ reports 
of their daily encounters with Israeli violence are largely ignored as “normal,” while 
reports from individuals who do not directly experience Israeli violence are regarded as 
important. Nevertheless, through solidarity activists’ disseminating information, larger 
audiences were exposed to Israeli violence. Through the support of international and 
Israeli activists sharing information, reframing the narrative was possible. This is an 
through the support of, and an essential part of the nonviolent resistance movement 
against the Wall.  
 Detailing the violence triangle through the case of the Wall highlights the political 
significance of the Wall as an Israeli tool, unilaterally dissolving of the 1967 Green-Line 
through the path, seizing Palestinian land, while simultaneously inhibiting any Palestinian 
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dissent. This dissertation has demonstrated that Israel is the source of the violence, and 
thus a shift begins in the narrative from one of security to one of land expropriation. U.S. 
mainstream media positions Israel as the victim in need of  “security,” reproducing this 
false narrative.  Activists’ communities have the ability to use the evidence produced 
throughout this dissertation in their quest to reframe the narrative. 
 
Political Implications of the Wall 
The Apartheid Wall exemplifies how Israel’s triangle of violence functions to 
oppress the indigenous Palestinian people to steal their land. This dissertation has 
emphasized, through the development of the chapters, how Israel uses the Wall as a tool 
to conquer more Palestinian land for Israeli settler-colonial aims, ultimately dissolving 
the Green-Line. I historicize the triangle of violence within the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories in part one to argue that the triangle of violence is not a new outline for Israeli 
political objectives. Rather, direct, structural and cultural violence has been employed 
throughout Israeli history as a method of suppressing the Palestinian population. By 
providing this context in the beginning of the dissertation, I expose the longstanding use 
of violence in Israel’s initial movement for statehood in 1948, and its use of intertwined 
forms of violence as a method to maintain overall control of the land, and the indigenous 
population, throughout the successive years. The focus on Israeli aggression exposes the 
reader to Israel’s capacity to continuously violate the occupied civilian population. This 
historical overview reinforces later claims of Israel’s ongoing violence in regards to the 
Wall violence, initially introduced in Chapter Three. The testimonies expose the use of 
the violence triangle by Israel to conquer Palestinian land. The photos added throughout 
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the texts support the evidence that Israel utilized extreme violence in the dispossession of 
Palestinian lands and resources. The dispossession of Palestinian land is thoroughly 
discussed to lay claim to the extreme loss the Palestinian people experienced through the 
establishment of the Wall.  By detailing the Wall in such as way, it is clear that the path 
was not for security, as Israel claims, but to steal more Palestinian land. This land is used 
for settler expansion, and reinforces the Apartheid system within the West Bank. The 
most important part of the results of the Wall’s path is that it unilaterally dissolves the 
Green-Line. Palestinian aspirations for statehood appear grim due to the violence triangle 
of the Wall separating the land into numerous enclaves. This dissertation provides 
sufficient evidence that the Wall was a political strategy for colonial aspirations, and thus 
needs to be exposed to reframe the narrative. 
 The Wall curbs collective action, which is necessary for nonviolent resistance. As 
a result violence is deemed the only possible response against the triangle of violence. 
 Collective action had proven fruitful for Palestinians resisting the violence triangle 
during the First Intifada, when the realities on the ground were accommodating. Israel 
increased the violence triangle to enforce limitations on dissent, as we see from the 
Second Intifada. The lack of widespread collective action was in part due to the armed 
tactics, but the fragmentation of the Occupied Territories played a role in the use of 
tactics employed. The establishment of the Wall increased the separation of Palestinian 
communities, and structural violence implements were increased through the integrated 
network, as was detailed in Chapter Four. The triangle of violence enabled the 
establishment of the Wall; Israel’s cultural violence campaign was effectively used to 
legitimize the Wall to the Israeli public, all through the guise of a security measure, while 
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Israeli settler and soldiers enforced direct violence to repress the Palestinian people. The 
continued use of fragmenting the Palestinian people, all the while utilizing extreme 
violence upon them, reduces the prospects of an end to armed Palestinian resistance.  
As seen in the case of the Second Intifada, dissent was still present but it was also more 
dangerous. The case of the Wall compounds this relationship of opportunity for collective 
nonviolent action and resistance methods. As Wendy Pearlman addresses,  
When a movement is cohesive, it enjoys the organizational power to 
mobilize mass participation, enforce strategic discipline, and contain 
disruptive dissent. In consequence, cohesion increases the possibility that 
a movement will use nonviolent protest. Inversely, when a movement is 
fragmented, it lacks the leadership, institutions, and collective purpose to 
coordinate and constrain its members (2011: 2). 
 
Pearlman is arguing on behalf of internal fragmentation within movements, yet I see this 
as an important factor in regards to the physical landscape. The structurally violent 
implements restrict Palestinian movement; hence restrict future opportunities for 
widespread nonviolent collective action. The strength of nonviolence is having large 
numbers of activists collectively resisting against a common opponent with a specific 
message. In the case of the Wall, stopping the construction was the initial aim, and with 
time the resistance asserted an end to settlements. Without the opportunity for collective 
dissent, a reliance on sporadic violent resistance is regarded as the only response for 
Palestinians seeking to counter to the violence of the occupation. Confining Palestinians 
into the West Bank through the establishment of the Wall will not “secure” Israel, but 
rather will merely cage the indigenous people through the violence triangle, of which 
these sporadic reactions will occur. These acts will work towards the advantage of the 
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Israeli state, maintaining their efforts of cultural violence and maintaining their false 
narrative.  
 In the case of the Jerusalem Envelope, sporadic acts of violent resistance against 
the violence triangle have enhanced the mainstream media narrative, even if the claims 
were not verified as correct. Mainstream media narratives position Israel as the victim, all 
the while not recognizing the existence of the Palestinian residents in Jerusalem living 
under the violence triangle. As described in Chapter Five, Palestinians are systematically 
being pushed out of East Jerusalem, while Israeli settlements are flourishing. The use of 
the violence triangle is exacerbated in this area, settler communities encroaching on 
Palestinian homes, while Palestinians are targeted as potential terrorists through each 
move they make, and essentially expelled out of the city through structural violence. This 
direct, cultural and structural violence, which is experienced on an ongoing basis by the 
Jerusalemites, came to a head throughout the fall of 2015, when several Palestinian youth 
were murdered for stabbing Israelis. Sporadic acts of Palestinian violence, as a reaction to 
the continued Israeli violence triangle, have been at the forefront of the U.S. mainstream 
media. This framing attempts to maintain the narrative of the aggressive Palestinian 
without exposing the historical and ongoing triangle of violence that motivated these 
isolated acts.  My work contributes to fields of activism and research by exposing the 
realities of Israel use of the violence triangle onto the Palestinian people. The significance 
of my work is that the application of the violence triangle, in regards to the Wall, 
participates in shifting the dominant narrative. This fear, this cultural violence, of the 
“potential Palestinian terrorist” has resulted in the murders of several unarmed 
Palestinians in suspicion of terrorist activity, with whom several were exonerated after 
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death. Ali Abunimah wrote an article for the Electronic Intifada on October 4, 2015 
entitled “Death-Chanting Israeli Mob Rejoices as Palestinian Teen is Executed”. This 
article exposes the mob mentality that exists within the Jerusalem Envelope as the result 
of rampant cultural violence. As Abunimah explains in regards to the video of a young 
Palestinian man being shot, “celebratory voices are heard shouting, “Yes! Yes! Son of a 
bitch!” and “Wow!” and “He’s an Arab!” “Death to the Arabs!” others shout” (2015). 
The perpetrators of the violence in this video are Israeli settlers and the Israeli police, 
who take the word of the settler mob, and shoot the Palestinian teen before knowing if he 
had even committed a crime. This provides more evidence to the ways cultural violence 
facilitates direct violence towards Palestinians, and how this is exacerbated in the 
Jerusalem Envelope. These incidents are an increase in direct violence by both the Israeli 
settlers and soldiers throughout the West Bank, and have exacerbated the cultural 
violence throughout Israeli society. There is a need to change popular narrative; my work 
could serve as a resource for this. By analyzing the violence of the Wall in such depth, I 
challenge the mainstream narrative with the objective of reframing it. Understanding the 
context to which Palestinians live at the mercy of Israeli violence reinforces the claims 
for resistance in a nonviolent manner, thus supporting the Palestinian solidarity 
movement. This study will allow international and Israeli activists communities to 
identity the violence triangle, and therefore Israeli cultural violence against Palestinians 
becomes ineffective. 
 
 
 
	   352	  
Looking Forward 
 The newest phase Palestinian resistance is not restricted by the violence triangle 
in comparison to the struggle against the Wall. Palestinian resistance continues to grow 
with each struggle; each intifada provides lessons for the next in the quest to combat 
Israeli violence for the goal of self-determination. The struggle against the Wall did not 
eliminate the violence triangle, but it did develop a strong base of activists, and 
reinforced the reframing of the narrative. This in turn successfully combated cultural 
violence against Palestinians within activists’ communities, and enlarged the movement. 
A larger collective of Palestine solidarity activists has proven useful for the next phase of 
Palestinian anti-occupation resistance, the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) 
campaign. The BDS movement began on July 9, 2005, and was founded exactly one year 
after the ICJ decision, which declared the Wall illegal. This is an important, symbolic 
date, it is apparent that the Wall is a form of Israeli violence that the Palestinian people 
unite around. It was clear to Palestinian civil society that the resistance to the Wall and 
the international courts could not combat Israel’s Apartheid Wall, or achieve “positive 
peace,” which is the absence of the violence triangle. The limitations of the grassroots 
movement against the Wall decelerated the resistance aims on the ground due to 
enhanced Israeli violence. Direct and structural violence repressed those that attempted to 
continue to struggle on the ground. The Wall was eventually established and actively 
imprisons the population located in the West Bank. BDS offered an alternative 
nonviolent resistance movement that Israel could not penetrate using the similar violence. 
Through the use of large-scale, third party intervention, the BDS campaign relied on the 
international community to join this new phase of nonviolent struggle. The organizers of 
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the movement realized that unless Israel was forced, it would never relinquish control 
over the indigenous Palestinian people or, importantly, their land.  
The triangle of violence lacked the ability to impede the BDS movement, as a 
global structure, direct and structural violence were ineffective. Emulating the successful 
anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa, this new movement aimed to create a new, 
global campaign focusing on Israeli apartheid. As it was a continuation, BDS took 
lessons from the previous resistance movements. BDS recognized the First Intifada’s 
successful economic boycotts, which challenged Israel’s economic stability. In the First 
Intifada: 
The Palestinian strategy of unlinking the West Bank and Gaza strip from 
their dependency on the occupier through economic self-reliance had 
some negative effects on the Israeli economy. For instance, the boycott of 
Israeli goods resulted in a 40% decline in exports to the occupied 
territories in 1988, and a $300 million loss for Israeli businesses (Dudouet, 
2008: 16). 
 
Boycotts were largely free of direct and structural violence, though not completely, and 
effectively coerced Israel into transforming their violence. In addition to lessons from the 
First Intifada, the BDS movement, unlike the anti-Wall struggle, was free of geographic 
constraints. Direct and structural violence were more difficult for Israel to enforce when 
the majority of activists resisted outside of Israel’s grasp, in international and Israeli 
communities. Israel did harass prominent Palestinian BDS leaders, but in much more 
subtle ways.  
In accordance with the anti-Wall struggle, and to develop a movement free of 
internal cultural violence, the Palestinian civil society established BDS as a Palestinian-
led movement. According to Omar Barghouti in his book, BDS: The Global Struggle for 
Justice:  
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More than 170 Palestinian civil society groups, including all major 
political parties, refugee rights associations, trade union federations, 
women’s unions, NGO networks, and virtually the entire spectrum of 
grassroots organizations, recalled how people of conscience in the 
international community have “historically shouldered the moral 
responsibility to fight injustice, as exemplified in the struggle to abolish 
apartheid in South Africa,” calling upon international civil society 
organizations and people of conscience all over the world to “impose 
broad boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar 
to those applied in South Africa in the apartheid era (2011: 5). 
 
Palestinian self-determination is first and foremost a Palestinian cause. Those in 
solidarity must respect Palestinian leadership as well as their desired goals. As solidarity 
activists, we must not recreate the violence triangle within the anti-occupation movement, 
or assert our privilege. Solidarity activists have an important role in the BDS movement, 
utilizing the myriad of skills, within the context of their communities, strengthens the 
movement and thus it becomes more effective as a global anti-occupation movement.  
 As Israel intensifies the violence triangle, the media cannot ignore Israeli 
violence. Even if the narrative is falsely framed, a larger audience is introduced to Israeli 
violence, and countless find their way to participate in the BDS campaign. Activists draw 
their activities from a Palestinian body inside the Occupied Territory, known as the 
Boycott National Committee, which is the central command of the decentralized 
resistance movement. The committee has created guidelines for the thousands of global 
activists supporting the Palestinian people’s struggle. As the movement is decentralized 
and global, and international solidarity activists play a vital role remotely, violence 
triangle implements do not control the BDS movement. Solidarity activists in various 
countries demonstrate as they wish in various cultural contexts in partnership with BDS 
and their guidelines. BDS has operated for over ten years, maintaining the struggle with 
	   355	  
increased momentum. In fear of the BDS movement’s power, Israel has enlisted its allies 
to enforce restrictions on the BDS movement, with no success. The use of nonviolent 
tactics within the BDS movement supports the resistance, and assists in reframing the 
narrative, which is what Israel is most concerned about. As Israel escalates violence 
against the Palestinian people, more solidarity activists join the BDS movement. This 
style of resistance enables those outside the region, and in Israel proper, to engage in a 
nonviolent struggle for justice and freedom. 
 In summary, this dissertation has discussed in depth the violence triangle through 
the establishment of the Wall, and the resistance movement against the Wall from 2002-
2013. Israel’s use of the violence triangle has aided their political aims of conquering 
more land, and repressing the Palestinian people, but resistance is still active, Israel has 
not been able to defeat the Palestinian nonviolent movements. The BDS movement aims 
to end the occupation and establishing freedom and equality, and as it stands, has the 
power to do so. The reframing of the narrative has been successful thus far, cultural 
violence is weakened daily and activists’ communities continue to expose Israel’s 
violence. This dissertation will provide them with more authority to do so. However, the 
end of the occupation is not the end goal. BDS, the struggle against the Wall, and each 
movement that preceded them, aims for self-determination of the Palestinian people.  
Moving forward, the realities on the ground, through the violence triangle, inhibit 
the prospect of a Palestinian state next to an Israeli state, known as the Two State 
Solution. This is a direct result of Israel rendering the Green-Line obsolete through the 
establishment of the Wall and embedding Israeli settlements throughout the West Bank. 
The first hand experience of living in a structurally violence system underscores to the 
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Palestinian people located inside the Occupied Territory that two states, in this manner, is 
not sustainable. As Ali Abunimah notes in One Country, a Bold Proposal to End the 
Israel-Palestinian Impasse,  
“The disparities between those with rights and those without become more 
glaring every day, ordinary Palestinians are being pushed by their own 
experiences to view the conflict more in terms of individual rights than 
national rights - and this is more noticeable in the countryside than among 
Palestinian opinion makers” (2006: 63). 
 
Palestinians have been seeking statehood for several decades, and nationalism has been 
the impetus for the resistance movements. Israel’s use of the violence triangle has 
transformed the discussion, and has inadvertently assisted activists on both sides of the 
Wall in their desire for one democratic state for both the Israeli and Palestinian 
populations. With no longer a need to maintain an occupation, by way of the violence 
triangle, one binational state would alleviate the majority of the violence currently 
experienced. This one-state would eradicate the concept of a state based on religious 
privilege, but a state based on peace.	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